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ABSTRACT 
 
Lindsay Thompson Munn: Team Dynamics and Learning Behavior in Hospitals:  
A Study of Error Reporting by Nurses 
(Under the direction of Cheryl B. Jones) 
 
 
 Error reporting is the primary way that hospitals identify errors and near misses, and 
it is essential for organizational learning and improvement to occur.  However, it is widely 
recognized that errors in hospitals are significantly underreported.  As a result, there are 
numerous lost opportunities for health care organizations to learn from errors and improve 
the care delivered to patients. 
 The purpose of this study was to use the model of work-team learning as the 
theoretical foundation to examine the error reporting behaviors of nurses.  The study 
examined the team factors of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety 
and their effect on nurses’ error reporting. 
 A cross-sectional, descriptive design was used for the study.  Data were collected 
from nurses and nurse managers through self-administered surveys.  The research questions 
of the study were answered with data from up to 814 nurses and 43 nurse managers using 
methods for modeling correlated outcomes.  Bootstrap confidence intervals with bias 
correction were used to determine the mediating effect of psychological safety. 
 The results of the study demonstrated that the team factors of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety positively predicted nurses’ perceptions of the 
frequency of error reporting on their unit.  Furthermore, the results indicated that these same 
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team factors of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety negatively 
predicted the number of error reports that nurses reported submitting over a 12-month period.  
The study findings also showed that psychological safety mediated the relationship between 
the interprofessional relationships dimension of the safety climate and nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting frequency on their unit as well as the relationship between leader 
inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency on their unit. 
 This study’s findings underscore the complexity of error reporting in hospitals and the 
need for more advanced research methods that allow for deeper investigation and explanation 
of error reporting in hospitals.  This study lays the groundwork for future study by 
demonstrating the importance of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological 
safety to help explain error reporting by nurses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The identification of errors that occur in the treatment of patients is central to the 
ability of hospitals to learn from errors and thereby improve the quality and safety of care 
delivered to patients (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2000; Leape, 2002).  However, research 
indicates that errors in hospitals are grossly underreported (Levinson 2012; Sari, Sheldon, 
Cracknell, & Turnbull, 2006).  As a result, countless opportunities to improve quality and 
safety in hospitals by learning from errors are missed because errors are not reported.  Past 
studies of error reporting have often lacked a strong theoretical foundation to inform the 
relationships and variables of study examined (Holden & Karsh, 2007; Russo, Buonocore, & 
Ferrara, 2015).  This study will assess unit/team level factors that affect error reporting, 
specifically the variables of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety 
derived from the model of work-team learning (Edmondson, 1999).  Such an approach will 
enhance our understanding of clinician error reporting behaviors and help to identify 
improvements that may foster better error reporting in hospitals. 
Background 
In 2000, the IOM released a landmark report, To Err is Human, the first in a series of 
reports on quality and safety of patient care.  This report brought national attention to the 
number of patient care errors that occur in the U.S. health care system, particularly in 
hospitals.  It acknowledged that error reporting provides factual documentation of errors and 
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near misses, and gives healthcare leaders the knowledge needed to improve the safety and 
quality of care delivered to patients.  This report also called for the expansion of error-
reporting activities in hospitals to enhance organizational learning1 (IOM, 2000; Leape, 
2002).  The IOM recommendations have led to the universal adoption of error-reporting 
systems in hospitals nationwide as a mechanism to facilitate clinicians’ reporting of errors as 
they occur, and as a way for organizations to learn from these recorded errors (Farley, 
Haviland, Haas, & Pham, 2010; Levinson, 2012; Mitchell, Schuster, Smith, Pronovost, & 
Wu, 2016). 
From an organizational learning perspective, error reporting is viewed as valuable 
because it provides an opportunity to learn from failures and near misses (Edmondson, 
2004).  However, it is difficult for leaders of organizations to take actions that promote 
learning from errors because organizational structures often prevent error identification and 
social factors may inhibit transparent discussion and analysis of errors in a way that 
facilitates collective learning by the organization (Canon & Edmondson, 2005).  
Subsequently, relatively few organizations truly learn from their errors (Canon & 
Edmondson, 2005).  Canon and Edmondson (2005) identified three essential elements that 
must exist for organizational learning to occur: organizations must identify errors, they must 
evaluate them, and they must engage in purposeful experimentation to address these errors.  
Formal error reporting is the foundation of organizational learning because it initiates 
evaluation of errors and the development of interventions or experimentations to address 
them. 
 
                                                 
1 Organizational learning is an area of organizational science that proposes organizations, like individuals, learn 
from experiences (Argyris & Schön, 1996; de Feijter, de Grave, & Koopmans, 2012). 
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Errors and Error Reporting 
Error-related events in patient care include both actual errors and near misses in 
preventive care, diagnosis, and treatment (Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012; IOM, 2000; Taylor 
et al., 2004).  Errors are defined as the unintended outcome of care that may or may not 
result in physical harm to the patient, while near misses are defined as potential errors that 
could have resulted in actual harm to a patient if not intercepted by clinicians or other means 
(Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012; IOM, 2000).  Error reporting is the communication of errors 
and near misses to managers and healthcare administrators (Leape, 2002).  Throughout this 
dissertation, the term “errors” encompass both near misses and errors because error reporting 
typically captures both types of events. 
 Errors in healthcare are caused by both human error and system factors (Garrouste-
Orgeas et al., 2012; IOM, 2000).  James Reason (2008), a noted patient safety researcher and 
theorist, said the following: 
Fallibility is part of the human condition.  Errors cannot be eradicated but they can be 
anticipated and managed accordingly.  We can’t fundamentally change the human 
condition, but we can change the conditions under which people work in order to 
make errors less likely and more easily recoverable. (p. 34) 
 
As Reason (2008) asserted, human error is a relatively unchangeable characteristic of 
individuals that renders admonitions for increased vigilance or individual efforts by 
healthcare providers ineffective in reducing error (Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012).  Instead, 
system factors, elements of the work environment, and the processes in organizational 
systems must be changed in a way that shifts the culture from one of blaming and punishing 
individuals to one that examines and encourages organizational learning through 
introspection and analysis, and, in turn, supports individuals to do the right thing by reporting 
errors (IOM, 2000; Reason, 1998, 2000). 
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Error-Reporting Systems 
 Error-reporting systems are put in place by organizations as a mechanism to formally 
collect error reports.  An estimated 90% of hospitals have such systems in place (Mitchell, 
Schuster, Smith, Pronovost, & Wu, 2016).  The majority of error-reporting systems are 
voluntary, but some are mandatory (Robinson & Hughes, 2008).  Almost all error-reporting 
systems are confidential, meaning that no legal action can be taken for the reports filed.  
Some systems go a step further and are anonymous, keeping the identity secret of the 
individual reporting the error (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2014).  
Medication errors and patient falls generally account for the largest number of error reports 
submitted to error reporting systems (AHRQ, 2014).  Ideally, the purpose of error reporting 
systems is to promote organizational learning and improve the safety and quality of care.  In 
reality, however, error-reporting systems are often used for risk management purposes 
because errors that cause harm to patients also pose the threat of substantial litigation costs to 
hospitals (Helmreich, 2000). 
Error-reporting systems in hospitals necessarily rely on clinicians (e.g., nurses, 
physicians, pharmacists, etc.) to report errors.  Because individual clinicians are directly 
involved with errors by identifying them, observing them, or contributing to them, they are 
the ones who must ultimately report errors.  However, because most error reporting systems 
are voluntary; individuals may choose whether to report an error and how to report it.  Thus, 
error reporting in hospitals has both an organizational component through the formal 
reporting system as well as an individual component, because individuals can choose to    
identify and report errors through the system. 
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Error-reporting systems are the formal, primary way through which healthcare 
professionals report errors in hospitals (Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012; Levinson, 2012).  
Unfortunately, error-reporting systems are not always used in the way or to the degree 
intended.  Research demonstrates that healthcare professionals sometimes engage in 
“informal” reporting practices that include verbally discussing an error-related event with a 
manager or team colleague instead of making a formal report, which allows clinicians the 
opportunity to acknowledge that something happened while protecting themselves from 
being exposed for reporting or committing an error (Espin, Lingard, Baker, & Regehr, 2006; 
Espin et al., 2007; Hewitt & Chreim, 2015; Lederman, Dreyfus, Matchan, Knott, & Milton, 
2013).  Sometimes clinicians may forgo formal error reporting altogether if they are unsure 
of what constitutes an error (Levinson, 2012; Sari et al., 2006).  The reasons that individuals 
engage in formal or informal reporting practices or choose not to report an error at all are 
sometimes complex. 
Past Studies of Error Reporting 
We know that knowledge deficits related to what should be reported and the time-
consuming nature of error reporting are common reasons cited by clinicians for not reporting 
errors (Hartnell, MacKinnon, Sketris, & Fleming, 2012; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kaldjian et al., 
2008; Mayo & Duncan, 2004).  Past studies have also documented surprising findings related 
to error reporting.  In a study examining how healthcare professionals (e.g., nurses, 
physicians, and pharmacists) made a choice between fixing a safety problem and moving on 
with their work versus fixing the problem and then reporting it, researchers found that 
healthcare professionals refrained from reporting near misses because the error was not 
realized.  They also found that health professionals refrained from reporting safety problems 
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they could either fix themselves or were so common that the problem was accepted as part of 
the everyday work routine (Hewitt & Chreim, 2015).  These findings are similar to Tucker 
and Edmondson’s (2003) study of nurses in nursing units where they inferred that a lack of 
organizational learning from failures may be explained, in part, by empowerment of nurses to 
fix problems themselves.  
In a mixed-methods case study examining the effects of an electronic error-reporting 
system in two large Australian hospitals, researchers identified several barriers that inhibited 
error reporting.  These obstacles included the need for further training and familiarity with 
the system, fear of blame from others for reporting errors, and the use of informal error 
reporting (Lederman et al., 2013).  The researchers also found that clinicians sometimes 
engaged in error reporting system for more unexpected reasons, such as using it as a 
defensive tool to justify their clinical decisions or to protect themselves from the possibility 
of perceived future threats (e.g., threats of blame from the manager for clinical decisions).  
These findings are consistent with other qualitative studies reporting that clinicians used 
error-reporting systems as legal protection or to protect themselves from managers or 
physicians who they feared (Hartnell et al., 2012).  Studies have also documented that 
clinicians sometimes used the reporting system as a way to complain to upper management 
about problems in the work place that were not being addressed (Lederman et al., 2013).  
Thus, clinicians do or do not report error-related events for reasons that seem counter-
intuitive but reflect the complicated nature of error reporting.  
Similarly, the reasons that individuals forego formal error reporting in favor of 
informal reporting practices or not reporting errors at all are just as convoluted.  Informal 
error reporting practices include verbally notifying a manager or team colleague about an 
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error, documenting the error in a clinical note in the patient’s chart, or discussing the error 
with the multidisciplinary healthcare team during patient rounds (Espin et al., 2006, 2007; 
Lederman et al., 2013).  Studies indicate that these informal reporting practices fulfill 
clinicians’ felt obligations to report errors and thus explain why they may refrain from 
submitting an error report to the hospital error reporting system (Lederman et al., 2013).  The 
reasons that clinicians choose to engage in informal rather than formal methods differ.  In 
some cases, seemingly positive factors lead clinicians to forgo formal error reporting.  For 
example, one study (Espin et al., 2007) found that a clinician’s choice to discuss an error 
with a team colleague rather than formally reporting the error was significantly influenced by 
strong interpersonal dynamics within the team.  In this case, positive team dynamics were 
associated with informal reporting methods.  However, the same researchers found in another 
study that nurses were hesitant to report errors they observed by individuals with a higher 
scope of practice or those with whom they perceived a greater power differential, such as 
physicians (Espin et al., 2006, 2010).  Instead, nurses felt more comfortable informally 
reporting errors involving physicians by verbally discussing the events with a peer or nurse 
manager or documenting the events in a clinical note rather than submitting an error report. 
Existing research demonstrates that error reporting is a multifaceted phenomenon in 
hospitals, where there are multiple diverse and complicated reasons that explain why error-
reporting processes breakdown.  While much of the past research on error reporting has 
sought to identify facilitators and/or barriers to error reporting, these studies have not fully 
explained how more complex factors within an organization may affect error reporting by 
clinicians.  Theory and research from organizational and team literature may help to better 
explain the more complex reasons that clinicians do or not report errors in a way that past 
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research on error reporting has failed to do.  Based on past error reporting research, the 
variables of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety are especially 
relevant to understanding error reporting in hospitals, particularly in patient care units.  
Safety climate.  Past studies of error reporting indicate that the environment of the 
patient care unit where clinicians work is an important influence on error reporting 
(Edmondson, 1996); in particular, work environments where safety is prioritized encourage 
more error reporting (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013).  Past studies demonstrate that the safety 
climate, which is defined as the shared perceptions and experience of employees about the 
practices, policies, and procedures related to the safety of patients (Katz-Navon, Naveh, & 
Stern, 2005; Vogus, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010), is a characteristic of patient care units that 
have a higher incidence of error reporting.  A few past studies have examined the safety 
climate and similar concepts in relationship to error reporting.  These studies lend support for 
safety climate as an important factor to consider relative to error reporting (Naveh, Katz-
Navon, & Stern, 2006). 
Leader inclusiveness.  Past studies of error reporting have also demonstrated that 
leadership behavior is another important influence on error reporting.  In a study that 
examined how the behaviors of healthcare leaders (e.g., nurse managers, physicians, etc.) 
influenced error reporting and error management among their subordinates in hospital teams, 
findings demonstrated that leadership behavior related to safety was a more important 
influence on staff error reporting than the words they spoke (Van Dyck, Dimitrova, de 
Korne, & Hiddema, 2013).  Leader inclusiveness is when leaders are available, open, and 
accessible to employees by inviting input and demonstrating an appreciation for their 
contributions (Hirak, Peng, Carmeli, & Schaubroeck, 2012; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  
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Past organizational and team research underscores that leader inclusiveness is important to 
the functioning of patient care teams.  In particular, a past study demonstrated that leader 
inclusiveness led to greater team engagement in quality improvement intitiatives on nursing 
units (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  Similarly, some of the key behaviors embodied in 
leader inclusiveness (i.e., availability and accessibility of nurse managers) have been 
demonstrated to positively affect the willingness of clinicians to report errors (Edmondson, 
1996).  More research is needed to determine the effect of leader inclusiveness on error 
reporting, but findings from past team studies support the use of this variable to study error 
reporting.    
Psychological safety.  Past studies of error reporting also show that fear of reporting 
errors and speaking up about unsafe practices greatly inhibits error reporting.  In a study 
employing focus groups of clinicians to determine the facilitators and barriers to error 
reporting, researchers found that fear of retribution was one of the factors inhibiting error 
reporting (Hartnell et al., 2012).  Similarly, another study examining the use of an electronic 
error-reporting system in two hospitals in Australia found that fear of negative repercussions 
over reporting was a significant barrier to error reporting (Lederman et al., 2013).  
A concept similar to fear that has been explored more widely in the team and 
organizational literature is that of psychological safety, the degree to which individuals feel 
safe to speak up about problems or unsafe conditions in their work team (Edmondson, 1999).  
Recently, researchers studying error reporting in VA hospitals found that psychological 
safety was related to perceptions surrounding error reporting (Derickson, Fishman, Osatuke, 
Teclaw, & Ramsel, 2015).  While the study examined both psychological safety and error 
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reporting at the organizational level, the findings support the relationship between 
psychological safety and error reporting as well as demonstrate the need for more study. 
In summary, past research on error reporting supports numerous reasons that 
clinicians do and do not report errors.  Research on error reporting has not yet sufficiently 
explained the complexities of error reporting in hospitals.  Knowledge of this information is 
critical for addressing errors and improving the quality and safety of care in hospitals.  
Research from organizational and team science may help better explain the organizational 
and relational factors that affect error reporting.  Based on past research from these fields and 
research on error reporting, the variables of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and 
psychological safety seem to be particularly important factors to consider in relationship to 
error reporting. 
Nurses and Error Reporting 
The clinician group that most consistently uses error-reporting systems in hospitals is 
nurses (Farley et al., 2010; Levinson, 2012; Robinson & Hughes, 2008).  Past research also 
suggests that nurses are in an important position to identify errors and intervene to keep 
patients safe from harm.  For example, a study that examined errors in the Intensive Care 
Unit (ICU) of a hospital found that nurses intercepted as many as 62% of the errors observed 
by researchers, thereby preventing harm to patients (Rothschild et al., 2006).  Due to their 
important role in the healthcare team and their integral involvement in patient care, nurses 
have knowledge of errors and error reporting that is different from other clinicians and is 
therefore essential to examine when studying error reporting.  Thus, this study of error 
reporting focuses on nurses. 
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The Nursing Unit 
 The structure of patient care delivery and work in hospitals is hierarchical in nature.  
Both patients and nurses are admitted or report to work on nursing units in hospitals.  
Nursing units are grouped into departments, which are then organized in clusters within the 
hospital.  In recent years, hospitals are often part of a larger hospital system or affiliation of 
hospitals.  Importantly, the fundamental work group of the hospital is the nursing unit 
(Leppa, 1996).  That is, the care delivered to patients is predominantly delivered within the 
context of nursing units; moreover, the professional and institutional identity of nurses is tied 
to the unit where they work (Leppa, 1996).  
Nursing units are also unique, with distinctions that can vary from unit to unit.  For 
example, past studies demonstrate that error-reporting rates can vary significantly between 
units in a hospital (Edmondson, 1996).  In a study of learning from errors conducted in 
different nursing units across several hospitals, Edmondson (1996) found that error detection 
rates, which were measured in part by the number of errors reported, varied between units of 
a hospital.  In explaining the variation, Edmondson (1996) observed that the climate of the 
unit and the leadership behaviors of the nursing unit manager were important influences on 
error detection.  Thus, the study findings suggested that not only can error reporting vary by 
nursing unit, but the factors that affect error reporting may also vary by unit.  This study 
examines error reporting at the nursing unit level and conceptualizes the nursing unit as a 
team.   
Purpose 
Building on past research and addressing the need for future research, this study 
sought to determine how team dynamics influence error reporting.  Specifically, the study 
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examined the team dynamics of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety 
and their effects on error reporting by nurses.  The model of work-team learning provided the 
theoretical foundation by informing the development of the conceptual model used in this 
study and the relationships and variables examined. 
Theoretical Foundation and Conceptual Model 
The theoretical foundation used in this study was the model of work-team learning 
from which the study’s conceptual model was derived.  The model of work-team learning 
was developed and tested by Amy Edmondson (1999) to study learning behavior in work 
teams and provides an explanation for how team structures (conceptualized as organizational 
context and team leader coaching) and interpersonal dynamics (described as the construct of 
team beliefs and conceptualized as team safety) affect the specific team behavior of learning.  
The conceptual model operationalizes the concepts of organizational context, team leadership 
behavior, team safety, and team learning behavior in this study as safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety, and examines how these factors affect the team 
learning behavior of error reporting. 
The model of work-team learning provided an appropriate theoretical basis for 
studying error reporting for at least two reasons.  First, error reporting is a necessary 
condition for organizational learning and can thus be considered an indicator of learning 
behavior.  Second, the model of work-team learning is a team level theory and is thus 
designed to explain learning behavior in teams.  Nursing units can be conceptualized as 
teams, and past researchers have studied them as such (Edmondson, 1996; 2003).  Thus, to 
the extent that error reporting is necessary for organizational learning and the factors that 
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affect error reporting are team level factors, this theoretical model is ideal for studying the 
phenomenon of error reporting. 
Significance 
 In order for organizational learning to take place in response to errors, awareness that 
errors have occurred is essential.  Organizational awareness of errors can only happen if 
nurses, physicians, or other clinicians report that an error or near miss happened.  This study 
sought to identify and explain factors that influence error reporting by nurses.  By identifying 
factors that encourage nurses to report errors and uncovering the underlying reasons for error 
reporting, nurses and healthcare leaders can begin to work in tangible ways to improve the 
reporting of errors.  By applying the model of work-team learning to error reporting in 
hospitals, this study also further contributes to theory development and adds to the 
cumulative understanding of how this theoretical model might be adapted to studying the 
phenomenon of error reporting in nursing units of hospitals. 
Chapter Summary and Outline of This Dissertation 
 This chapter described the need for the present study, developed a better 
understanding of the multiple factors that influence error reporting, and outlined the general 
nature and direction of the research.  The study’s findings will point to important suggestions 
for organizational leaders and policy makers as well as significant implications for future 
research and theory. 
  Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the independent variables of the study and 
justification for conceptualizing the nursing unit as a team.  Chapter 2 also discusses the 
study’s conceptual framework, including a review of literature on the major aspects of the 
framework and a presentation of the research questions of the study.  Chapter 3 presents the 
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methodology for the study including the research design, study setting and sample, 
operationalized variables and instruments, and data analysis.  Chapter 4 presents the study 
findings.  Chapter 5 explores study findings within the context of practice, research, and 
policy-making, as well as theoretical implications and future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the literature on factors affecting error reporting 
in hospitals, and presents the theoretical foundation and conceptual model of the study.  The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the conceptualization of the nursing unit as a team 
followed by a review of the literature on the key variables of the study: safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety.  Next, there is a discussion of the theoretical 
foundation of the study and the model of work-team learning (Edmondson, 1999).  This is 
followed by an explanation of how the conceptual model of the study was derived from the 
theory with support from the literature for the operationalization of the key variables of the 
study.  Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the study covariates and rationale for their 
inclusion in this study. 
Literature Review 
 The existing body of research on error reporting indicates that error reporting in 
hospitals is exceedingly complex.  Much of the past research in this area has worked to 
identify barriers and facilitators to error reporting and has not fully explained the complicated 
nature of error reporting.  Research from organizational and team sciences as well as team 
theory may better explain error reporting in hospitals by identifying team characteristics that 
influence error reporting.  Past research from these areas as well as past studies of error 
reporting indicate that the factors of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological 
16 
safety may be particularly important to error reporting.  Past research demonstrates 
variability in error reporting between units and because the factors that may affect error 
reporting can differ between units of study, the team perspective is particularly important to 
error reporting. 
 The section that follows examines the relevant literature to explain how patient care 
units in hospitals relate to the context of teams.  Next, key variables identified from the 
literature on patient safety and errors at the unit level—safety climate, leader inclusiveness, 
and psychological safety—are examined in relationship to error reporting.  After a review of 
the literature, gaps in past research are identified, followed by a discussion of how this study 
seeks to fill these gaps through an examination of error reporting. 
The Nursing Unit as a Team 
 Traditionally, scholars have defined teams as groups having a distinct and stable 
membership, where team members have clearly-defined roles, work in close coordination to 
carry out their work, and share resources to achieve common goals (Chen, Kirkman, Kanfer, 
Allen, & Rosen, 2007; Wageman, Gardner, & Mortensen, 2012).  More recently, scholars 
have pushed for new conceptualizations of team that move beyond this strict definition of “a 
bounded, stable set of individuals interdependent for a common goal” (Wageman et al., 2012, 
p. 311).  Broader definitions of teams have been proposed, recognizing that teams of 
individuals working toward a common goal might not be as bounded or stable as traditional 
definitions imply.  Furthermore, researchers recognize that the changing landscape of 
organizations and the way work is conducted allows for a broader definition of team 
(Wageman et al., 2012).  
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Nursing units fit this broader conceptualization of team.  First, nursing units are 
bounded entities.  As such, they have separate and distinct operating budgets, supplies, and 
for the most part, permanent staff members. There is generally a single nurse manager who 
leads the nursing unit, manages the budget and personnel, and oversees the day-to-day 
operations of the unit.  Second, current conceptualizations of teams acknowledge that 
conventional definitions of stability may not necessarily apply to all teams (Wageman et al., 
2012).  This is true of the nursing unit.  Nurses may enter and depart from nursing units at 
various times because of hiring and turnover or to “float” to other units during periods of 
organizational need. 
Overall, however, nursing unit leaders desire a relatively stable work group.  In order 
to achieve adequate staffing to care for patients 24 hours a day, seven days a week, nurses 
typically work in shifts.  This means that the same nurses do not work the same shift all the 
time, all possible shifts, or even every day of the week.  So while the traditional definitions of 
stability in teams may not perfectly fit nursing units in hospitals, these entities function as a 
collective and, generally, as stable groups. 
Finally, members of nursing units typically share the common goal of providing safe, 
high quality care to their patients, and they must work in careful coordination to achieve this 
goal of patient care.  Based on these criteria set forth in the literature on teams, this study 
conceptualizes the nursing unit as a team, which is also supported by past research studies 
(e.g., Edmondson, 2003; Van Bogaert et al., 2014).  The emphasis on nursing units as teams 
is important to this study because much of the supporting literature used to inform this study 
is from the organizational sciences and the smaller subset of team literature. 
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Safety Climate 
The environment of patient care units is important to error reporting, especially as it 
relates to the safety of patients.  Researchers however are divided in how to study the safety 
environment, which has been described as having both a safety culture and a safety climate.  
There is a great deal of overlap and even confusion in the literature regarding the use of the 
terms “safety culture” and “safety climate” (Zaheer, Ginsburg, Chuang, & Grace, 2015).  The 
two terms are often used interchangeably, which has led to confusion on the part of 
researchers and those in practice (Mearns & Flin, 1999).  This confusion in terminology can 
be traced back to longstanding debates in organizational research over the related but broader 
concepts of organizational culture and organizational climate (Denison, 1995; Mearns & 
Flin, 1999; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013).  The fundamental difference between 
culture and climate in the literature is that there are two differing, theoretical schools of 
thought—organizational sociology and organizational psychology—that lead researchers to 
study culture versus climate (Denison, 1995).  Organizational culture typically focuses on the 
organizational system, while organizational climate typically focuses on the impact of the 
organization on individuals within the organization. 
The literature on organizational culture is rooted in organizational sociology, which 
holds a social constructivist view of organizations where employees both work in and create 
the social systems of organizations (Denison, 1995).  Organizational culture is defined as the 
values and beliefs of an organization that are embedded in the structure of the organization 
and observed in the norms, rituals, and behaviors of employees (O’Reilly, Chatman, & 
Caldwell, 1991).  In past studies of culture, researchers have often used qualitative 
methodologies (e.g., ethnography) to study organizational culture because it is difficult to 
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separate out the employee and their perceptions from the organizational context (Denison, 
1995; Glick, 1985).  
In contrast, organizational climate is rooted in the field of organizational psychology 
(Denison, 1995).  Organizational climate is defined as the shared beliefs and perceptions of 
employees about the practices, policies, and procedures of an organization, and focuses more 
on the influence of the organizational system on individuals (Denison, 1995; Schneider et al., 
2013).  Thus, the strength of the climate perspective is in studying the influence of 
organizational context on individuals (Denison, 1995) versus culture, which tends to focus on 
the values and beliefs within organizations.  An additional strength of the climate perspective 
is that climate is thought to be more amenable to change than culture because it is a more 
surface level concept (Vogus et al., 2010).  This perspective puts forth the idea that managers 
and organizational leaders are the creators of the organizational climate, and employees are 
subordinates in power who do not exert influence or control over the organizational climate 
(Denison, 1995).  As a result, organizational climate research typically focuses on 
employees’ perceptions of the organizational climate (Denison, 1995). 
While the present study examines safety climate in relation to error reporting, past 
research on both safety culture and safety climate and their relationship to error reporting is 
relevant to this study.  The majority of research on error reporting has examined safety 
culture rather than safety climate.  In the discussion that follows, the literature on safety 
culture in relationship to error reporting is reviewed first, followed by a review of the 
literature on safety climate and error reporting. 
Safety culture is a dimension or sub-component of organizational culture that is 
specifically related to patient safety (Cooper, 2000).  There is evidence from the literature 
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that safety culture is positively associated with error reporting.  A study by researchers in 
Israeli hospitals examined the association between its patient safety culture and the incidence 
of error reporting.  It found that patient safety culture was postively associated with increased 
levels of error reporting (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013).  Similarly, a large study that used data 
from hospitals across the U.S. to determine how safety culture affected error reporting found 
that dimensions of the safety culture (e.g., management support, teamwork across units, etc.) 
were positively associated with clinicians’ perceptions about the frequency of error reporting 
on their patient care unit (Richter, McAlearney, & Pennell, 2014).  
A study of pharmacists in the United Kingdom revealed that pharmacists were more 
willing to report errors when they believed that the hospitals valued and welcomed error 
reports as a way to learn and improve.  Conversely, a negative safety culture was seen as a 
barrier to error reporting when the pharmacists believed that individuals were blamed for 
errors (Williams, Phipps, & Ashcroft, 2013).  Similarly, a study that examined the 
perspectives of clinicians (i.e., nurses and physicians) regarding error reporting found that a 
significant barrier to reporting was a culture of blame for errors (Jeffe et al., 2004).  Thus, 
past studies of safety culture suggest that cultures that hold systems rather than individuals 
accountable for errors increase error reporting markedly. 
Like safety culture, safety climate is a sub-dimension of organizational climate that is 
specifically related to patient safety.  Safety climate has not been studied extensively in 
relationship to error reporting, and certainly not to the same degree as safety culture.  Safety 
climate is defined as the shared perceptions and experience of employees about the practices, 
policies, and procedures related to the safety of patients (Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Vogus et 
al., 2010). 
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Evidence from the literature suggests that work teams that perceive better safety 
climates exhibit better error reporting behaviors (Naveh et al., 2006) and commit fewer errors 
(Hoffman & Mark, 2006; Naveh, Katz-Nevon, & Stern, 2005).  In a study of error reporting 
by clinicians in 44 units within three hospitals in Israel, the investigators found that certain 
aspects of the safety climate on the unit significantly predicted the clinicians’ readiness to 
report medical treatment errors (Naveh et al., 2006).  Specificially, the safety climate 
dimensions of safety procedures and safety information flow were positively linked with the 
total number of error reports submitted over the course of a year to the risk management 
system.  Based on this past evidence, coupled with the knowledge that climate is ideal for 
studying the influence of the organizational context on individuals, the present study 
examines the effect of safety climate on error reporting. 
Leader Inclusiveness 
Research indicates that leadership behavior is important to error reporting.  One study 
showed leadership behaviors of healthcare leaders (e.g., nurse managers, physicians, etc.) 
related to safety, not the verbal directives about safety, to be a far more important influence 
on error reporting by the staff they managed (Van Dyck et al., 2013).  These findings are 
further supported by additional studies that have established the importance of team 
leadership behavior to error reporting (Ko & Yu, 2015; Pfeiffer, Briner, Wehner, & Manser, 
2013).  For example, Ko and Yu (2015) examined the relationships among nurses’ 
perceptions of the patient safety culture, nurse leader coaching behaviors, and nurses’ intent 
to report errors in five Korean hospitals.  The findings of the study indicated that nurse leader 
coaching behaviors were positively related to nurses’ intent to report errors.  In a 2013 study, 
Pfeiffer and colleagues examined individual, organizational, and system-level influences on 
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clinicians’ willingness to report errors.  They found that managers’ support for error 
reporting positively influenced clinicians’ willingness to report errors.  Thus, findings from 
past studies demonstrate that leadership behavior is significantly related to error reporting, 
but these studies have examined different leadership behaviors (i.e., leadership behaviors 
related to safety, nurse leader coaching, and management support for error reporting). 
An operationalization of leadership behavior found in more recent organizational and 
team literature is that of leader inclusiveness.  Leader inclusiveness is when leaders 
demonstrate availability, openness, and accessibility to team members by inviting input and 
offering appreciation for their employees’ contributions (Hirak et al., 2012; Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2006).  Nembhard and Edmondson (2006) first introduced leader inclusiveness 
in a study that examined its effects with professional status on psychological safety, and the 
improvement efforts in health care teams working in neonatal intensive care units.  The 
researchers of the study found that leader inclusiveness positively predicted team 
engagement with quality improvement work.  Another study examined how leader 
inclusiveness promoted employee creativity in Research and Development teams of high-
technology organizations and found that leader inclusiveness positively affected 
psychological safety among employees, which in turn increased employee creativity in the 
workplace (Carmeli, Reiter-Palmon, & Ziv, 2010).  Hirak et al. (2012) examined the effects 
of leader inclusiveness and psychological safety on team learning and team performance 
among employees working in units of a large hospital in Israel.  They found that leader 
inclusiveness was positively associated with team psychological safety, which in turn 
positively affected team learning from failure and ultimately resulted in better team 
performance.  These studies thus demonstrate that leader inclusive behaviors in teams 
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promote improved team functioning by engaging members in quality improvement 
initiatives, workplace creativity, and team learning and performance. 
Past study findings suggest that leader inclusiveness may be an important factor in 
promoting team learning behaviors related to error reporting.  The study of leader 
inclusiveness is relatively new (Carmeli et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2016), so there is only a 
limited number of studies that have examined leader inclusiveness.  Moreover, no previous 
studies have examined the relationship between leader inclusiveness and error reporting.  
Despite the lack of study in this area, research that ties leader behaviors to error reporting 
suggests that leader inclusiveness should also positively influence error-reporting behavior. 
Psychological Safety 
Psychological safety has been defined as 
individuals’ perceptions about the consequences of interpersonal risks in their work 
environment.  It consists of taken-for-granted beliefs about how others will respond 
when one puts oneself on the line, such as by asking a question, seeking feedback, 
reporting a mistake, or proposing a new idea. (Edmondson, 2004, p. 241) 
 
The ideas represented by the concept of psychological safety are seen in much of the 
literature on error reporting.  Specifically, much of the past research on error reporting 
indicates that fear is a significant barrier to error reporting, which could be interpreted as 
poor psychological safety. 
Research on error reporting that has used qualitative methods indicates that fear can 
significantly inhibit error reporting by nurses and other clinicians (Lederman et al., 2013).  
Psychological safety conveys the extent to which team members feel safe to identify and 
speak up about problems they encounter in their work (Edmondson, 1999, 2004).  Thus, it 
seems that fear related to error reporting is indicative of poor psychological safety on the part 
of clinicians, inhibiting them from reporting errors.  For example, in a study of nurses and 
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physicians who were asked to evaluate a scenario that clearly portrayed the hospital as the 
source of error, not the individual, a theme emerged from the nurse focus groups of fear to 
speak up and report the error (Jeffe et al., 2004).  Other studies have documented that nurses 
were particularly hesitant to report errors they observed physicians commit because they 
perceived physicians to be more powerful (Espin et al., 2006, 2010).  As a result, nurses felt 
more comfortable informally reporting errors committed by physicians by verbally 
discussing the events with a peer or nurse manager, or by documenting the events in the 
clinical note of a patient’s chart rather than formally submitting an error report through the 
voluntary error reporting system.  In another study that examined error reporting by nurses 
working in pediatric units of hospitals (Stratton, Blegen, Pepper, & Vaughn, 2004), nurses 
indicated that fear related to reporting (e.g., fear of losing their nursing license, fear that 
colleagues would think they were incompetent) were primary reasons for not reporting 
errors.   
In the healthcare literature, there is growing support for the role of psychological 
safety as an important positive influence on error reporting and the ability to speak up about 
safety concerns in healthcare (Leroy et al., 2012).  A recent study conducted in the Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA) demonstrated a positive relationship between psychological 
safety and error reporting.  Specifically, individuals working in hospitals with higher and 
more positive psychological safety scores indicated a greater willingness to report errors 
(Derickson et al., 2015). 
Another study of healthcare professionals working in cancer hospitals in Sweden 
examined a broader but similar concept to error reporting, speaking up behavior, and found 
that healthcare professionals who did not feel psychologically safe were unlikely to speak up 
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about unsafe conditions they encountered (Schwappach & Gehring, 2015).  Similarly, a study 
conducted on nursing units of a hospital examined the relationships among nurse managers’ 
behavioral integrity for safety, team priority for safety, and team psychological safety, and 
the number of treatment errors reported by nurses (Leroy et al., 2012).  The study findings 
indicated that more positive team psychological safety resulted in greater reporting of 
treatment errors by nurses. 
Past research indicates that there is a significant relationship between psychological 
safety and error reporting (Derickson et al., 2015; Leroy et al., 2012).  Therefore, this study 
used existing research indicating that psychological safety inhibits error reporting by 
including psychological safety in this study of error reporting.  
Knowledge Gaps 
A broad review of past organizational and error-reporting literature suggests that the 
variables of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety are important in 
the study of error reporting.  Past research has also demonstrated that leadership behaviors 
significantly affect error reporting (Ko & Yu, 2015; Van Dyck et al., 2013), but these studies 
did not examine the specific behavior of leader inclusiveness, which the literature on teams 
suggests may affect error reporting.  While the factors of safety climate (Naveh et al., 2006) 
and psychological safety (Derickson et al., 2015; Leroy et al., 2012) have been examined to 
some extent in past studies of error reporting, none of the identified studies of error reporting 
have assessed these factors and their relationship to error reporting within the context of 
related theory.  Doing so would help to elucidate the relationships among variables and error 
reporting behaviors.  This kind of evidence would be important information for those in 
healthcare leadership positions of hospitals as they work to improve error reporting in order 
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to gain better knowledge of how to improve the hospital system in order to prevent future 
errors from occurring.  Therefore, this study of error reporting addresses significant gaps in 
the research by examining safety climate, psychological safety, and error reporting with the 
model of work-team learning.  
Theoretical Foundation of the Study 
 The theoretical foundation for this study of error reporting is the model of work-team 
learning, which emphasizes team level factors that are believed to affect error reporting.  This 
model reflects the work of Amy Edmondson (1999).  In particular, there are three past 
studies conducted by Edmondson that are relevant to a discussion of the model of work-team 
learning.  Each of these studies is reviewed in the following sections. 
Group and Organizational Influences on Learning from Mistakes 
 In 1996, Edmondson explored how group and organizational factors affected learning 
from mistakes in hospitals.  The study used both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
better understand whether some hospital work-teams were better than others at finding and 
correcting errors before serious harm occurred.  The study also examined which teams were 
more capable of learning from the errors they identified, and thereby avoided similar 
mistakes in the future.  In particular, the study sought to explain what accounted for the 
differences in performance between the teams.  The quantitative component of the study 
examined 12 variables in five organizational categories: leadership behavior, organization 
context, unit characteristics, unit outcomes, and individual satisfaction.  The results of the 
analyses showed that higher perceptions of unit performance, the quality of unit 
relationships, and nurse manager leadership behaviors were positively related to higher error 
rates (recorded through daily chart review, daily visits to the unit, and a confidential error 
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reporting system).  Noting that she expected to find the opposite, Edmondson questioned 
whether her findings indicated that better nursing leadership led to higher error rates, or 
whether units with leaders who created a climate of openness to facilitate the discussion of 
errors encouraged employees to be more willing to report errors.  Furthermore, the study 
demonstrated considerable variability in error reporting rates among the units, which led 
Edmondson to propose that there were at least two influences on detected error rates in 
hospital units: the number of actual errors that occur and the willingness of unit employees to 
report the actual errors made.  
 Qualitative data for the study were collected from clinicians (e.g., nurses, physicians, 
and pharmacists) and manager interviews on eight patient care units in two different 
hospitals, and provided further support for Edmondson’s quantitative findings.  These data 
were used to identify several factors that helped to explain the variation between units: the 
climate of the unit; the characteristics of the nurse manager as perceived by staff (i.e., 
openness, attire, and trustworthiness); perceived supportiveness among nurses of each other 
and of the nurse manager; and nurses’ willingness to collaborate across disciplines (e.g., 
nurses with physicians).  Thus, the qualitative findings of Edmondson’s study supported the 
conclusions she reached about the quantitative results, suggesting that nurse managers’ 
leadership behaviors were an important influence on clinicians’ beliefs about discussing 
errors.  Higher rates of error detection were found on units with more positive leadership 
characteristics.  
Edmondson’s study is relevant to the model of work-team learning for a number of 
reasons.  First, this study established that two structural characteristics at the team level—the 
climate of the unit where clinicians worked and the leadership behavior of the nurse 
28 
manager—were important to clinicians’ willingness to speak up about mistakes or problems 
in their unit and the ability of the team to then learn from the mistakes reported.  This study 
emphasizes the importance of both the climate of the unit and leadership behavior as well as 
the effect of these two factors (climate and leadership behavior) on error-reporting rates.  
Second, the study highlights that the climate of the unit, the leadership behaviors of nurse 
managers, the error reporting rate, and team learning all varied widely between the units 
studied.  Edmondson recommended continued study of errors and reporting from a team level 
in organizations.  She found that team factors on these nursing units seemed to affect error 
identification and learning in teams.  Finally, Edmondson recognized that employees must 
feel safe to speak up before they are willing to report mistakes and share information that 
might challenge the status quo, a concept that becomes more fully articulated in the model of 
work-team learning as psychological safety. 
Learning Behavior in Work Teams 
 In 1999, Edmondson examined team learning in manufacturing organizations, using 
the model of work-team learning.  This study again used quantitative and qualitative methods 
to explore how structural and interpersonal dynamics of the team influenced team learning 
and, in turn, whether team learning influenced team performance.  The study also explored 
the concept of psychological safety in work teams, which was prompted by findings from her 
1996 study.  Prior to this study, psychological safety had been examined in the organizational 
literature of the 1960s, but research on psychological safety had mostly been abandoned until 
the 1990s when researchers like Edmondson began to study psychological safety within the 
context of organizational teams (Edmondson & Lei, 2014).   
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Edmondson explained the concept of psychological safety by noting that there is a 
natural proclivity on the part of all individuals to protect themselves from potentially 
embarrassing situations, something that most individuals accomplish by not challenging 
conventional practices, discussing problems, or reporting their own mistakes.  However, this 
natural tendency, she noted, poses a threat to organizational learning because the very 
information individuals are apt to suppress (e.g., mistakes, problems, challenging 
conventionality) is essential for learning and enacting improvements in teams and 
organizations.  She also noted that research has demonstrated that the tendency to withhold 
potentially embarrassing or uncomfortable information is counteracted, to some degree, by 
familiarity and comfort with the teams where individuals worked.  She cited findings from 
her 1996 study in support of this assertion, noting that clinicians’ willingness to report errors 
was associated with the climate of the unit and the leadership behaviors of the manager.  
Thus, the concept of psychological safety in teams was more purposefully explored in this 
study than in her previous work. 
 In this study of psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams, 
Edmondson introduced the model of work-team learning as the theoretical basis for the 
study.  The model included the constructs of team structures (operationalized as context 
support and team leader coaching) and team beliefs (operationalized as team safety and team 
efficacy) on team behaviors (operationalized as team learning behavior) and team outcomes 
(operationalized as team performance).  The model is more fully explained later in this 
chapter. 
This study provided support for the important role of psychological safety to team 
learning behavior and the ultimate performance of the team.  It also supports the use of the 
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model of work-team learning as a theoretical foundation for studying learning behaviors in 
teams.  The study demonstrated that the team structures of context support and team leader 
coaching were important antecedents to psychological safety, and that psychological safety 
positively affected team learning behavior and ultimately team performance.  The only 
portion of the model of work-team learning that was not supported by the study findings was 
the concept of team efficacy, which Edmondson had hypothesized was related to team 
learning behavior when controlling for the variable of psychological safety.  She had also 
hypothesized that team efficacy acted as a mediator between team structures (team leader 
coaching and context support) and team learning behavior.  Neither of these hypotheses were 
supported by the model, and in response Edmondson wrote, “. . . the theoretical premise that 
lies at the core of the team learning model does not appear to require the supplementary 
effects of team efficacy” (p. 376).  Based on study findings, Edmondson suggested that team 
efficacy was not important in future studies using the model of work-team learning. 
This 1999 study by Edmondson provided support for the concept of psychological 
safety and for the importance of this variable in studying learning behavior in teams.  
Furthermore, the study affirmed the utility of the model of work-team learning, with the 
exclusion of team efficacy as a theoretical foundation for the study of learning behavior in 
teams. 
The Learning Process in Interdisciplinary Action Teams 
 In 2003, Edmondson returned to healthcare and conducted a study that examined 
interdisciplinary work teams in the operating room and how team structural factors (team 
leadership and organizational context) affected the learning processes (speaking up, practice 
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and reflection, boundary spanning), and the successful implementation of a new technology 
for cardiac surgery.  This study was particularly focused on how team leader behaviors and  
the organizational context2 affected the team learning process and the implementation 
success of the new technology.  The study used multiple case comparison methods to gather 
both quantitative and qualitative data and was conducted with 16 teams and 150 individuals 
from hospitals across the U.S. in the process of implementing a new, minimally invasive 
cardiac surgery.  This new technology was implemented in interdisciplinary action teams, 
and therefore provided a unique opportunity to study learning and change in a different type 
of team situation.  
Results of the study showed that multiple factors were important to the successful 
implementation of the technology.  Specifically, quantitative data demonstrated that team 
leader coaching, team preparation, the ease with which team members could speak up about 
problems, and the boundary spanning of team members (i.e., the ability to communicate and 
coordinate both within the team context and outside the team) were all related to the 
procedure’s implementation success.  The study findings emphasized the important role of 
team leadership behaviors in team members’ willingness to speak up and ultimately to the 
successful implementation of the technology.  In discussing the results, Edmondson noted 
that the study findings suggested that the team leadership behaviors of engaging team 
members and directing their behaviors to the goal or task were closely aligned with the 
leaders’ invitations for team members to speak up.  She noted that employing motivating 
                                                 
2 In the original model of work-team learning, Edmondson (1999) uses context support.  In this particular study 
of work-teams in the operating room (Edmondson, 2003), she uses the slightly different term of organizational 
context.  However, both terms convey the same idea of tangible and intangible supports in place for the team.  
Thus, context support and organizational context are interpreted as equivalent concepts. 
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behaviors and promoting psychological safety by inviting input and downplaying power 
differentials enabled leaders to promote learning within the team.  Of particular note, the 
study did not find a significant relationship between the organizational context and 
implementation success, suggesting that the importance of the organizational context to team 
outcomes may differ depending on the type of team and the nature of their work. 
 Interestingly, this study did not use the model of work-team learning as the theoretical 
basis, but instead used some of the model constructs, particularly the constructs of team 
leadership and organizational context.  The findings of this study with respect to team 
leadership highlight the importance of the relational aspects of leadership (e.g., emotional 
and social factors) to the team members’ willingness to speak up (e.g., psychological safety).  
The organizational context was therefore not important to the learning process or to the 
teams’ successful implementation of the technology in this study.  These findings 
demonstrate that teams vary in their goals and contexts in such a way that team factors that 
are important for success in one arena may not be essential in another.  
 In summary, Edmondson’s 2003 study contributes to our understanding of some 
constructs and concepts included in the model of work-team learning.  In particular, this 
study emphasizes the importance of team leader behaviors to team members’ perceptions of 
psychological safety.  Furthermore, this study highlights that some team factors such as 
context support may be important in some team situations (e.g., teams in the manufacturing 
industry; Edmondson, 1999), but not in others (e.g., interdisciplinary action teams in the 
operating room of hospitals; Edmondson, 2003). 
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Summary of Key Studies by Edmondson 
 This review of relevant studies conducted by Amy Edmondson (1996, 1999, 2003) 
helps to explain the model of work-team learning from which this study’s conceptual model 
was derived.  In general, there is support for the use of the model of work-team learning to 
study learning behavior in teams.  In particular, these studies are relevant to understanding 
the role of team structures in the team members’ perceptions of psychological safety and 
team learning.  In the section that follows, the model of work-team learning is described and 
explained by examining the constructs and concepts of the model. 
The Model of Work-Team Learning 
The model of work-team learning (Figure 1) demonstrates how structural and 
interpersonal dynamics of the team influence team learning and team performance 
(Edmondson, 1999).  The model of work-team learning is a mid-range or intermediate theory 
that addresses the relationships between abstract and operational elements (Edmondson, 
2003; Edmondson & McManus, 2007). 
 
From “Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams,” by A. C. Edmondson, 1999, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44(2), p. 357. Copyright 1999 by ASQ.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
Figure 1. A model of work-team learning (Edmondson, 1999, p. 357). 
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The model reflects the major constructs of antecedent conditions, team beliefs, team 
behaviors, and outcomes.  Antecedent conditions are considered to be team structures while 
team beliefs are team safety and team efficacy, team behaviors are team learning behavior, 
and outcomes are team performance.  These constructs, along with related concepts and 
variables, will be discussed below using Edmondson’s three prior studies to describe the 
model of work-team learning (Edmondson 1996, 1999, 2003). 
Antecedent Conditions: Team Structures 
 The first construct in Edmondson’s model of work-team learning is antecedent 
conditions.  This construct is manifested as the team structures, defined as properties of the 
team that inform team beliefs, team behaviors, and ultimately team outcomes (Edmondson, 
1996, 1999).  In the model of work-team learning, team structures are conceptualized as 
context support and team leader coaching (Edmondson, 1999).  Context support refers to the 
shared beliefs among team members that they are supported in their work in tangible ways 
(i.e., informational needs are met) and intangible ways (i.e., rewards are given for hard work) 
(Edmondson, 1999).  Team leader coaching refers to the way leaders behave, and whether 
they are perceived to be open to team members’ ideas and supportive of the team as a whole 
(Edmondson, 1999).  There is support from past research that context support and team 
leader coaching are important factors in creating an environment that team members believe 
is safe to share their ideas or admit mistakes (Edmondson, 1996, 1999). 
Team Beliefs: Team Safety and Team Efficacy 
The next construct in Edmondson’s model of team learning is team beliefs, which are 
postulated as a manifestation of the antecedent conditions (context support and team leader 
coaching).  These antecedent conditions were described as influencing the degree to which 
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team beliefs predicted team behaviors and outcomes (Edmondson, 1999).  Team beliefs are 
defined as the shared group perspectives that arise from individuals’ perceptions about a 
group (Knott, 2009), and include team safety and team efficacy.  
The concept of team safety, measured by the variable of psychological safety, reflects 
team members’ shared perceptions of trust and mutual respect that enable team members to 
take certain risks, such as reporting mistakes, asking questions, seeking feedback, and 
challenging the status quo (Edmondson, 1999, 2004).  The concept of team efficacy is team 
members’ shared perceptions of the work team’s ability to accomplish team goals.  
Edmondson (1999) theorized that both team safety and team efficacy influenced team 
behaviors and in particular, team learning behavior.  Findings from her study of team 
learning behavior in the manufacturing industry supported the relationship between team 
safety and team learning behavior, showing that beliefs about mutual respect in the team and 
the ability of team members to speak up about unsafe practices enabled learning behavior 
that ultimately influenced team performance (Edmondson, 1999).  Additionally, 
psychological safety was supported as a mediator between team structures (context support 
and team leader coaching) and team learning behavior, with psychological safety explaining 
how team context support and team leadership coaching are related to team learning and 
performance.  As previously discussed, Edmondson (1999) did not find support for her 
hypotheses about the role of team efficacy as either an influence on team learning behavior 
or as a mediator between team structures (context support and team leader coaching) and 
team learning behavior.  Accordingly, she recognized that team efficacy did not appear 
necessary to team learning behavior. 
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Team Behaviors: Team Learning Behavior 
 The next construct in the model is team behaviors, which is conceptualized as the 
actions of the team that allow for improvement and learning (Edmondson, 1999; Knott, 
2009).  Team behaviors are conceptualized as team learning behavior and viewed as the 
learning process that occurs at the unit or team level of the organization (Edmondson, 1999, 
2003).  While some scholars of organizational learning have defined learning as an outcome, 
Edmondson (1999) views learning as an ongoing process that involves seeking feedback and 
information via team reflection, from clients, and from others relevant to team performance.  
Information sharing has long been recognized as an essential aspect of learning (Argyris, 
1976; Levitt & March, 1988), and was included by Edmondson (1999) as part of the concept 
of team learning behavior.  Her analysis of team learning behavior in manufacturing work 
units demonstrated that team learning behavior was positively related to team performance. 
Outcomes 
The final construct in Edmondson’s model of work team learning is outcomes, 
operationalized as team performance and conceptualized as the result of team structures, 
team beliefs, and team behaviors (Edmondson, 1999).  While team learning behavior is the 
overall process through which the team learns, the ultimate outcome is team performance 
(Edmondson, 1999).  The achievements of the team might include outcomes such as 
customer satisfaction or successful team implementation of a new technology (Edmondson, 
1999, 2003). 
The Model of Work Team Learning Applied to This Study of Error Reporting 
 The model of work team learning was the theoretical basis of this study to examine 
the phenomenon of error reporting, and was used to develop the conceptual model used in 
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this study.  Three of the four constructs from the model of work-team learning were used in 
the conceptual model: team structures, team beliefs, and team behaviors.  Like Edmondson’s 
model, these constructs are believed to be related to one another.  Team structures inform 
team beliefs which in turn affect team behaviors. 
The construct of outcome, conceptualized as team performance, was not examined in 
this study because the utility of the work-team learning model largely depends on the 
phenomenon of study, and in this study, the focus was on the team learning behavior of error 
reporting.  Also, it is difficult to tease out the outcomes per se that might be associated with 
error reporting.  For example, many studies of patient safety or quality use patient outcomes 
(e.g., length of stay, infection rates, mortality rates, etc.) or nurse outcomes (e.g., nurse 
satisfaction, nurse turnover, staffing mix, etc.) to reflect unit or team performance.  However, 
there was no support found in the literature documenting a relationship between error 
reporting and any of these commonly studied outcomes.  In fact, after a review of the 
literature, error reporting was not found to be clearly related to any patient or nurse 
outcomes, and this lack of support in the literature suggests that common outcome measures 
are not linked to error reporting, and argues against including these outcome variables in this 
study of error reporting.  The relationship between team learning behavior and outcomes also 
has not been supported through prior research.  This lack of support from prior research for a 
relationship between team learning behavior and outcomes of care can be explained by the 
fact that team learning with respect to error reporting instead likely leads to organizational 
learning, versus the outcomes of care typically studied in patient safety and quality.  
The conceptual model for this study is presented in Figure 2.  The section that follows 
provides a discussion of how the constructs and concepts from the model of work team 
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learning were applied to develop the conceptual model, and provides an explanation of how 
the concepts were operationally defined.  The relationships in the conceptual model are then 
discussed with a presentation of the research questions of the study.  Finally, the covariates 
believed to be important in the study of error reporting on patient care units are reviewed. 
  
Figure 2. Conceptual model of error reporting, derived from Edmondson’s model of work-
team learning. 
Team Structures 
Similar to Edmonson (1999), team structures in this study were viewed as the 
antecedent conditions of the conceptual model.  Past organizational research has supported 
this construct, suggesting that team structures are related to both team learning and team 
beliefs about safety (Bresman & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2013; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010; 
Edmondson, 1999).  In a study of pharmaceutical research and development teams that in 
part examined the effect of team structure on team learning (Bresman & Zellmer-Bruhn, 
2013), the researchers found that team structures were positively associated with team 
learning both internally between team members, and externally between the team and other 
groups in the organization.  Similarly, Bunderson and Boumgarden (2010) examined teams 
39 
in high-technology firms of the Fortune 100 to determine how team structure influenced team 
learning.  They found that team structure, by establishing psychological safety, positively 
influenced team learning. 
Team structure is commonly examined in the research on teams, but there is no clear 
consensus among researchers and theorists on the best way to conceptualize team structure.  
In Edmondson’s (1999) study of teams in manufacturing organizations, the study where she 
introduced and used the model of work-team learning, she conceptualized team structure as 
context support and team leader coaching.  Other researchers have used the sociology and 
organizational literature to conceptualize team structure as specialization (e.g., roles and 
responsibilities of the team members or the vertical distribution of work), hierarchy (e.g., the 
vertical relationship between the team leader and the employees), and formalization (e.g., 
priorities and procedures that regulate and govern work).  Like the model of work-team 
learning, this study conceptualizes team structures as context support and team leadership 
behavior.  This conceptualization differs slightly from Edmondson (1999), by using team 
leadership behavior instead of team leader coaching.  
Context support.  The first element of team structure included in this conceptual 
model is context support, which Edmondson (1996, 1999, 2003) has described as team goals, 
team design, resources, information, and climate.  The idea of context support can be 
explained as the structural elements present that influence team beliefs and team behaviors 
(Edmondson, 1996, 1999, 2003) or the norms and climate of the team (Bunderson & 
Boumgarden, 2010).  In keeping with Edmondson’s (1996) study of error reporting and 
learning in hospital teams, this study operationalizes context support as climate, and more 
specifically, as the safety climate of the nursing unit, also described earlier. 
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Team leadership behavior.  The second element of team structure in this conceptual 
model is team leadership behavior.  This concept differs slightly from Edmondson (1999) 
who instead used team leader coaching.  Team leadership behavior was chosen for use in this 
study because it is a broader definition of team structure derived from earlier work by 
Edmondson (1996).  In her 1996 study of learning from mistakes in hospital units, 
Edmondson used both qualitative and quantitative methods to understand the differences in 
teams that helped to explain why some teams identified and learned from errors better than 
others.  Among her findings, she identified leadership behaviors by the unit managers (i.e., 
nurse managers) that positively affected error detection and learning.  These positive 
behaviors included openness, accessibility, and engaging with staff, which she then seemed 
to both conceptualize and operationalize as “team leader coaching” (Edmondson, 1996, 
1999).  While Edmondson used the term “team leader coaching,” the behaviors she described 
are not limited to merely coaching.  This study describes “team leadership behavior” instead, 
which recognizes a wider array of leadership behaviors that can positively influence the team 
belief about safety and the learning behavior of teams.  Therefore, the second element of 
team structure in this model is defined as team leadership behavior, which is conceptualized 
as leader inclusiveness and discussed earlier in the chapter. 
Team Beliefs 
 Team beliefs begin with the individual but emerge and are observed in shared team 
attitudes, perceptions, experiences, and behaviors (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  Team beliefs 
are comprised of both cognitive and social processes (Van den Bossche, Gijselaers, Segers, 
& Kirschner, 2006).  Past research demonstrates that team structures influence team beliefs, 
which, in turn, influence team behaviors (Edmondson, 1999).  A more recent study of nurses 
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and other health professionals working in nursing teams found that team beliefs influenced 
team behaviors, specifically team learning behavior (Ortega, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & 
Rico, 2013). In this study of error reporting, team belief is conceptualized as team safety 
belief, which is in keeping with the work of past scholars (Edmondson, 1999; Ortega et al., 
2013). 
Team safety belief.  The concept of team safety is a shared perception among team 
members of trust and mutual respect that empowers individuals in the team to take 
interpersonal risks like reporting mistakes, challenging the status quo, asking questions, and 
seeking feedback (Edmondson, 1999, 2004).  In a study conducted in nursing units of 
hospitals, Edmondson (1996) used both qualitative and survey methods to examine the 
differences in medication errors detected between eight nursing work teams.  Through 
qualitative interviews, she discovered that shared perceptions among team members about 
the consequences of making an error influenced the rate of error reporting.  She identified 
this notion of willingness to speak up or willingness to discuss mistakes.  In later research, 
Edmondson further refined this concept of willingness to speak up as team safety, and 
measured as psychological safety, noting that team safety influences both team learning 
behavior and team performance (Edmondson, 1999, 2003).  She operationally defined team 
safety as psychological safety and developed a valid measure of this variable (Edmondson, 
1999).  Similarly, this study of error reporting conceptualizes team safety as psychological 
safety.  
Team Behaviors 
 Team behaviors reflect the actions or conduct exhibited by teams, as a whole.  Past 
research has examined team behaviors manifest in a multitude of ways, including unethical 
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behaviors (Pearsall & Ellis, 2011), involvement in quality improvement (Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2006), and team learning behavior (Edmondson, 1999, 2003).  In this study, 
similar to the model of work-team learning, team behavior is conceptualized as team learning 
behavior. 
 Team learning behavior.  Team learning behavior is characterized by reflection and 
action by team members that result in improved performance in the team (Edmondson, 
1999).  There is some debate among organizational learning scholars over the nature of 
learning.  Some have viewed learning as an ongoing process that organizations engage in 
while others have viewed learning as an outcome.  Similar to Edmondson’s (1999) 
conceptualization, this study views learning as reflection and subsequent action taken by 
team members.  Specifically, this study examines how the antecedent conditions of team 
structures and team safety influence the team learning behavior of error reporting in 
hospitals.  
Relationships of the Model 
 In this section, the relationships illustrated by the conceptual model and postulated in 
this study are examined in detail.  The discussion begins with the relationships of context 
support and team leadership behavior to team learning behavior followed by an analysis of 
the relationship of team leadership behavior and context support with team safety belief.  
Next, the study looks at the relationship of team safety belief with team learning behavior.  
Finally, there is a discussion of the mediating role of team safety belief.  Each relationship in 
the model is presented with related research questions. 
Context support and team leadership behavior.  Previous studies have 
demonstrated that both context support and team leadership are important to team beliefs and 
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learning behavior.  Early work by Edmondson (1996) found that organizational 
characteristics of the unit, such as the climate, contributed to the detection of errors on the 
unit.  Additionally, the same study found that leadership behaviors were strongly tied to the 
number of errors detected on the unit, with more positive leadership behaviors resulting in 
greater error detection.  A 2006 study by Naveh and colleagues found that certain dimensions 
of the safety climate of nursing units positively affected clinicians’ readiness to report errors 
so that more positive aspects of the safety climate were related to more error reports 
submitted by clinicians.  Another study that examined the relationship between nurses’ 
perceptions of the safety culture, nurse leader coaching behaviors, and nurses’ intent to report 
errors found that both safety culture and nurse leader coaching behaviors were positively 
related to nurses’ intent to report (Ko & Yu, 2015).  Taken together, these studies 
(Edmondson, 1996; Ko & Yu, 2015; Naveh et al., 2006) provide support for the importance 
of context support and team leadership behaviors relative to team learning behavior (in this 
study, error reporting).  Thus, Research Question 1 (RQ1) seeks to determine how team 
context support and leadership behavior influence team learning behavior by asking: How do 
safety climate and leader inclusiveness affect error reporting? 
The study conducted by Edmondson (1999) in work teams of manufacturing 
organizations supports the relationship between context support and team safety belief.  That 
study demonstrated that context support was positively related to the team safety belief of 
psychological safety.  No identified past studies have examined the specific relationship of 
safety climate to psychological safety, but it seems logical to expect that an organizational 
environment that prioritizes safety is one where individuals would feel safe to speak out 
about unsafe conditions or error-related events they observe.  
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There is past research to support the relationship between team leadership behavior 
and team safety belief (operationalized as psychological safety).  For example, a study that 
examined improvement efforts in health care teams working in neonatal intensive care units 
of hospitals first demonstrated a positive relationship between team leadership and 
psychological safety (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  Later research has further supported 
the notion that team leadership (measured as leader inclusiveness) is positively associated 
with the team safety belief of psychological safety (Carmeli et al., 2010; Hirak et al., 2012).  
A study by Carmeli and colleagues (2010) examined how leader inclusiveness and 
psychological safety promoted team creativity in the workplace.  The study findings 
demonstrated that leader inclusiveness was positively related to psychological safety, which 
was then positively associated with employee creativity in the workplace.  Another study 
conducted in nursing units of a large medical center in Israel found that leader inclusiveness 
positively affected psychological safety, which subsequently resulted in team learning from 
failure and the ultimate performance of the unit (Hirak et al., 2012).  In Research Question 2 
(RQ2), the relationships of context support and team leadership behavior with team safety 
belief are explored by asking: How do safety climate and leader inclusiveness affect 
psychological safety? 
Team safety belief.  Past studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between 
the team safety belief of psychological safety and team learning (Brueller & Carmeli, 2011; 
Edmondson, 1999; Kostopoulos & Bozionelos, 2011).  Edmondson (1999) found that the 
team safety belief of psychological safety promoted team-learning behavior in work-teams 
within a manufacturing organization.  Similarly, Brueller and Carmeli (2011) conducted a 
study of teams in eight large organizations in Israel to determine how high quality 
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relationships in the team affected team learning and team performance.  They found that 
psychological safety was one of the significant predictors of both team learning and team 
performance.  Another study examined teams in information technology companies and 
pharmaceutical organizations in three countries to determine the effect of psychological 
safety on different types of team learning and team performance (Kostopoulos & Bozionelos, 
2011).  The researchers found that psychological safety positively affected team learning 
activities or behaviors (measured as team exploratory learning and team exploitive learning), 
which resulted in improved team performance.  These studies illustrate and support the role 
of team beliefs about safety, operationalized as psychological safety, on team learning 
behavior. 
There is also growing support in the healthcare literature for the role of psychological 
safety as an important influence on error reporting, which is how team learning behavior is 
operationalized in this study (Leroy et al., 2012).  A recent study conducted in the Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA) demonstrated a positive relationship between psychological 
safety and error reporting.  Individuals working in hospitals with more positive psychological 
safety scores indicated greater willingness to report errors (Derickson et al., 2015).  Another 
recent study of healthcare professionals working in cancer care hospitals in Sweden found 
that withholding patient safety concerns among healthcare professionals was negatively 
associated with psychological safety, and that individuals who did not feel psychologically 
safe were unlikely to speak up about safety concerns they encountered (Schwappach & 
Gehring, 2015).  In other words, the study findings demonstrated that psychological safety is 
an important factor in whether individuals were willing to report error-related events.  Based 
on the cumulative literature on psychological safety found both in the organizational and 
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psychology and healthcare literature, there is strong empirical support for the positive 
relationship between psychological safety and error reporting.  Thus, Research Question 3 
(RQ3) seeks to determine the effect of team safety belief on team learning behavior by 
asking: How does psychological safety affect error reporting? 
 Additional evidence from the literature suggests that psychological safety in teams 
often mediates different team factors that can affect team-learning behavior.  For example, a 
study that examined the effect of emotional intelligence on learning behavior in work teams 
of different organizations found that psychological safety mediated the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and team learning behavior (Ghosh, Shuch, & Petrosko, 2012).  Thus, 
psychological safety helped to explain how emotional intelligence affected learning behavior 
in teams.  Similarly, a study of teams in 85 different organizations in China found that 
psychological safety was an important mediator between the relationship of the team leader’s 
values (measured as leader’s values of participation, people, and productivity) and team 
learning.  Edmondson (1999) found that within work teams of a manufacturing company, 
psychological safety was an important mechanism through which the team structures of 
context support and leader coaching affected team learning and performance.  In the context 
of that study, psychological safety mediated the relationship between context support and 
leader coaching with team learning behavior.  Based on past research, this study seeks to 
determine whether psychological safety helps to explain how safety climate and leader 
inclusiveness affect error reporting.  It may be that psychological safety is an important 
factor in explaining the effect of the safety climate and leadership on error reporting.  
Research Question 4 (RQ4) determines the mediating role of team safety belief by asking: 
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Do leader inclusiveness and safety climate indirectly affect error reporting through 
psychological safety? 
Covariates 
Covariates are often included in studies of organizations, particularly in studies of 
patient safety and outcomes in hospitals, as researchers seek to determine characteristics of 
employees (e.g., nurses) or the work unit that may explain variations in responses (de 
Cordova, Phibbs, Schmitt, & Stone, 2014; Needleman, Buerhaus, Pankratz, Leibson, & 
Stevens, 2011).  The covariates included in this study are categorized as nurse characteristics 
(individual level) and nursing unit characteristics (unit level).  The nurse characteristics 
included nurse education, nurse experience, and nurse tenure.  The nursing unit 
characteristics included nurse manager education, nurse manager tenure, the size of the 
nursing unit, and the type of nursing unit.  Each of these covariates are discussed in greater 
detail in the sections that follow. 
 Nursing characteristics.  Nursing characteristics are individual characteristics of the 
nurse.  In this study, nurse education, nurse experience, and nurse tenure are the nursing 
characteristics included as covariates.  These covariates are briefly discussed from the 
literature with an explanation for their inclusion in this study. 
Nurse education.  In 2012, the IOM recommended increasing the total percentage of 
nurses with a baccalaureate degree to 80% by the year 2020.  This group recognized that 
while there is inconclusive evidence in the literature to causally link nurse education (i.e., 
academic degree) with patient outcomes, there is considerable evidence to support the 
relationship between nurse education and patient outcomes such as mortality or failure to 
rescue (Aiken et al., 2011; Aiken, Clarke, Cheung, Sloane, & Silber, 2003).  For example, 
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Aiken and colleagues (2003) examined the association between nurse education levels and 
the rate of mortality and failure to rescue in hospitals.  Using data from acute care hospitals 
in Pennsylvania, they found that hospitals with a higher proportion of baccalaureate degree 
nurses had lower mortality and failure-to-rescue rates.  Another study by Aiken and 
colleagues (2011) explored the effect of nurse staffing, nurse education, and nurse work 
environment on hospital mortality rates.  The study further demonstrated this important 
relationship by showing that even in hospitals with poor work environments, increases in the 
percentage of nurses with a baccalaureate degree decreased patient mortality rates. 
However, there is no evidence from past studies that nursing education is a significant 
predictor of error reporting by nurses (Chlang, Lin, Hsu, & Ma, 2010; Hung, Chu, Lee, & 
Hsiao , 2015; Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Notwithstanding previous findings, nurse education level is included in this study because it 
is a common covariate in many studies of nursing and patient safety.  One would anticipate 
that as nurses’ educational levels increase, so too, does their knowledge of errors and the 
importance of reporting errors.  Furthermore, this variable also provides important 
descriptive information of the study sample. 
Nurse experience.  There is evidence from past studies that the number of years an 
individual has worked as a nurse influences patient safety outcomes.  Studies of medication 
errors suggest that as nurses gain nursing experience, the number and severity of errors 
decreases (Fasolino & Snyder, 2012; Westbrook, Rob, Woods, & Parry, 2011).  Another 
study reported that nursing units with more experienced nurses had fewer medication errors 
and patient falls (Blegen, Vaughn, & Goode, 2001).  The relationship of nurse experience to 
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medication errors suggests that the number of years an individual has worked as a nurse may 
be related to team learning behaviors (i.e., error reporting). 
Researchers who have examined the relationship between nurses’ experience and 
error reporting have reported mixed results.  In a study of newly graduated nurses and 
experienced nurses, Unver, Tastan, and Akbayrak (2012) found that there was no statistically 
significant difference between newly graduated nurses’ and experienced nurses’ perceptions 
of error reporting.  However, there was a significant difference in understanding between 
new and experienced nurses of what constitutes an error and what should be reported as an 
error.  More experienced nurses were better aware of what constituted an error and should be 
reported.  In contrast, another study found an inverse relationship between experience and 
willingness to report so that nurses with less experience were more willing to report errors 
and vice versa (Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007).  The difference in these findings may be 
explained by different measures of error reporting (i.e., perceptions of reporting, willingness 
to report, or knowledge of what to report).  Nonetheless past research suggests that nurse 
experience is important in error reporting and should be considered when examining nurse 
error reporting.  Thus, this study included nurse experience as a covariate in the model. 
Nurse tenure.  Tenure, the length of time a nurse has worked on a particular nursing 
unit, is important because there are skills and knowledge that are acquired over time that are 
specific to a particular unit or team in which a nurse may work.  Furthermore, the nature of 
nursing work is highly interdependent and the relationships between workers can influence 
communication and productivity practices.  Therefore, nursing tenure is important, both from 
depth of knowledge as well as strength of relationship, a concept that has been described as 
human capital (Bartel, Beaulieu, Phibbs, & Stone, 2014).  Specifically, a study investigating 
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the effects of human capital variables (i.e., nurse turnover and nurse education) on 
productivity (measured as patient length of stay) found that human capital had a significant 
influence on productivity (Bartel et al., 2014).  Similarly, in studying error reporting, nurse 
tenure may be an important variable to include because of the potential relationship between 
nurses’ unit tenure and their perceptions of nurse manager inclusiveness, safety climate, 
psychological safety, and error reporting.  Nurses’ perceptions of these team factors may 
change as they gain experience and exposure to the structural and interpersonal dynamics of 
the team. 
 Among nursing characteristics typically included in studies of error reporting, nurse 
tenure is not included as often as others (i.e., nurse education).  However, three studies have 
examined nurse tenure in relation to error reporting.  Two studies found no significant 
relationship with tenure and error reporting (Chlang et al., 2010; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), 
while another found that tenure was significantly associated with error reporting so that 
greater tenure was associated with less fear in speaking up about errors (Castel, Ginsburg, 
Zaheer, & Tamim, 2015).  Based on these very limited but conflicting findings, further study 
of nurse tenure and its relationship to error reporting is warranted. 
 Nursing unit characteristics.  The nursing unit characteristics examined in this study 
included nurse manager and unit specific characteristics that might help to explain error 
reporting on nursing units.  Much of the past research on error reporting has not been 
conducted from a multilevel or unit perspective; thus, there are covariates included in this 
study that were not included in past studies.  However, a rationale is provided to explain why 
these variables were included.  The nursing unit characteristics included in this study were 
nurse manager education, nurse manager tenure, unit size, and type of unit.  
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Nurse manager education.  There is a growing recognition in some hospitals across 
the U.S. that nurse managers should obtain advanced, graduate level degrees (e.g., Master of 
Science in Nursing, Master of Healthcare Administration, etc.) to effectively manage and 
lead in hospitals (Yoder-Wise, Scott, & Sullivan, 2013).  However, there is a gap in the 
literature that ties nursing, patient, or hospital outcomes to the educational level of nurse 
managers (Thompson & Fairchild, 2013).  
Because graduate level education often emphasizes system thinking, it is possible that 
nurse managers with at least a master’s level education, when compared to an entry-level 
degree in nursing, have a deeper understanding of safety issues on the units they manage.  In 
turn, error reporting may be emphasized to nurses who work on the unit as an essential 
component of improving the quality and safety of care delivered to patients.  Thus, nurse 
manager education was included as a covariate in this study.  
 Nurse manager tenure.  Nurse manager tenure, the amount of time the individual 
nurse manager has been in his or her position was included as a covariate because the length 
of time leading the unit is related to the depth and productivity of unit relationships.  Also, 
the extent to which nurse managers influence nurse error reporting may be in some way 
associated with the amount of time they have been in the position.  Almost all identified 
studies of error reporting did not control for unit manager characteristics.  While there is no 
identified evidence from past studies for the inclusion of nurse manager tenure as a covariate, 
the economic concept of human capital supports nurse manager tenure and the knowledge 
and skills associated with tenure as a potentially important covariate to this of error reporting. 
 Unit size.  There is known variability between nursing units in hospitals, so 
researchers examining outcomes in nursing units often control for a number of unit-level 
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variables (Needleman et al., 2011).  One such variable is unit size, which has been included 
as a covariate in past studies conducted on nursing units (Bae, Kelly, Brewer, & Spencer, 
2014; Shah, Mirea, Solimano, & Lee, 2015).  One study examined how nurse-staffing 
characteristics affected the patient outcomes of pressure ulcer rates and patient falls (Bae et 
al., 2014).  Researchers in the study indicated that unit size was one of the nursing unit 
variables for which they controlled.  However, there is no information in the article about the 
significance of this control variable on the outcome measures.  Shah and colleagues (2015) 
examined the effect of unit size, resource allocation, and occupancy in neonatal intensive 
care units in relationship to any associated morbidities of preterm infants cared for in the 
respective study units.  Findings from the study indicated that larger unit size was 
significantly associated with an overall increase in morbidities for preterm infants.  There is 
some evidence that unit size has influenced unit outcomes in past studies.    
In studies of error reporting, unit size has been investigated in a limited capacity.  
Only one identified study included unit size as a covariate, and those researchers did not find 
a significant relationship between unit size and error reporting (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
While there is limited past evidence to determine the effect of unit size on error reporting, it 
is possible that larger units with more staff generate more errors and therefore more error 
reports.  In larger units with more staff, nurses may not feel as psychologically safe because 
there is less opportunity for interactions with the manager or with colleagues, which 
contributes to feelings of psychological safety.  Because of these reasons, unit size was 
included as a covariate in this study. 
Type of unit.  The type of nursing unit is an important covariate that is frequently 
included in studies of nursing units within hospitals.  For example, one study that examined 
53 
reported medication errors on nursing units found that emergency department units reported 
fewer medication errors, and intensive care units reported more medication errors.  
Interestingly, the number of medication errors reported by surgical units was not significant 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Another study that examined contributing factors to medication 
errors observed that medical units and intensive care units had the greatest percentage of 
medication errors over surgical units, emergency units, pediatric units, and other units (Tang, 
Sheu, Yu, Wei, & Chen, 2007).  Thus, past evidence suggests that the type of unit is an 
important covariate to include in the study because the number of errors reported can vary 
depending on the type of nursing unit. 
Summary of the Conceptual Model 
 The conceptual model for this study was derived from the model of work-team 
learning and uses the constructs of team structures, team belief, and team behavior.  An 
illustration of how the study constructs were used to derive the concepts, variables, and 
measures of this study is provided in Figure 3.  In addition, Table 1 provides definitions for 
the concepts and variables of the study. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the derivation of underlying conceptual components of this study of 
error reporting. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of the Study Concepts and Variables Used in this Study of Error Reporting 
Construct Concept:  Definition Variable:  Definition 
TEAM 
STRUCTURES 
Context Support:  The elements that support the 
team to engage in learning behavior and also 
promote trust among team members by dispelling 
fear (Edmondson, 1996; Edmondson, 1999; 
Edmondson, 2003). 
Safety Climate: The shared perceptions and experience of 
employees about the practices, policies, and procedures 
related to the safety of patients (Katz-Navon et al., 2005; 
Vogus et al., 2010) 
 
 
Team Leadership:  The behaviors whereby the 
team leader conveys openness, accessibility, and 
approachability to team members thereby 
promoting trust within and between team members 
(Edmondson, 1996, 1999, 2003). 
Leader Inclusiveness:  The behavior of leaders that 
demonstrates availability, openness, and accessibility to 
employees whereby they invite input and demonstrate an 
appreciation for the contribution of employees (Hirak et al., 
2012; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). 
 
 
TEAM 
BELIEF 
Team Safety:  The beliefs among team members 
of trust and mutual respect that empower them to 
take interpersonal risks like reporting mistakes, 
challenging the status quo, asking questions, and 
seeking feedback (Edmondson, 1999, 2004). 
Psychological Safety: The willingness of team members to 
speak up about concerns without fear of negative 
consequences (Edmondson, 1999, 2004). 
 
  
TEAM 
BEHAVIORS 
Team Learning Behavior:  Reflection and action 
by team members that promote team learning 
(Edmondson, 1999) 
 
 
 
Error Reporting:  The formal and primary way by which 
healthcare professionals document and communicate to 
unit managers and those at upper levels of healthcare 
administration the errors and near misses that occur during 
the provision of medical care to patients (Leape, 2002). 
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Chapter Summary 
 This chapter reviewed relevant literature on the independent variables of the study: 
safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety.  From the literature review 
there were two primary gaps identified.  Leader inclusiveness has not been previously studied 
in relationship to error reporting, and more importantly, the majority of research on error 
reporting has not used a cohesive theoretical foundation to examine the factors related to 
error reporting.  This research study addresses both of these gaps by integrating leader 
inclusiveness and by applying the model of work-team learning as the theoretical basis of the 
conceptual model to investigate team factors that affect error reporting. 
 A synopsis of key studies conducted by Amy Edmondson (1996, 1999, 2003) was 
then presented to facilitate the discussion of the model of work-team learning.  The 
conceptual model of the study was discussed along with theoretical and research support for 
the relationships examined by the research questions of the study.  This chapter concluded 
with a discussion of the covariates and a rationale for their inclusion in the study.  Building 
on this review of literature and discussion of the conceptual model for the study, Chapter 3 
presents an outline of the study methods and procedures that were used to examine the team 
factors related to error reporting. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of context support, team 
leadership behavior, and safety belief on team learning behavior.  The theoretical foundation 
for this study was the model of work-team learning (Edmondson, 1999), which then was used 
to derive the conceptual model for examining error reporting by nurses.  The study 
accomplishes its purpose by examining the effects of nurses’ perceptions of safety climate, 
leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety on error reporting.  The research questions of 
the study were answered by using methods for modeling correlated outcomes.  Continuous 
outcomes were examined using linear mixed models with random effects, while count 
outcomes were examined using Poisson regression models and generalized estimating 
equations.  This chapter presents research and methodological issues germane to the conduct 
of this study. 
Study Design 
 This study used a cross-sectional, descriptive design to address the research 
questions.  Data were collected from nurses and nurse managers through a self-administered 
survey available in paper or electronic format, depending on respondents’ preferences.  The 
following research questions were addressed in this study: 
1. How do safety climate and leader inclusiveness affect error reporting (RQ1)? 
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2. How do safety climate and leader inclusiveness affect psychological safety 
(RQ2)?  
3. How does psychological safety affect error reporting (RQ3)?  
4. Do safety climate and leader inclusiveness indirectly affect error reporting 
through psychological safety (RQ4)?  
Setting and Sample 
The setting for this study was a large academic medical center in the southeastern 
U.S. with 805 licensed beds (American Hospital Association, 2013).  The sample was a 
convenience sample of nurses and nurse managers who were employed by the hospital.  
Nurses included in the study were Registered Nurses (RNs; i.e., per diem, part-time, or 
fulltime) who spent the majority of their time providing direct care to patients.  The nurse 
sample was recruited from 50 patient care units, including 38 inpatient areas as well as short-
term or outpatient areas, including the operating room, emergency room, dialysis, procedural, 
and rehabilitation units.  Nurse managers are the formal organizational administrators of 
nursing units providing inpatient care, as well as short-term or outpatient areas, including the 
operating room, emergency room, dialysis, procedural, and rehabilitation units. 
Power Analysis 
Power analyses were conducted using the approach of Hauck, Gilliss, Donner, and 
Gortner (1991) and were based on the effective sample size, that is, the equivalent number of 
independent observations.  Prior to data collection, it was estimated that 49 nursing units 
would provide an average of 16 nurse responses per unit.  For a small intra-unit correlation 
of .05, the effective sample size would be 448; for a large correlation of .125, the effective 
sample size would be 273.  This latter, conservative effective sample size would be sufficient 
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to identify a very small R2 of 2.8% for a bivariate regression analysis at 5% significance with 
80% power and 3.9% for a multiple regression based on three predictors (Cohen, 1992).  
While nurses in 53 units responded to the survey, there were only usable data for nurses from 
49 units.  Actual sample sizes ranged from 736 to 814 due to missing data.  Using the 
conservative value of 736, or about 15 nurses per unit, and the largest observed intra-unit 
correlation of .13, the effective sample size is 261.  This provides 80% power at 5% 
significance for identifying a small effect size of 2.9% for a bivariate regression analysis and 
4.0% for a multiple regression based on three predictors.  With an intra-unit correlation 
of .05, the effective sample size increases to 448.  Consequently, the study is very well 
powered for conducting the regression analyses for the first three steps of the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) approach to mediation analysis, possibly even allowing for an extra covariate.  
For the fourth step of the mediation analysis, the simulation results of Fritz and MacKinnon 
(2007) indicate that a sample size of n = 396 was needed for 80% power and 5% significance 
based on the slopes of the data for steps 2 and 3 of the mediation analysis using the bias-
corrected bootstrap.  Thus, tests for indirect effects may be underpowered for analyses 
involving larger intra-unit correlation but well powered for smaller ones. 
Instrumentation 
Variables and Their Measurement 
The dependent variable in this study was error reporting, while the independent 
variables were safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety.  The covariates 
examined in this study were nursing characteristics and nursing unit characteristics.  The 
nursing characteristics identified in the literature as being relevant to this study were: nurse 
education (Aiken et al., 2011, 2003), nurse experience (Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007), 
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and nurse tenure (Castel et al., 2015).  The nursing unit characteristics also derived from the 
literature and relevant to this study included the following: nurse manager education, nurse 
manager tenure, unit size (Shah et al., 2015), and type of nursing unit (Tang et al., 2007; 
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
The quality of instruments used in a research study is essential to the accuracy of the 
data collected and the research study itself (DeVellis, 2003).  When discussing instruments, 
there are two important and interrelated concepts: validity and reliability.  Validity is 
concerned with the extent to which items in a scale accurately measure and reflect the 
underlying concept responsible for item co-variation (DeVellis, 2003; Vogt & Johnson, 
2011).  Reliability refers to the internal consistency or performance of the scale (Tavakol & 
Dennick, 2011).  The reliability of the instruments used in this study was tested using 
Cronbach’s alpha to determine the internal consistency of each instrument.  
The section that follows provides a more detailed discussion of the study variables, 
their operational definition, and how they were measured.  
Error Reporting  
Error reporting was defined as nurses’ perceptions of and engagement in error 
reporting on their nursing unit.  Error reporting was measured in two ways.  First, the 
frequency of error reporting on nursing units was measured with the 3-item subscale, the 
Frequency of Event Reporting Scale, from the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSPSC; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ], n.d.).  The HSPSC is a 46-
item instrument with 12 subscales that was developed to measure patient safety culture in 
hospitals (Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  Respondents provided answers to scale items via multiple 
choice responses with options specific to the item.  Validity for the HSPSC was addressed by 
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its developers, who generated the items of the scale by conducting literature reviews and 
interviewing staff in hospitals  (Pinkerton, 2005).  The survey was then tested, piloted, and 
amended before it was widely administered in hospitals (Pinkerton, 2005).  Through this 
process, the researchers developed a valid tool for measuring patient safety culture in 
hospitals.  The psychometric properties of the scale have been evaluated by past researchers 
who found evidence that overall, the dimensions of the scale and the items are 
psychometrically sound  (Blegen, Gearhart, O’Brien, Sehgal, & Alldredge, 2009; Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010).  The subscale composites had reliability scores, assessed with Cronbach’s 
alpha, that ranged from .62 to .85 (Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  Other than one subscale dimension, 
the staffing composite, the overall Cronbach’s alpha for each of the subscales was greater 
than or equal to .70, indicating good reliability (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). 
The Frequency of Event Reporting Scale used in this study was originally developed 
as one of 12 subscales that comprise the HSPSC.  This subscale of the HSPSC has three 
items that are scored with a 5-point unbalanced scale where 1 = never and 5 = always.  The 
Frequency of Event Reporting Scale has been used as a standalone measure in two other 
identified studies of error reporting in hospitals (Hillen, Pfaff, & Hammer, 2015; Richter et 
al., 2014).  The study by Hillen et al. (2015) examined how the transformational leadership 
of hospital directors in Germany influenced the frequency of event reporting by staff.  The 
authors used the Frequency of Evens Reporting Scale and reported a Cronbach’s α = .86.  
Another study (Richter et al., 2014) examined the effect of safety culture on error reporting 
and how those perceptions differed between managers and staff in hospitals across the U.S., 
and also used the Frequency of Event Reporting Scale; however, they did not report the 
psychometric properties for the scale in their study.  Past studies that have examined the 
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HSPSC have used factor analysis and inter-item correlations to assess the validity and 
reliability of the scale.  Those studies found that the Frequency of Event Reporting Scale had 
a one-factor solution with inter-item reliabilty ranging from .69 to .85 and an overall 
Cronbach’s α = .85 (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). 
For use in this study, slight changes were made to the original items of the Frequency 
of Event Reporting Scale to improve clarity. These changes were made in consultation with 
experts in the fields of survey design, psychometrics, and organizational study who also 
reviewed the items for face validity.  The original item wording and the changes to the items 
used in this study can be viewed in Appendix 1.  Each item of the 3-item scale was scored on 
a 5-point unbalanced scale, with a score of 5 corresponding to greater frequency of error 
reporting on the unit.  In this study, factor analysis confirmed a one-factor solution and the 
inter-item correlations for the Frequency of Event Reporting Scale ranged from .62 to .74.  
The reliability of the scale, using Cronbach’s alpha, was .81. 
The second measure of error reporting, the number of errors, was measured through a 
self-reported numerical estimate reported by individual nurse respondents in the 12 months 
prior to the survey administration.  This numerical estimate of error reports submitted 
through the error reporting system was chosen as a second measure of error reporting 
because it assesses one aspect of error reporting that is distinct from nurses’ perceptions 
about unit error reporting and it gets closer to the actual number of reports that nurses 
submitted.  This measurement is also consistent with other studies that have examined actual 
error reports as a measure of error reporting (Milch et al., 2006; Naveh et al., 2006; Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  While the number of reports actually submitted through the error reporting 
system for each respondent would have been preferable to a self-report of errors reported, it 
 63 
was impossible to obtain these data from the study hospital and its risk management 
department.  Thus, the self-report measure of error reports was used instead, as it was 
believed to be the closest measure of the actual number of error reports submitted by nurses.  
A similar item is used in the AHRQ HSOPSC (n.d.), but provides numeric categories for 
participants from which to choose.  In this survey, respondents were asked to “Estimate the 
number of error reports you have completed in the last 12 months.”  This allowed for a count 
rather than categorical variable for the response, which provided greater flexibility in data 
analysis. 
Safety Climate 
Safety Climate is the shared perceptions and experiences of employees about the 
practices, policies, and procedures related to the safety of patients (Katz-Navon et al., 2005; 
Vogus et al., 2010).  The Safety Climate Survey used in this study is a 21-item scale designed 
to measure individual perceptions of the unit level safety climate (Thomas, Sexton, Neilands, 
Frankel, & Helmreich, 2005).  Scale items were scored with a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 
corresponding to poor safety climate and 5 corresponding to a very positive or very strong 
safety climate.  
The survey has previously been used in over 251 clinical units in 52 hospitals 
(Thomas et al., 2005) and is recognized and endorsed by the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement, an organization dedicated to the improvement of healthcare (Kho, Carbone, 
Lucas, & Cook, 2005).  The authors of the Safety Climate Survey indicated that the survey 
was developed based on similar surveys from the aviation industry (Thomas et al., 2005).  
The authors of the scale conducted focus groups with healthcare workers, consulted with 
subject matter experts, and conducted field testing to address the validity of the measure 
 64 
(Thomas et al., 2005).  However, they neither reported any results from a factor analysis of 
the safety climate survey, nor did they provide details on the reliability of the survey.  Other 
researchers, who did a study comparing different measures of the safety climate, reported 
that the reliability of the Safety Climate Survey in their study, using Cronbach’s alpha, 
was .86 (Kho et al., 2005).  No other psychometric properties of the scale were identified 
from the published literature. 
Prior to survey administration, psychometric and subject matter experts reviewed the 
items of the scale for face validity.  In consultation with these experts, some of the items in 
the scale were altered for clarity or changed from a single item into two separate items.  For 
example, one of the items read, “The physician and nurse leaders in my areas listen to me 
and care about my concerns.”  Because this question referred to both physicians and nurse 
leaders it was modified to be two separate items that read “The physician leaders on my unit 
listen to me and care about my concerns” and “The nurse leaders on my unit listen to me and 
care about my concerns.”  The original scale items and the changes to the items made for this 
survey of error reporting are found in Appendix 2. 
Prior to data analysis, Item 21 from the Safety Climate Survey, “The staff on my unit 
frequently disregards established rules or guidelines” was reverse-coded.  In a search of 
published literature on the Safety Climate Survey, no studies were found that reported an 
analysis of the survey dimensions through factor analysis (Colla, Bracken, Kinney, & Weeks, 
2005).  Thus, after data collection, an exploratory factor analysis of the scale items was 
conducted using principal axis factoring with Oblimin rotation.  Examination of the Scree 
plot suggested that this scale had four factors.  The 2-, 3-, and 4-factor solutions were 
reviewed.  The 3-item solution was immediately eliminated because the majority of the scale 
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items (17 items) loaded on the first factor.  Only two items loaded on the second factor and 
two items on the third factor.  The 2-factor and 4-factor solutions were then examined to 
determine which was the best factor solution.  The 2-factor solution was chosen because it 
provided two conceptually distinct factors without a great deal of overlap.  Further, the 2-
factor solution demonstrated good reliability of at least α = .70 in both factors.  After 
choosing the 2-factor solution, two items from Factor 1 were eliminated from the scale 
because they did not meet the criteria for item retention, a factor loading of at least 0.40 
(Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003).  The items that were eliminated from the original 
scale are noted in Appendix 3. 
Factor 1 contained 15 items examining the support of unit leaders for safety, the 
degree to which errors were handled appropriately on the unit, the culture for learning from 
mistakes on the unit, and the degree to which respondents would feel safe being treated as a 
patient on the unit.  These items all addressed elements of the safety climate that were 
specific to the environment of the nursing unit and were therefore titled Safety Climate—Unit 
Environment.  This dimension of the safety climate survey was scored individually on a 5-
point Likert scale, with 5 corresponding to a very positive safety climate-unit environment.  
Reliability of this dimension of the safety climate survey was assessed using Cronbach’s 
alpha, which was .93, and the inter-item correlations ranged from .25 to .77.  See Appendix 3 
for the items included in the Safety Climate—Unit Environment. 
Factor 2 had five items.  These items assessed safety briefings on the unit that were 
generally attended by interdisciplinary team members and assessed the level of support 
provided by physician and pharmacy interdisciplinary staff.  Because these items addressed 
the availability, interaction, and support of interdisciplinary staff on the unit, Factor 2 was 
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labeled Safety Climate—Interprofessional Relationships.  Each item of the scale was scored 
on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 indicating poor interprofessional relationships on the unit and 
5 indicating very positive interprofessional relationships on the unit.  Cronbach’s alpha 
was .77.  The inter-item correlations ranged from .27 to .73.  See Appendix 3 for the items 
included in the Safety Climate Survey—Interprofessional Relationships. 
Leader Inclusiveness 
Leader inclusiveness is defined as nurses’ perceptions of the degree to which the 
words and actions of the unit nurse manager communicate an invitation of and appreciation 
for the contribution of the individual nurse (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  Leader 
inclusiveness was measured with the Inclusive Leadership Scale, a 9-item scale that was 
developed to measure individual worker perceptions of manager inclusiveness (Carmeli et 
al., 2010).  Scale items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 corresponding to low 
degrees of leader inclusiveness and 5 corresponding to high degrees of leader inclusiveness 
for the nurse manager of the unit. 
Because the study was designed to assess team factors in nursing units, small changes 
were made to the original scale items to reflect the unit level of study.  For example, the first 
item of the scale originally read, “The manager is open to hearing new ideas.”  This item was 
changed to read, “The manager on my unit is open to hearing new ideas.”  The original scale 
and the changes made to the items for this study are found in Appendix 4. 
In creating the scale, the authors addressed the validity of the scale by first creating 
items that accurately reflected the three dimensions of leader inclusiveness: openness, 
availability, and accessibility (Carmeli et al., 2010).  Next, they had 15 graduate students and 
10 employees at the study site review the items in the scale and indicate the extent to which 
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each item reflected the construct it was designed to reflect.  Any items that did not reflect the 
underlying construct or reflected more than one construct were removed from the scale.  This 
process resulted in a 9-item scale with a one-factor solution.  
To date, there are two identified published studies that have used the Inclusive 
Leadership Scale.  Carmeli and colleagues (2010) developed the Inclusive Leadership Scale 
for a study of team engagement in creative tasks on the research and development units of 
eight high-tech firms.  Cronbach’s α for the scale in that study was .94.  Hirak and others 
(2012) also used the Inclusive Leadership Scale to examine work team performance in 67 
nursing units of a hospital (Hirak et al., 2012).  They reported a Cronbach’s α = .93 for the 
Inclusive Leadership scale. 
The factor analysis conducted in this study affirmed a one-factor solution for this 
scale.  The inter-item correlations ranged from .68 to .91.  The high inter-item correlation 
suggests that the items in the scale are redundant, highlighting a weakness of this scale 
(Netemeyer et al., 2003).  Internal consistency of the scale, using Cronbach’s alpha, was .98.  
Psychological Safety 
Psychological Safety is the degree to which a nurse feels safe to speak up about issues 
or needs in the unit (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  The original psychological safety 
scale, developed by Edmondson (1999), included seven items, which were scored on a 7-
point scale with 1 = “very inaccurate” to 7 = “very accurate.”  There are examples 
throughout the literature of researchers who have adapted the original 7-item scale to include 
four items (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006), five items (Carmeli, Brueller, & Dutton, 2009; 
Carmeli et al., 2010), and six items (Baer & Frese, 2003; Kark & Carmeli, 2009; Lau & 
Murnighan, 2005).  In previous published studies, the coefficient alpha for the psychological 
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safety measure has ranged from 0.67 to 0.82 (Baer & Frese, 2003; Carmeli et al., 2009; 
Edmondson, 1999; Kark & Carmeli, 2009; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Leroy et al., 2012; 
Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Ortega et al., 2013).  Specifically, α = .74 for the Carmeli et 
al. (2010) study, which used the same five items from the original 7-item scale used in this 
study.  
In her development of the psychological safety scale, Edmondson (1999) addressed 
the validity of the scale by indicating that it was derived from theoretical constructs.  Further, 
she used qualitative interviews to create the scale and then tested the scale through 
psychometric analysis.  She indicated that discriminant validity was primarily addressed 
through factor analysis, which yielded a one-factor solution for psychological safety, thus 
supporting the validity of the scale to measure the concept of psychological safety.  In the 
published study that described and tested the psychological safety scale, study results showed 
inter-item correlations that ranged from .28 to .48, with a Cronbach’s α = .82.  
Consistent with other studies (Carmeli et al., 2010), this study used five items from 
the original 7-item psychological safety scale (Edmondson, 1999).  Prior to survey 
administration, some items were changed for clarity.  For example, item 5 in the scale 
originally read, “No one on this team would deliberately act in a way that undermines my 
efforts.”  It was changed to read, “No one I work with would deliberately act in a way that 
undermines my efforts.”  The individual items of the scale were scored with a 5-item Likert 
scale with 1 corresponding to low degrees of psychological safety and 5 corresponding to 
high degrees of psychological safety. 
Prior to data analysis in this study, Item 2 from the Psychological Safety scale, 
“People on my unit sometimes reject or ignore others for being different” was reverse coded.  
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Each item of the scale was scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with a score of 1 corresponding 
to low levels of psychological safety and a score of 5 corresponding to high levels of 
psychological safety.  A factor analysis was performed, which confirmed a single factor 
scale.  The mean inter-item correlation for the scale was poor at .30 and the inter-item 
correlations ranged from .06-.49.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the 5-item scale was .66.  In 
particular, there was one item with poor inter-item correlation, and at least 2 study 
participants even commented in an open-ended section at the end of the survey that the item 
was confusing.  The item read, “It is safe to take a risk on my unit.”  As a result, this item 
was dropped from the scale.  The resulting Cronbach’s alpha improved to .70, and the inter-
item correlations ranged from .29 to .49 with a mean inter-item correlation of .39.  See 
Appendix 5 for the original items from the Psychological Safety Scale and the items that 
were used in this study of error reporting. 
Covariates 
 Nursing characteristics.  Nursing characteristics are often included in studies of 
patient safety and outcomes as researchers try to determine characteristics of nurses that may 
significantly affect patient outcomes.  A rationale was provided in Chapter 2 to explain why 
these nursing characteristics—nurse experience, nurse tenure, and nurse education—were 
included as covariates. 
Nurse education.  In this study, nurse education was defined as the highest level of 
nursing education possessed by nurses.  This variable was measured as a categorical variable, 
and respondents were first asked to select their highest degree in nursing from the following 
choices: Diploma, associate degree in nursing (ADN), bachelor of science in nursing (BSN), 
master of science in nursing (MSN), or doctorate in nursing.  Second, respondents were 
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asked to indicate their highest non-nursing degree from the following choices: no degree 
outside of nursing, diploma, associate degree, bachelor degree, master of business 
administration, master of health administration, master of public health, other master’s 
degree, doctorate, or other.  Nurses’ responses were then assigned codes so that 1 = Diploma 
degree in nursing, 2 = ADN, 3 = BSN, and 4 = MSN or higher. 
Nurse experience.  Nurse experience was operationally defined as the length of time 
in years that an individual had practiced as a nurse.  This variable was determined by asking 
nurses for the year of their original licensure to practice as a registered nurse and subtracting 
that date from the study year. 
Nurse tenure.  Nurse tenure was operationally defined as the length of time in years 
that an individual had been employed on the nursing unit where they currently worked.  This 
variable was measured by asking respondents to provide the year they first began working on 
their current nursing unit and subtracting that date from the study year. 
 Nursing unit characteristics.  The nursing unit characteristics examined in this study 
included nurse manager and unit specific characteristics that might help to explain error 
reporting on nursing units.  A rationale was provided in Chapter 2 to explain why these 
covariates were included.  The nursing unit characteristics included in this study were: nurse 
manager tenure, nurse manager education, unit size, and type of unit.  
Nurse manager education.  Nurse manager education was operationally defined as a 
nurse manager’s highest level of education.  This variable was measured in two different 
questions as a categorical variable.  First, respondents were asked to select their highest 
degree in nursing from the following choices: Diploma, ADN, BSN, MSN, or Doctorate in 
Nursing.  Second, respondents were asked to select their highest degree outside of nursing 
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from the following choices: No degree outside of nursing, diploma, associate degree, 
bachelor degree, master of business administration (MBA), master of health administration 
(MHA), master of public health (MPH), other master’s degrees, or doctorate.  Because all 
nurse managers had at least a BSN, and many had a master’s degree outside of nursing, the 
data from these two questions was combined into the nurse manager education variable.  The 
following dummy codes were assigned for data analysis: 1 = BSN and 2 = Master’s degree or 
higher. 
Nurse manager tenure.  Nurse manager tenure was operationally defined as the 
length of time the nurse manager had served in his or her current position on the nursing unit.  
This variable was measured as the year a nurse manager started working in the role of 
manager on the unit.  Nurse manager tenure was determined by taking the difference between 
this date and the study year. 
 Unit size.  Unit size was operationally defined as the number of RN employees on the 
nursing unit.  This variable was measured in two ways.  First, as the number of RN 
employees (i.e., head count) on the unit, as reported by the nurse manager, and secondly, as 
the number of FTE RN employees on the unit, as reported by the nurse manager. 
Type of nursing unit.  The type of nursing unit was operationally defined as 
Medical/Surgical, Intensive Care Unit (ICU), Specialty, and Other.  Each of the 49 patient 
care units represented in this study were assigned to these four catagories.  After this initial 
assignment to type of unit, an expert in quality and safety who also works at the study 
hospital reviewed the assignment of units to catagories and made changes.  Finally, an expert 
in organizaitonal research also reviewed the categories and unit assignments for agreement.  
The units were then coded so that each unit in the study was designated as a  
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Medical/Surgical (1 = yes; 0 = no), ICU (1 = yes; 0 = no), Specialty (1 = yes; 0 = no), or 
Other (1 = yes; 0 = no) type of unit. 
Study Survey 
The survey questionnaire for the study was comprised of four different instruments 
that measured the key study variables of error reporting, safety climate, leader inclusiveness, 
and psychological safety.  The overall survey included a total of 46 items.  Table 2 provides 
details on the study variables and covariates, and how they were collected.  
Table 2 
Study Variables, Level of the Variable, Type of Variable, and Source of the Variable 
 
Variable 
 
Individual 
 
Unit 
 
Categorical 
 
Continuous 
Nurse 
Survey 
NM 
Survey 
Error Reporting X   X X  
Safety Climate X   X X  
Leader 
Inclusiveness 
X   X X  
Psychological 
Safety 
X   X X  
Nurse Education X  X  X  
Nurse 
Experience 
X   X X  
Nurse Tenure X   X X  
Nurse Manager 
Education 
 X X   X 
Nurse Manager 
Tenure 
 X  X  X 
Unit Size  X  X  X 
Unit Type X X X  X X 
Note. NM Survey: Nurse Manager Survey. 
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Prior to survey administration, a panel of six experts reviewed the survey for clarity 
and in some cases made recommendations for wording changes to items in the survey.  As a 
whole, the experts represented a knowledgeable panel with extensive experience in survey 
development and administration, psychometric analysis, quality and patient safety, and error 
reporting.  In particular, one reviewer is a survey expert who teaches instrumentation and 
measurement and consults nationally and internationally as an expert on survey construction 
and instrumentation.  Another reviewer consults throughout the university community and 
beyond on survey construction and administration.  Two reviewers are experts from practice 
and are highly engaged in patient safety and quality as well as the measure of quality and 
safety in the hospital setting.  Another reviewer is a statistician, and the final reviewer is an 
expert in the field of organizational study and the nursing workforce. 
Human Subjects Protection 
 Approval to conduct this study was obtained from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill as well as the nursing research 
council at the study site before beginning data collection.  Consent to participate in the study 
was attached to both the online and paper surveys distributed to RNs (Appendix 6) and nurse 
managers (Appendix 7).  Study participants indicated their consent to participate by choosing 
to advance to and submit the survey questions in the online survey or by completing and 
returning the paper survey.  The study consent notified the study participants, both individual 
RN participants and nurse manager participants, that data collected were confidential.  
Further, the identities of the study hospital and nursing units were kept confidential.  While 
nursing units were collapsed and labeled as broad specialty categories to be used for data 
analysis, they were not named. 
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Procedures 
 After receiving approval to conduct the study from the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill IRB and the study site research council, the recruitment of participants and 
data collection began.  A number of targeted approaches were used to maximize the response 
rate.  These included the use of a study site coordinator, specific recruitment activities, and a 
survey implementation plan.  These procedures are discussed in greater detail below. 
Study Site Coordinator 
A study site coordinator was identified in the study site hospital to facilitate sample 
recruitment and data collection.  This individual was well connected in the study site, served 
as the chair of the organization’s research council, and was a highly respected clinical 
nursing leader.  The study site coordinator played an important role in recruitment and data 
collection by advising the researcher on the best ways to communicate with the 
organization’s research council, staff hospital directors, nurse managers, and staff nurses in 
the hospital.  This individual helped to troubleshoot any problems that arose, facilitated study 
communications by distributing recruitment fliers and paper surveys, and sent out all 
electronic communications to staff nurses and nurse managers.  
Recruitment Activities 
Study recruitment activities began on April 7, 2015, when the study investigator 
attended the Nurse Manager Forum Meeting, a monthly meeting of all nurse managers at the 
study site.  At this meeting, the purpose of the study was explained by the study investigator 
to the nurse managers, who were provided time to ask questions about the study.  The nurse 
managers were asked to make staff aware of the study and to encourage staff nurse 
participation.  Nurse managers were also given a study packet for their individual unit, which 
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contained flyers to be posted on the nursing unit and in the staff break room.  Paper surveys 
with stamped return envelopes addressed to the researcher were also provided for any staff 
nurses who preferred to complete a paper versus online survey.  During this meeting, the 
nurse managers asked to be informed about their unit’s response rates at regular intervals so 
that they could send out weekly email updates to staff members on all units.  Thus, emails 
were sent to nurse managers during the recruitment period so they could communicate about 
the study with their staff and remind them of the opportunity to participate in the study.  In 
addition to asking nurse managers to encourage staff nurses’ participation in the study, the 
nurse managers themselves were also asked to participate in the study by completing the 
nurse manager survey. 
Data Collection 
There is anecdotal and research evidence suggesting that different groups of nurses 
show preference for different modes of electronic versus paper survey administration 
(VanGeest & Johnson, 2011).  To account for this preference, both the staff nurse and nurse 
manager surveys were made available to prospective participants in paper and electronic 
format.  Data collection for both paper and electronic surveys began on April 7, 2015 and 
ended on June 12, 2015.  
Nurses who chose to complete the paper surveys were instructed to return their 
surveys via the United States Postal Service directly to the researcher.  Nurse managers who 
chose to complete a paper survey were also instructed to return their surveys directly to the 
researcher or to the study site coordinator, who then forwarded the surveys to the researcher. 
Electronic surveys for both the nurse and nurse manager surveys were developed to 
follow the flow of the paper surveys (including all skips and other patterns), and formatted 
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using Qualtrics, an online survey tool.  Electronic responses for both nurses and nurse 
managers who completed their respective online surveys were captured via separate Qualtrics 
databases. 
Survey Implementation 
Nurse surveys.  The paper surveys for the nurses at the study site were distributed 
through the nurse managers, who were asked to place the paper surveys along with attached 
stamped, addressed envelopes in the break room of the nursing unit.  The researcher neither 
had face-to-face interaction with potential respondents, nor addresses with which to contact 
the respondents, either to distribute the paper surveys or to send paper reminders about the 
survey.  As a result, the implementation of the paper survey was done in conjunction with the 
electronic version of the survey so that all reminders were sent through email to notify 
participants of the opportunity to participate in the study by either paper or electronic means.  
This methodology was chosen because the study site hospital routinely used email to 
communicate with all of their employees.  Thus, every employee had access to a personal 
email account, and there were computers on all patient care units that allowed them to access 
their email.  Further, the hospital predominantly used electronic means to communicate with 
the staff so that using only electronic communications for survey implementation was not 
perceived as problematic.  Further details on the implementation of the nurse survey are 
provided in Table 3. 
The original intent of the study investigator was to use a four-contact method of 
survey implementation so that as nurse managers posted fliers and paper surveys on the units, 
potential participants would also receive the first recruitment email (Dillman, Smyth, & 
Christian, 2009).  However, unanticipated challenges in obtaining email addresses from the 
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hospital’s Human Resources (HR) department for all nurses at the study site delayed the 
distribution of initial contact emails to nurses.  There was a delay of almost two weeks from 
the distribution of the study fliers and paper surveys to receipt of the email of the initial 
contact emails.  Ultimately, the study site coordinator was able to work with the HR 
department to obtain the email addresses for the staff nurses employed on study units of 
interest.  There were also further difficulties in obtaining the email addresses, specifically for 
nurses working in the operating room (OR), delaying initial contact by an additional 1 to 1.5 
weeks.  These delays are reflected in the timeline shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Details on the Implementation of the Nurse Survey 
Contact Date Survey Implementation 
April 7, 2015 
Contact 1:a Paper versions of the nurse survey were given to NMs, who 
were asked to distribute them to nurses employed on the unit by making 
the survey packets available in their unit’s break room.   
April 21, 2015b 
Contact 2: Initial recruitment email was sent to nurses at the study site, 
by the study site coordinator.  The recruitment email included 
information on study participation and an electronic link to the survey, 
as well as information on the availability of paper surveys on the unit. 
April 28, 2015c 
 
Contact 3: First reminder email was sent to nurses at the study site by 
the study site coordinator and included information on study 
participation and an electronic link to the survey. 
May 5, 2015d 
Contact 4: Second reminder email was sent to nurses at the study site 
by the study site coordinator and included information on study 
participation and an electronic link to the survey. 
May 13, 2015e 
Contact 5: Third and final reminder email was sent to nurses at the 
study site by the study site coordinator and included information on 
study participation and an electronic link to the survey. 
Note. a Ideally, Contact 1 and 2 should have occurred simultaneously rather than at separate times, but 
unanticipated events resulted in separate contacts; b April 29, 2015, was Contact 2 for nurses working in the OR; 
c May 5, 2015, was Contact 3 for nurses working in the OR; d May 13, 2015, was Contact 4 for nurses working 
in OR; e May 20, 2015, was Contact 5 for nurses working in the OR. 
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Nurse manager surveys.  Paper surveys were distributed to nurse managers present at 
Nurse Manager Forum meetings in April and May 2015.  The study investigator sent an 
electronic invitation to participate in the nurse manager survey to any nurse managers who 
did not submit a paper survey at the Nurse Manager Forum meeting in April 2015.  
Additional information on the timing of the nurse manager survey is provided in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Details for the Implementation of the Nurse Manager Survey 
Contact Date Paper Survey Electronic Survey 
April 7, 2015 
Contact 1:  Paper surveys were 
distributed at the nurse manager 
(NM) forum meeting, and 
completed surveys were collected. 
 
April 10, 2015 
 
Contact 1:  Initial recruitment 
email was sent to NMs by the 
study investigator and included 
information on study participation 
and an electronic link to the 
survey. 
April 20, 2015 
 Contact 2:  First reminder email 
sent to NMs by the study 
investigator reminding them of 
the study and included an 
electronic link to the survey. 
April 27, 2015 
 Contact 3:  Second reminder 
email sent to NMs by the study 
investigator reminding them of 
the study and included an 
electronic link to the survey. 
May 4, 2015 
 Contact 4:  Third and final 
reminder email sent to NMs by 
the study investigator reminding 
them of the study and included an 
electronic link to the survey. 
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Table 4 
Cont. 
Contact Date Paper Survey Electronic Survey 
May 5, 2015 
Contact 2:  Paper surveys were 
distributed at the NM forum 
meeting by the study site 
coordinator, and completed surveys 
were collected and returned to the 
researcher. 
 
Note.  NM:  Nurse Manager. 
 
Data Management and Analysis 
 Qualtrics, an online survey tool, was used for electronic survey data collection.  
Nurses and nurse managers who followed the electronic link provided to them via email 
completed the electronic survey.  Paper surveys from both nurse managers and nurses were 
entered into Qualtrics by the researcher and then responses were double-checked against the 
paper version of the survey.  After the paper surveys were entered into Qualtrics and double-
checked, they were destroyed by shredding.  
At the end of the data collection period, data were first downloaded into Excel 
spreadsheets and then imported into a SAS® dataset.  Data from both the nurse and nurse 
manager surveys were cleaned, recoded as needed, and then merged into a single data file for 
analysis.  The data analysis for this study was conducted using SAS® software, Version 9.4 
(TS1M1) of the SAS System for Windows 8 [Copyright © 2002-2012 SAS Institute Inc. 
SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. product or service names are registered trademarks or 
trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA]. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations were conducted.  The outcome variable for the 
study, error reporting, was defined and measured in two ways that necessitated the use of 
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different methods of analysis to answer the research questions.  The first measure of error 
reporting was nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the unit, measured with 
the frequency of event reporting scale that yielded a mean score.  The second measure of 
error reporting was nurses’ reporting of errors on the unit, measured as nurses’ estimates of 
the number of error reports submitted over the last 12 months.  A discussion of how the data 
were analyzed is organized by the research questions of the study and these two different 
measurements of the outcome variable, error reporting. 
How Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Affect Error Reporting? 
 Research question 1 was first answered by using linear mixed models with random 
effects.  Linear mixed modeling with random effects was chosen over ordinary least squares 
(OLS) linear regression because an underlying assumption of OLS regression is that 
observations are statistically independent, or mutually exclusive (Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003).  However, because individual nurses work on nursing units in hospitals, and 
the data collected from nurses is clustered or correlated due to this organizational structure, 
an assumption of independence cannot be made (Liang & Zeger, 1993).  Therefore, to 
account for any intra-unit correlation, linear mixed models with random effects representing 
the intra-unit correlation were used to analyze the data for this question.  
After analyses for RQ1 were completed for nurses’ perceptions of error reporting on 
their unit, an analysis of the covariates was conducted, again using linear mixed methods.  
Any covariates that significantly predicted nurses’ perceptions of error reporting on their unit 
were then included in the linear mixed models to answer RQ1 with the addition of significant 
covariates. 
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 Next, Poisson regression models with generalized estimating equations (GEE) were 
used to regress the number of error reports submitted by nurses in the last 12 months on 
safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader 
inclusiveness.  Poisson regression was chosen for these analyses because the estimate of error 
reports submitted in the last 12 months was a count variable (Cohen et al., 2003), and GEE 
was used to address the correlated nature of the data (Der & Everitt, 2006).   
After analyses for RQ1 were completed for the number of error reports submitted by 
nurses in the last 12 months, an analysis of the covariates was conducted using Poisson 
regression with GEE.  Any covariates that significantly predicted this measure of error 
reporting were then included in the Poisson regression models to answer RQ1 with the 
addition of significant covariates. 
How Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Affect Psychological Safety? 
 Research question 2 was answered by using linear mixed models to regress the mean 
score for psychological safety on safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness.  Next, an analysis of covariates was 
performed to determine if any covariates significantly predicted psychological safety.  Since 
none of the study covariates significantly predicted psychological safety, no further analyses 
were conducted to address RQ2. 
How Does Psychological Safety Affect Error Reporting? 
 Research question 3 was first answered using linear mixed models to regress the 
mean score for nurses’ perceptions of frequency of error reporting on psychological safety.  
Next, any significant covariates were added to the models.  Research question 3 was then 
answered a second time with Poisson regression models with GEE to regress the number of 
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error reports submitted by nurses in the last 12 months on psychological safety.  Afterward, 
any significant covariates were added to the Poisson regression models with GEE. 
Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Indirectly Affect Error Reporting Through 
Psychological Safety? 
 Research question 4 addressed the mediating effect of psychological safety on the 
relationship between safety climate-unit environment and error reporting; safety climate-
interprofessional relationships and error reporting; and leader inclusiveness and error 
reporting.  For both measures of error reporting, nurses’ perceptions of error reporting on the 
unit, and the number of error reports submitted by nurses in the last 12 months, the same 
basic steps were used to answer RQ4.  However, the models used differed so that linear 
mixed models were used for nurses’ perceptions of error reporting, and Poisson regression 
models with GEE were used for the number of error reports submitted by nurses. 
There were four steps to the mediation analysis, the four steps of the causal steps 
approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) for addressing mediation.  Step 1 assessed the total 
effect of the individual predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the outcome variable (error 
reporting).  In order to establish a mediating effect, Step 1 of the mediation analysis does not 
have to be significant, but the remaining steps (Step 2, Step 3, and Step 4) must all be 
significant (Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer, 2008).  Step 2 assessed the effect of the 
individual predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the mediator variable, 
psychological safety.  Step 3 assessed the direct effect of the individual predictor variables 
(safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader 
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inclusiveness) controlling for the mediator variable (psychological safety) on the outcome 
variable, nurse perceptions of error reporting.  Finally, Step 4 assessed the indirect effects of 
the predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional 
relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the outcome variable (error reporting) through the 
mediator (psychological safety). 
For the outcome variable of nurses’ perceptions of frequency of error reporting on the 
unit, linear mixed models were used to address Steps 1, 2, and 3 of the mediation analysis.  
Step 4 was addressed by using bootstrap confidence intervals, with bias correction, to 
account for the change in slope (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  Simplified, the bootstrapping method is a process that 
samples one observation from the total number of complete observations in the dataset (n = 
779), and then replaces the observation in the dataset before sampling another single 
observation.  This process is then repeated until a resample with the same sample size as the 
original sample is obtained.  In this study the resampling generated 1000 bootstrap samples, 
which were used with bias correction to compute confidences intervals for the indirect effect 
of psychological safety.  An advantage to using the bootstrapping method is that a mediation 
analysis can be conducted with a smaller sample size (Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  These 
computations were performed using macros available at http://www.unc.edu/~gknafl/ 
software.html from Dr. George Knafl (gknafl@unc.edu, Chapel Hill, NC, USA).  Once all 
four steps of the mediation analysis were completed for nurses’ perceptions of frequency of 
error reporting, the significant covariates were added to the models and Steps 1-4 were 
repeated. 
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The same 4-step mediation analysis was used for the error-reporting measure of the 
number of error reports submitted in a 12-month period.  Steps 1-3 of the mediation analysis 
were conducted using Poisson regression models, because of the count outcome variable, 
with GEE, to account for intra-unit correlations.  Step 4 of the mediation analysis was again 
conducted using bootstrap confidence intervals, with bias correction, to account for the 
change in slope using macros available at http://www.unc.edu/~gknafl/software.html from 
Dr. George Knafl (gknafl@unc.edu, Chapel Hill, NC, USA).  Once the 4-step mediation 
analysis was completed for the number of error reports submitted by nurses, the significant 
covariates were added to the models and the 4-step mediation analysis was repeated. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided a review of the study methodology.  The research study used a 
cross-sectional, descriptive design to examine the effect of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety on error reporting.  The study was conducted in a 
single academic medical center in the southeastern U.S. with a convenience sample of nurses 
and nurse managers working predominantly in the inpatient setting.  Data were collected with 
a survey that was available to potential participants in either paper or electronic format, using 
four scales to measure the dependent and independent variables of the study.  Error reporting 
was defined in two ways, as nurses’ perceptions about the frequency of error reporting on the 
unit and as the number of error reports submitted by nurses; separate analyses were therefore 
used to answer the research questions of the study.  Altogether, the research questions were 
answered using linear mixed models, Poisson regression with GEE, and bootstrapping 
confidence intervals with bias correction.  The results of the data analyses of the study are 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
 
 This chapter presents the findings from this study that examined the effect of nursing 
unit factors—safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety—on error 
reporting by nurses.  The chapter begins with a description of the study sample followed by a 
description of the study variables.  Next, the results of the analyses are presented for each of 
the study research questions.  The chapter ends with a summary of the major study findings. 
Description of the Sample 
Response Rate and Sample Size 
There were 1,922 RNs employed on 50 nursing units at the study site who were 
recruited to participate in this study.  Of those nurses, 924 responded to the survey, for a 
response rate of 48.1%.  Of the nurses who responded to the survey, 96.5% completed the 
web-based version of the survey and the remaining 3.5% completed the paper version.  
Nurses representing 53 units at the study hospital responded to the survey by following the 
web-based link that was posted on recruitment flyers, but data were only usable from nurses 
in 49 units.  The sample sizes reported in analyses ranged from 687 to 924, depending on 
missing data and the relationships being examined. 
The 50 nursing units at the study site, which were the focus of recruitment efforts, 
had one nurse manager with administrative responsibilities for overseeing patient care 
delivery on each unit.  Of the nurse managers on the 50 units, 43 responded to the survey, 
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which represents a response rate of 86%.  Most of the nurse manager respondents (72.1%) 
completed the paper version of the survey, while the remainder (27.9%) completed the web-
based version of the survey. 
Missing Item Values 
 There were missing responses for all of the scales used in this study.  Consistent with 
other studies, values were imputed for individuals who had no more than 30% missing items 
for any given scale (Hillen et al., 2015; Roth, Switzer, & Switzer, 1999).  A number of 
methods for imputing missing items exist.  In this study, the individual mean approach was 
used for missing items so that an individual’s mean score for the scale was used to replace no 
more than 30% of missing item values from a single scale.  This approach is considered 
superior to other methods (e.g., single imputation, where the total mean score on the scale for 
all participants is used to impute missing values) because the individual’s mean score likely 
best represents their views on a phenomenon, rather than the mean value for all participants 
(Newman, 2014; Peyre, Leplege, & Coste, 2011; Roth et al., 1999). 
In total, values for 91 observations (2.2%) were imputed due to missing data for each 
of the scales in the study.  Specifically values for 5 out of 876 observations (0.6%) were 
imputed in the frequency of event reporting scale (i.e. nurses’ perceptions of error reporting 
frequency on the unit); 50 out of 824 observations (6.1%) were imputed for the safety 
climate-unit environment (i.e., safety climate); 9 out of 822 observations (1.1%) were 
imputed for the safety climate-interprofessional relationships (i.e., safety climate); 20 out of 
847 observations (2.4%) were imputed for the inclusive leadership scale (i.e. leader 
inclusiveness); and 7 out of 842 observations (0.8%) were imputed for the psychological 
safety scale (i.e., psychological safety). 
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Description of the Variables 
Sample Characteristics 
 The characteristics of the nurses in the study sample and the units on which they 
worked are displayed in Appendix 8.  The nurses who participated in the study had an 
average of 11.7 years of experience as a nurse and were employed on their current unit for an 
average of 6.1 years.  The majority of nurses in the sample had a bachelor of science in 
nursing (BSN) degree (68.4%).  Because there were so few nurses with an earned doctorate 
(n = 3) and the number was too small to generate meaningful results, doctorally-prepared 
nurses were combined with MSN-prepared nurses (n = 48) in subsequent analyses.  
For nurse manager participants, the average tenure as the nurse manager on their 
current unit was 5.3 years, but their tenure ranged from less than one year to a maximum of 
26 years.  The educational preparation of nurse managers was almost evenly split with 54.4% 
of nurse managers prepared with the highest degree of BSN and 43.5% of nurse managers 
prepared with a master’s degree.  Similar to the nurses in the study, the number of nurse 
managers with a doctorate (n = 1) was so small that it was combined in the category of nurse 
managers with a master’s degree in subsequent analyses (n = 20).  
Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
 
 The means, standard deviations (SD), and minimum and maximum values for the 
study variables are presented in Appendix 9.  The mean score for nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting on their unit was 3.4 (SD = 0.9).  Overall, nurses perceived that error reporting 
“sometimes” occurred on their unit.  The number of error reports submitted by each nurse 
during a 12-month period was reported to be approximately two error reports per year (SD = 
3.5), but the range in the number of error reports reported by nurses was great, from zero to 
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40 reports per year.  The mean score for the safety climate-unit environment was 3.9 (SD = 
0.7) while the safety climate-interprofessional relationships had a mean score of 3.7 (SD = 
0.8), which means that overall the nurses on the units perceived that the unit environment and 
interprofessional relationships on their unit were good.  The mean score for leader 
inclusiveness was 4.0 (SD = 1.0), which means that nurses working units at the study site 
perceived their managers to be inclusive leaders.  Finally, the mean score for nurses’ 
perceptions of psychological safety was 3.9 (SD = 0.7), meaning that nurses who participated 
in the survey felt positive psychological safety on their units.  All in all, the nurses who 
responded to the survey perceived that in their units there was positive safety climate, 
positive leader inclusiveness, and positive psychological safety.     
Relationships between Study Variables 
 The Pearson correlation coefficients for the relationships between the continuous 
dependent variables, independent variables, and covariates of the study are found in 
Appendix 10.  Nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the unit were positively 
associated with the study variables of safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety.  Safety 
climate-unit environment was positively associated with safety climate-interprofessional 
relationships, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety but negatively associated with 
nurse manager tenure and unit size.  Safety climate-interprofessional relationships was 
positively associated with leader inclusiveness and psychological safety but not with any of 
the nursing characteristics or nursing unit characteristics.  Leader inclusiveness was 
positively related to psychological safety, nurse experience, and nurse tenure but negatively 
related to nurse manager tenure and unit size.  Psychological safety was negatively associated 
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with nurse manager tenure and unit size.  Nurse experience was positively related to nurse 
tenure.  While tenure of nurses on the nursing unit was positively related to nurse manager 
tenure, it was negatively related to the size of the nursing unit (number of RN employees and 
number for RN FTEs).  
The correlations for nurse manager tenure and unit size were analyzed separately 
because both nurse manager tenure and unit size represent nursing unit characteristics 
measured at the nursing unit level (Appendix 11).  Nurse manager tenure was not 
significantly associated with either measure of unit size (number of RN employees and 
number of RN FTEs).  The two measures of unit size were also positively related. 
Covariate Selection 
 The covariates included in this study were nurse education, nurse experience, nurse 
tenure, nurse manager education, nurse manager tenure, unit size, and type of unit.  
Covariates were examined to select the covariates that would be used in the examination of 
dependent variables for the research questions of the study.  Specifically, covariates were 
examined for the dependent variables of psychological safety, error reporting measured as 
nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency on the unit, and error reporting measured as 
the number of error reports submitted by nurses in the past 12 months.  The process used to 
examine covariates is described next. 
 Covariate analysis for psychological safety.  A standard t-test was used to assess 
whether nurse education significantly influenced nurses’ perceptions of psychological safety.  
Specifically, the four types of academic degrees (diploma, ADN, BSN, and MSN or higher) 
were examined individually to determine if any type of degree had a significant effect on 
psychological safety.  Because of the continuous nature of the variables of nurse experience 
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and tenure, and since both of these variables were measured at the individual level, Pearson 
correlation coefficients were used to determine if these two covariates were significantly 
related to nurses’ perceptions of psychological safety.  
The remaining unit-level covariates (nurse manager education, nurse manager tenure, 
unit size, and type of unit) were examined using linear mixed models with random effects to 
account for within unit correlation and to assess the influence of these covariates on nurses’ 
perceptions of psychological safety.  The types of nurse manager education (BSN or master’s 
degree or higher) and the four types of nursing units (medical/surgical, ICU, specialty, or 
other) were each assessed individually to determine whether type of nurse manager degree 
and type of nursing unit individually predicted nurses’ psychological safety.  None of the 
covariates significantly predicted nurses’ psychological safety (Appendix 12). 
Covariate analysis for error reporting (nurses’ perceptions).  For the covariate of 
nurse education, again, a standard t-test was used to assess the influence of each type of 
academic degree (diploma, ADN, BSN, MSN or higher) on nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting.  Pearson correlation coefficients were used to assess the covariates of nurse 
experience and nurse tenure.  The unit level covariates of nurse manager education, nurse 
manager tenure, unit size, and type of unit were assessed using linear mixed models with 
random effects to account for within unit correlations.  For the categorical variables of nurse 
manager education and type of unit, separate models were created for each of the categories 
of the variables.  
The results of the covariate analyses conducted for nurses’ perceptions of error-
reporting frequency on the unit are included in Appendix 13.  There were a number of 
significant covariates for error reporting.  A diploma degree in nursing was positively related 
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to nurses’ perceptions of error reporting, but no other nursing degrees had a significant effect 
on nurses’ perceptions of error reporting.  Nurse manager education, specifically at the BSN 
and at the master’s degree or higher levels, had a significant effect on nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting.  However, on units led by BSN-prepared nurse managers, there was a 
negative relationship between nurse manager education and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting, such that nurses working on units with a BSN-prepared manager perceived that 
fewer errors were reported.  On units led by nurse managers with a master’s degree, there 
was a positive relationship between nurse manager education and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting, with nurses on these units perceiving that more errors were reported.  
Covariate selection for error reporting (number of reports submitted).  Because 
the second measure of error reporting—number of error reports submitted by nurses in the 
last 12 months—was a count variable, Poisson regression models were used to regress error 
reporting on the covariates.  For unit level variables, GEE was used to account for within unit 
correlations.  For categorical variables (i.e., nurse education, nurse manager education, and 
type of nursing unit), separate models were estimated for each variable.  Results for these 
covariate analyses are reported in Appendix 14.  Possessing a master’s degree or higher was 
positively related to the number of error reports that nurses reported submitting.  Nurse 
tenure was also positively related to the number of error reports submitted by nurses, so that 
the longer nurses worked on a specific unit, the fewer errors they reported submitting.  Nurse 
manager education was both positively and negatively related to the number of error reports 
submitted by nurses.  Nurses working on units with BSN-prepared managers submitted fewer 
error reports, while those who worked on units with a nurse manager prepared at the master's 
degree or higher level submitted greater numbers of error reports.  Finally, working on other 
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types of nursing units (e.g., procedural units or clinics) negatively predicted the number of 
error reports submitted by nurses, such that nurses working on these types of units submitted 
fewer error reports. 
Major Study Findings 
The major findings of the study are organized by the four research questions that were 
addressed in this study.  Analyses were first conducted without model covariates to maximize 
the sample size; the results of those analyses are reported first.  Next, the significant 
covariates for the corresponding outcome variables (Appendix 13 and Appendix 14) were 
added to models one at a time.  All remaining significant covariates were added to the 
models with the respective predictor and outcome variables.  If any covariates were no longer 
significant, they were removed from the model so that only significant covariates remained 
with the predictor and outcome variables.  Where significant, the results of the analyses with 
covariates included are reported below.  The conceptual model for the study, which 
illustrates the relationships examined by the research questions, is presented at the variable 
level in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual model for the study with identified research questions. 
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Research Question 1: How Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Affect Error 
Reporting?     
This question was first examined using linear mixed models with random effects to 
account for within unit correlations.  The results of the analyses, shown in Table 5, were all 
statistically significant and demonstrated that nurses’ perceptions of safety climate, both the 
unit environment and interprofessional relationships, positively affected nurses’ perceptions 
of error-reporting frequency on their unit.  Further, the results showed that nurses’ 
perceptions of the inclusiveness of their nurse managers also positively affected their 
perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the nursing unit where they worked.  
Table 5 
The Effect of Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness on Perceptions of Error Reporting 
  
n 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Model 1      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 788 738 0.59 12.45 < .01 
      
Model 1 with Covariates      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 788 738 0.59 12.59 < .01 
Nurse manager education:  BSN  47   0.30 3.59 < .01 
      
Model 2      
Safety Climate- 
Interprofessional Relationships 
787 737 0.45 10.76 < .01 
      
Model 2 with Covariates      
Safety Climate- 
Interprofessional Relationships 
787 737 0.44 10.89 < .01 
Nurse manager education:  BSN  47   0.26 3.41 < .01 
      
Model 3      
Leader Inclusiveness 811 761 0.24 7.20 < .01 
      
Model 3 with Covariate      
Leader Inclusiveness 811 761 0.25 7.39 < .01 
Nurse manager education:  BSN  47   0.27    3.21 < .01 
Note.  df = Degrees of Freedom; BSN: Bachelor of Science in Nursing. 
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Research question 1 was also examined using nurses’ estimates of the number of 
error reports submitted in a year.  Because this was a count variable, Poisson regression 
analyses with GEE was used to account for within unit correlations.  The results of the 
analyses are presented in Table 6 and indicated that safety climate, both the unit environment 
and the interprofessional relationships, negatively predicted the number of error reports 
submitted by nurses so that the more positively nurses perceived the safety climate-unit 
environment and the safety climate interprofessional-relationships, the fewer error reports 
they submitted.  The results also demonstrated that nurses’ perceptions of the inclusiveness 
of the nurse manager on their unit negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted.  
Nurses working on units with higher levels of leader inclusiveness reported submitting fewer 
error reports than those working on units with lower levels of leader inclusiveness. 
Next, the analyses were repeated with the addition of significant covariates 
(Appendix 14).  The results presented in Table 6 demonstrated that safety climate-unit 
environment negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted when controlling for 
nurses’ tenure on the unit and nurse managers’ education (master's degree or higher).  In 
addition, the results demonstrated that safety climate-interprofessional relationships 
negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted by nurses when controlling for the 
tenure of nurses on the unit where they worked and nurse manager education (i.e., master’s 
degree or higher).  Finally, leader inclusiveness negatively affected the number of error 
reports submitted by nurses when controlling for nurse managers’ education (master’s degree 
or higher). 
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Table 6 
The Effect of Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness on the Number of Error Reports 
 
 
n 
Estimated 
Slope 
 
SE 
Z 
score 
95% CI p 
value LL UL 
Model 1        
Safety Climate- 
Unit Environment 
792 -0.22 .08 -2.60 -0.38 -0.05 <.01 
        
Model 1 with Covariates        
Safety Climate-  
Unit Environment 
742 -0.22 .09 -2.62 -0.39 -0.06   .01 
Tenure  -0.02 .01 -2.23 -0.04 -0.002   .03 
Nurse Manager Education:  
Master’s degree or higher 
   0.83 .20 4.11   0.44 1.23 <.01 
        
Model 2        
Safety Climate-  
Interprofessional Relationships 
 
791 
 
-0.33 
 
.11 
 
-3.18 
 
-0.54 
 
-0.13 
 
<.01 
        
Model 2 with Covariates       
Safety Climate-  
Interprofessional Relationships 
 
742 
 
-0.33 
 
.08 
 
-4.12 
 
-0.49 
 
-0.17 
 
<.01 
Tenure  -0.02 .01 -2.47 -0.03 -0.004   .01 
Nurse Manager Education:  
Master’s degree or higher 
   0.86 .21 4.13   0.45 1.27 <.01 
        
Model 3        
Leader Inclusiveness 814 -0.18 .07 -2.58 -0.31 -0.04 <.01 
        
Model 3 with Covariates        
Leader Inclusiveness 814 -0.17 .06 -2.82 -0.29 -0.05 <.01 
Nurse Manager Education:  
Master’s degree or higher 
   0.81 .20 4.11   0.42   1.19 <.01 
Note.  SE:  standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
Research Question 2: How Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Affect 
Psychological Safety? 
 Research Question 2 was answered using linear mixed models with random effects to 
model within-unit correlation and fixed effects to model psychological safety, safety climate- 
unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness.  
The results, displayed in Table 7, show that nurses’ perceptions of the safety climate of their 
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unit, both the unit environment and the interprofessional relationships, predicted their 
feelings of psychological safety.  Additionally, nurses’ perceptions about leader inclusiveness 
positively affected their feelings of psychological safety.  
Table 7 
The Effect of Leader Inclusiveness and Safety Climate on Psychological Safety 
  
n 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Model 1      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 789 739 0.68 20.7 < .01 
      
Model 2      
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
788 738 0.36 10.8 < .01 
      
Model 3      
Leader Inclusiveness 809 759 0.27 10.4 < .01 
Note.  df = Degrees of Freedom 
Research Question 3: How Does Psychological Safety Affect Error Reporting?    
 Research question 3 assessed the effect of psychological safety on error reporting; 
thus, data was analyzed in two ways to determine the effect of psychological safety on 
nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency as well as the effect of psychological safety 
on the number of error reports submitted by nurses.  First, linear mixed models with random 
effects were used to assess the effect of psychological safety on nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting.  The results of the analysis, presented in Table 8, indicated that the psychological 
safety of nurses positively affected their perceptions of error reporting on the unit.  Next, the 
analysis was repeated with the addition of significant covariates (Appendix 13).  The results 
showed that psychological safety positively affected nurses’ perceptions of error reporting 
when controlling for nurse managers’ education (BSN).  In other words, holding the effect of 
nurse managers’ education constant (BSN), more positive levels of psychological safety by 
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nurses was associated with nurses’ perceptions of greater frequency of error reporting on the 
unit. 
Table 8 
The Effect of Psychological Safety on Nurses’ Perceptions of Error Reporting 
  
n 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Model 1      
Psychological Safety 805 755 0.28 6.56 <.01 
      
Model 1 with Covariate      
Psychological Safety 805 759 0.29 6.51 <.01 
Nurse Manager Education:  
BSN 
 
47 -0.24 -2.95 <.01 
Note.  df = Degrees of Freedom; BSN: Bachelor of Science in Nursing. 
 
Poisson regression models with GEE were then used to determine the effect of 
psychological safety on the number of error reports nurses reported submitting during a 12-
month period.  These results indicated that the psychological safety of nurses negatively 
affected the number of error reports they submitted.  In particular, the more psychologically 
safe nurses felt, the fewer error reports they indicated submitting in the past year.  Next, the 
analysis was repeated with the addition of significant covariates (Appendix 14).  The results 
of these analyses, shown in Table 9, demonstrate that psychological safety negatively 
affected the number of error reports submitted by nurses when controlling for nurse tenure 
and nurse manager education (master’s degree or higher).  In other words, more positive 
levels of psychological safety by nurses was associated with fewer numbers of error reports 
by nurses when controlling for the length of time nurses worked on the unit and for the nurse 
managers’ education (master’s degree or higher). 
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Table 9 
The Effect of Psychological Safety on Number of Error Reports Submitted 
 
 
n 
Estimated 
Slope 
 
SE 
Z 
score 
95% CI p 
value LL UL 
Model 1        
Psychological Safety 809 -0.19 .09 -2.04 -0.37 -0.01 .04 
       
 
Model 1 with Covariates       
Psychological Safety 742 -0.22 .10 -2.34 -0.41 -0.04 .02 
Nurse Tenure  -0.02 .01 -2.34 -0.04 -0.003 .02 
Nurse Manager 
Education:  Master’s 
degree or higher 
 0.87 .20 4.24 0.46 1.26 <.01 
Note.  SE:  standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
Research Question 4: Do Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness Indirectly Affect 
Error Reporting Through Psychological Safety?  
To address Research Question 4, mediation testing was first used to determine 
whether psychological safety mediated the relationship between the safety climate, both unit 
environment and interprofessional relationships, and nurse perceptions of error reporting, as 
well as the relationship between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting frequency on the unit.  There were four steps used in this mediation analysis.  
Briefly, and as described in Chapter 3, Step 1 assessed the total effect of the individual 
predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional 
relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the outcome variable, nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting.  Step 2 assessed the effect of individual predictor variables (safety climate-unit 
environment, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the 
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mediator variable, psychological safety.  Step 3 assessed the direct effect of the individual 
predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional 
relationships, and leader inclusiveness) and the mediator variable (psychological safety) on 
the outcome variable, nurse perceptions of error reporting.  Finally, Step 4 assessed the 
indirect effects of the predictor variables (safety climate-unit environment, safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness) on the outcome variable (nurse 
perceptions of error reporting) through the mediator (psychological safety).  
Steps 1, 2, and 3 were conducted using linear mixed models with random effects to 
account for any within unit correlation.  Step 4 of the mediation analysis was conducted 
using bootstrap confidence intervals with bias correction and 1000 resamples on the change 
in slope (MacKinnon et al., 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Knafl, 
personal correspondence, http://www.unc.edu/~gknafl/software.html).  In the mediation 
analysis, only observations with no missing data were used to maintain consistent sample 
sizes for all of the mediation models.  Doing so reduced the sample size for all steps of the 
mediation analysis (n = 779).  The findings from the mediation analysis for Steps 1, 2, and 3 
are found in Table 10, and Step 4 is found in Table 11.  Taken together, these findings 
indicated the following: (a) psychological safety mediated the relationship between safety 
climate-interprofessional relationships and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting, (b) 
psychological safety did not mediate the relationship between safety climate-unit 
environment and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting, and (c) psychological safety 
mediated the relationship between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting. 
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Table 10 
Steps 1-3 of the Mediation Analysis for Psychological Safety 
 
Mediation Analysis 
 
n 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
      
Step 1      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 779 729 0.59 12.3 < .01 
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
779 729 0.45 10.7 < .01 
Leader Inclusiveness 779 729 0.03 7.02 < .01 
      
Step 2      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 779 729 0.68 20.7 < .01 
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
779 729 0.37 10.9 < .01 
Leader Inclusiveness 779 729 0.27 10.5 < .01 
      
Step 3      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 779 
728 
 
0.61 
 
10.3 
 
< .01 
 
Psychological Safety 779 728 -0.04    -0.69   .49 
      
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
779 
728 
 
0.40 
 
8.94 
 
< .01 
 
Psychological Safety 779 728 0.14 3.03 < .01 
      
Leader Inclusiveness 779 728 0.19 5.17 < .01 
Psychological Safety 779 728 0.20 4.22 < .01 
Note.  df = Degrees of Freedom. 
  
 101 
Table 11 
Step 4 of the Mediation Analysis for Psychological Safety 
 
 
Mediation Analysisa 
95% 
Lower 
Bound 
 
 
Mid-Value 
 
95% Upper 
Bound 
 
Step 4 
   
Leader Inclusiveness 0.03 0.05 0.08 
    
Safety Climate—Interprofessional Relationship 
 
0.02 0.05 0.08 
Note.  aBootstrap confidence intervals with bias correction and 1000 resamples were used for the analysis. 
 
 Next, the four-step mediation analysis was repeated with the addition of significant 
covariates.  The results of this analysis with significant covariates for each step of the 
analysis are displayed in Tables 12 and 13.  Despite the addition of covariates to the 
mediation analysis, the effect of psychological safety on the relationship between safety 
climate-unit environment and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting was not significant.  
Thus, even after the addition of significant covariates, there was no evidence to support 
psychological safety as a mediator between safety climate-unit environment and nurses’ 
perceptions of error reporting. 
 Another mediation analysis was conducted to determine whether psychological safety 
mediated the relationship between safety climate and leader inclusiveness and the number of 
error reports submitted by nurses.  The results of this analysis did not support the role of 
psychological safety as a mediator (Appendix 15).  Next, the mediation analysis was repeated 
with the addition of significant covariates.  Again, no support was found for psychological 
safety as a mediator of the relationship between safety climate-unit environment or 
interprofessional relationships and the number of error reports submitted by nurses, or of the 
relationship between leader inclusiveness and the number of error reports submitted by 
nurses (Appendix 16). 
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Table 12 
Steps 1-3 of the Mediation Analysis for Psychological Safety with Significant Covariates 
 
Mediation Analysis 
 
n 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
      
Step 1      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 779 729 0.59 12.5 < .01 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.29 -3.47 < .01 
      
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
779 729 0.45 10.8 < .01 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.25 -3.20 < .01 
      
Leader Inclusiveness 779 729 0.24 7.21 < .01 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.28 -3.34 < .01 
      
Step 2      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 779 729 0.68 20.7 < .01 
      
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
779 729 0.37 10.9 < .01 
      
Leader Inclusiveness 779 729 0.27 10.5 < .01 
      
Step 3      
Safety Climate-Unit Environment 
Psychological Safety 
779 728 
728 
0.61 
-0.04 
10.4 
-0.75 
< .01 
.45 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.29 -3.49 < .01 
      
Safety Climate-Interprofessional 
Relationships 
Psychological Safety 
779 728 
728 
0.40 
0.14 
9.05 
3.08 
< .01 
< .01 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.25 -3.24 < .01 
      
Leader Inclusiveness 
Psychological Safety 
779 
728 
728 
0.19 
0.19 
5.33 
4.18 
< .01 
< .01 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)  47 -0.28 -3.25 < .01 
Note.  df = Degrees of Freedom; Bachelor of Science in Nursing 
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Table 13 
Step 4 of the Mediation Analysis for Psychological Safety with Significant Covariate 
Mediation Analysis a 
95% Lower 
Bound 
 
Mid-Value 
95% Upper 
Bound 
    
Step 4    
Safety Climate-Interprofessional Relationships 0.02 0.05 0.07 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)    
    
Leader Inclusiveness 0.03 0.05 0.08 
-Nurse Manager Education (BSN)    
Note.  BSN:  Bachelor of Science in Nursing; aBootstrap confidence intervals with bias correction and 
1000 resamples were used for the analysis. 
 
Additional Analyses 
 Because there were two measures for the outcome variable of error reporting in this 
study, and because the results for those two measures demonstrated seemingly conflicting 
results, an additional analysis was conducted to determine whether nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting predicted the number of error reports they submitted over a year (Appendix 
17).  Poisson regression models were used with GEE to model the within unit correlations.  
The results of the analyses were not statistically significant.  Next, the model was repeated 
with the addition of significant covariates (Appendix 14).  These results also indicated that, 
even after controlling for significant covariates, nurses’ perceptions of error reporting did not 
predict the number of error reports they submitted (Appendix 17). 
Summary of Study Results 
 The major findings of this study suggested that nurses’ perceptions of safety climate-
unit environment, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness 
positively affected nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency on the unit when 
 104 
controlling for nurse manager degree (BSN).  In contrast, safety climate-unit environment, 
after controlling for nurse tenure and nurse managers’ education (master’s degree or higher), 
negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted by nurses.  Safety climate-
interprofessional relationships, after controlling nurse managers’ education (master’s degree 
or higher), negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted by nurses.  Also, 
leader inclusiveness, after controlling for nurse managers’ education (master’s degree or 
higher), negatively affected the number of error reports nurses submitted during the previous 
12-month period. Thus, while safety climate and leader inclusiveness positively affected 
nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency on the unit, those same variables negatively 
affected the number of error reports that individual nurses reported submitting over a 12-
month period.  
 Study findings also demonstrated that the psychological safety of nurses was 
positively affected by their perceptions of the safety climate-unit environment, their 
perceptions of the safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and their perceptions of the 
inclusiveness of their nurse manager.  Further, nurses’ perceptions of psychological safety 
positively affected their perception of error reporting on the unit when controlling for nurse 
managers’ education (BSN), but negatively affected the number of error reports they 
submitted when controlling for nurse tenure on the unit and nurse managers’ education 
(master’s degree or higher). 
The mediation analyses showed that psychological safety mediated the relationship 
between safety climate-interprofessional relationships and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting on the unit when controlling for nurse managers’ education (BSN).  Psychological 
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safety also mediated the relationship between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting when controlling for nurse managers’ education (BSN). 
Finally, additional analyses were performed to determine whether there was a 
relationship between the two measures of error reporting in this study, nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting and the number of error reports submitted by nurses over a 12-month period.  
The results of those analyses, even after controlling for significant covariates, indicate there 
was no relationship between these two measures of error reporting. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented the results of analyses examining the relationship between 
nursing unit or team factors (safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety) 
and error reporting.  With few exceptions, the regression models predicted that safety 
climate, both unit environment and interprofessional relationships, leader inclusiveness, and 
psychological safety positively affected nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on 
the unit and negatively affected the number of error reports submitted by nurses on the unit.  
Further, the mediation analyses indicated that psychological safety is an important mediator 
between safety climate-interprofessional relationships and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting frequency on the unit and also between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ 
perceptions of error reporting.  The models allowed the most important variables affecting 
nurses’ error reporting behaviors to be identified and allowed research questions to be tested. 
Chapter 5 will discuss major study findings, including possible explanations of the 
findings in light of current trends in nursing and health care.  Specific recommendations will 
be made regarding practice and policy-making, future research and data collection efforts to 
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improve our understanding of nurses’ error reporting behaviors, and foster better reporting of 
errors among health care professionals. 
  
 107 
 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Knowledge of and about error reporting is essential for nursing and healthcare 
leaders.  This study was conducted to add to the existing body of knowledge by investigating 
factors associated with and impacting nurses’ error reporting.  The model of work-team 
learning guided the selection of salient variables for study (Edmondson, 1999).  Study 
questions aimed to identify whether the nursing team factors of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety influenced nurses’ error-reporting behaviors. 
This chapter presents a discussion of major study findings.  The first section contains 
a summary of research findings and general conclusions drawn from these findings relative 
to error reporting.  The chapter is organized by the relationships examined in the study, 
followed by a discussion of the significant covariates to error reporting, and additional 
analyses that were completed.  Next, study limitations are explored followed by an 
examination of the implication of study findings for future theory, research, practice, and 
policy.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that almost all of the major findings in this 
study were statistically significant.  However, because there was a large sample size for the 
study, care should be used in interpreting these findings when the reported correlation is less 
than .30.  Thus, there are some findings that are statistically significant, but the practical 
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value of the findings should be interpreted with caution when only a small amount of 
variance is explained by the independent variable. 
Summary and Interpretation of Major Study Findings 
The Effect of Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness on Error Reporting 
 The findings from this study demonstrated that nurses’ perceptions of the safety 
climate on their unit (as unit environment and interprofessional relationships) and the leader 
inclusiveness of their nurse manager positively predicted perceptions of the frequency of 
error reporting on their unit.  These findings are consistent with the model of work-team 
learning, which posits that context support (i.e., safety climate in this study) and team 
leadership (i.e., leader inclusiveness in this study) affect team learning behavior (i.e., error 
reporting in this study).  This finding is also consistent with prior research that demonstrates 
a positive relationship between unit-level climate and nurse manager leadership with error 
reporting by clinicians (Edmondson, 1999; Richter et al., 2014).  Thus, if the nursing unit is 
perceived to have a strong safety climate and nurse managers are perceived to be inclusive 
leaders, nurses believe that the error-reporting practices on their unit are such that more 
errors and near misses are reported. 
The study also demonstrated that both dimensions of safety climate and leader 
inclusiveness negatively predicted the number of error reports that nurses acknowledged 
submitting.  Findings suggest that a stronger safety climate and positive leader inclusiveness 
result in fewer error reports submitted by nurses.  This is a surprising finding, given that 
these same factors positively predicted nurses’ perceptions of error reporting. 
One possible explanation for this finding comes from qualitative studies that have 
identified alternate reporting methods that sometimes replace the submission of formal error 
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reports by nurses.  Espin and colleagues (2007) reported that nurses engaged in both formal 
error reporting (i.e., error reports submitted through a hospital’s error-reporting system) and 
informal error reporting (i.e., verbally discussing errors with team colleagues or manager).  
They noted that when nurses chose to informally report errors across professions (e.g., to a 
physician) that the behavior depended on the degree of confidence they felt in their 
relationships with team colleagues.  These same mechanisms may be at work on nursing 
units with strong team safety climates and leadership.  When nurses feel supported by the 
team structures in place, they feel free to discuss errors that occur with their team colleagues 
and nurse managers in a way that fulfills their obligation to formally report errors.  In 
contrast, nurses who work in less supportive environments, characterized by nurses’ 
perceptions of a weaker safety climate and lower levels of leader inclusiveness by the nurse 
manager, may submit more error reports because the available reporting option allows them 
the security of anonymity and confidentiality.   
An alternate explanation for the findings is that nurses’ perceptions of positive safety 
climates and leader inclusiveness on nursing units lead to safer care.  Thus, there are fewer 
error reports on these nursing units because there are actually fewer errors.  There is some 
evidence from the literature that this may be the case.  For example, Hofmann and Mark 
(2006) reported that safety climate on nursing units was negatively associated with the actual 
number of medication errors, which the researchers measured as the number of errors 
reported that resulted in “harm” to patients.  Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) also observed that 
more positive team leadership and safety organizing on the nursing unit resulted in fewer 
reported medication errors.  However, error detection has been described as a confluence of 
the number of actual errors that occur as well as the willingness of clinicians to report.  Thus, 
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the explanation of why more positive safety climates and inclusive leadership behaviors in 
nursing units predicted fewer numbers of error reports in this study is likely more complex 
than just differing reporting methods or altogether safer care.  
Another explanation of the difference in findings may be due to the fact that the two 
measures of error reporting had a different focus.  The measure of nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting was worded such that nurses were responding to their perceptions of error 
reporting on their unit.  In contrast, the number of error reports submitted by nurses was 
worded in such a way that the item reflected individuals’ behaviors.  So it could be that the 
differences in findings are attributable to how the items were measured because nurses’ 
perceptions of reporting on the unit differed from their own, individual reporting behavior.  
Ultimately, the study findings emphasize the need for better measures of error reporting and 
more sophisticated research methods that can uncover and better explain how team factors 
affect error reporting. 
The Effect of Safety Climate and Leader Inclusiveness on Psychological Safety 
 The findings from this study indicate that both safety climate and leader inclusiveness 
positively affected psychological safety; that is, nurses who worked in teams with a strong 
safety climate and for inclusive nurse managers reported higher levels of psychological 
safety.  These findings provide support for the model of work-team learning and also 
demonstrate that safety climate, an area of context support, and leader inclusiveness, a type 
of team leadership behavior, are important elements of team structure that influence team 
safety beliefs and the psychological safety of the team (Edmondson, 1999).  Therefore, safety 
climates in units and leader inclusiveness of nurse managers are both important influences on 
nurses’ perceptions of psychological safety.  
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The Effect of Psychological Safety on Error Reporting 
 This study’s findings indicated that psychological safety positively affected nurses’ 
perceptions of error reporting on the unit, so that higher levels of psychological safety were 
associated with higher levels of nurses’ perceptions of the frequency of error reporting on 
their unit.  These findings demonstrate that psychological safety is important in determining 
how nurses perceive the reporting practices on their unit.  When nurses experience greater 
psychological safety, they perceive that there is more error reporting occurring on their unit.  
These findings, in fact, support and are consistent with the model of work-team learning.  
The study findings also indicated that psychological safety negatively affected the 
number of error reports that nurses recall submitting during the past year, so that higher 
levels of psychological safety was associated with nurses submitting fewer error reports.  
This finding may be explained by the fact that, as nurses feel safer, they also engage in more 
informal reporting such as discussing errors face-to-face with managers and peers.  This 
informal error reporting, in turn, is believed to take the place of error reporting through a 
hospital’s formal reporting systems. 
However, this explanation does not help to put into context the results that lower 
levels of psychological safety were associated with nurses submitting a higher number of 
error reports.  These findings are difficult to explain in light of research suggesting that 
psychological safety is a shared team belief stemming from team members feeling safe 
talking about errors and raising concerns encountered in the work environment (Edmondson, 
1996, 1999).  In this context, one would expect that when psychological safety is poor, 
nurses would shy away from speaking up about errors.  Perhaps these findings demonstrate 
that nurses who work in unhealthy work environments, characterized by a manager whose 
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behaviors do not convey the inclusive leadership behaviors of openness and accessibility to 
staff and a climate in which safety is not prioritized, submit more error reports because the 
error reporting systems provides them a confidential and anonymous option for reporting 
errors.  In other words, nurses working in settings where they do not feel psychologically 
safe may choose to report errors through confidential and anonymous error reporting systems 
because they feel more psychologically safe doing so.  This explanation is supported by past 
research demonstrating that nurses sometimes use error reporting as a defensive tool to 
protect themselves from the possibility of perceived future threats (Lederman et al., 2013).  It 
may be inferred that in circumstances where nurses do not feel safe speaking directly with 
their managers or peers about unsafe practices, they submit a greater number of anonymous 
error reports through the error-reporting system because they view this as a “safe” way to 
document problems and put them in the hands of others who can address problems they 
observe in patient care and, at the same time, fulfill their fiduciary responsibility of reporting 
the error and protecting themselves from negative repercussions. 
The findings that psychological safety positively predicted nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting and negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted by nurses are 
confusing.  The difference in results is likely due to differences in the measurement of error 
reporting.  These seemingly opposing findings highlight the need for better measures of error 
reporting.  
The Mediating Effect of Psychological Safety 
This study’s results indicated that psychological safety mediated two relationships in 
the model.  First, the findings demonstrated that psychological safety mediated the 
relationship between one dimension of the safety climate, interprofessional relationships, and 
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nurses’ perceptions of error reporting.  This is interesting because psychological safety only 
mediated one aspect of safety climate (interprofessional relationships) and because the 
dimension it mediated relates to relationships with and availability on the unit of physicians 
and other clinicians (i.e., pharmacists).  Thus, this finding emphasizes the importance of 
psychological safety in explaining the relationship of interpersonal aspects of safety climate 
and error reporting.  Past studies examining nurses’ use of formal and informal reporting 
practices also reported that many nurses feared speaking up about errors they observed, 
especially when the error related to someone with higher levels of authority and scope of 
practice (e.g., physicians), which points to the power differential that nurses often feel when 
interacting with physicians (Espin et al., 2007, 2010).  The findings from this study suggest 
that psychological safety helps to explain how the interprofessional aspects of safety climate 
affect nurses’ perceptions about error reporting. 
Second, psychological safety mediated the relationship between leader inclusiveness 
and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency.  In other words, leader inclusiveness 
indirectly affected nurses’ perceptions of error reporting through psychological safety.  
Notably, the study did not find support for psychological safety as a mediator between either 
dimension of safety climate and the number of error reports submitted by nurses or the 
relationship between leader inclusiveness and the number of error reports submitted by 
nurses.  Past studies have not examined the mediating role of psychological safety between 
team factors and error reporting.  This study suggests that in some cases, psychological safety 
helps to explain how team factors affect error reporting.  Thus, there is a need for more study 
to help us better understand the situations and contexts in which psychological safety helps to 
explain the relationships between team factors and error reporting. 
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Study Covariates 
 Nurse characteristics.  Several individual-level nurse characteristics were examined 
in this study based on past research: nurse education, nurse experience, and nurse tenure.  
Only one of these characteristics, nurse education, was predictive of nurses’ perceptions of 
error-reporting frequency on the unit.  Specifically, nurses with a diploma degree perceived 
that when errors occurred on their unit, they were reported with greater frequency than did 
nurses with different educational preparations.  Based on this study and existing research on 
error reporting, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about this finding.  However, it 
may be that nurses with a diploma degree hold more positive attitudes about the work 
environment than nurses from other educational backgrounds, and/or are more aware of how 
and when to report errors through their educational and practice experiences and assume that 
others on their unit behave similarly. 
Two nurse characteristics, nurse education and nurse tenure, were predictive of the 
number of error reports submitted by nurses.  First, nurses with a master’s degree or higher 
reported submitting the highest number of error reports.  This finding may partially be 
explained because nurses, through master’s and doctoral programs, become more aware of 
and knowledgeable about the importance of error reports in organizations, and in turn report 
more errors.  It could also mean that nurses with higher levels of education are more vigilant 
in reporting errors to protect themselves and their organization from risk. 
The second significant covariate for the number of error reports submitted by nurses 
was nurse tenure: there was an inverse relationship between tenure and the number of error 
reports nurses recalled submitting on their units.  In other words, nurses employed on their 
units for a longer period of time recalled submitting fewer error reports.  This finding may 
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indicate that nurses who have been employed on a unit for a longer period of time have a 
better understanding of what constitutes an error and report errors more appropriately.  The 
finding may also mean that nurses with greater unit tenure overlook many errors that occur 
on the unit, prioritize the reporting of errors based on the impact to patients, or feel less 
inclined to report errors to protect themselves or their unit colleagues.  For these reasons, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about this finding, but further examination of nurses’ unit tenure 
and error reporting is warranted. 
 Nursing unit characteristics.  Several nursing unit characteristics were also included 
as covariates in the study: nurse manager education, nurse manager tenure, unit size, and type 
of unit.  One of these, nurse manager education, predicted nurses’ perceptions of frequency 
of error reporting on the unit.  Specifically, nurses who worked on a unit where the nurse 
manager had a bachelor’s degree in nursing as their highest degree perceived a lower 
frequency of error reporting on their unit, while nurses who worked on a unit where the nurse 
manager held a master’s degree or higher perceived a higher frequency of error reporting.  
Similarly, nurse managers’ education levels significantly predicted the number of error 
reports submitted by nurses on the unit.  Nurses who worked on a unit led by a nurse 
manager with a bachelor’s degree reported submitting fewer error reports, while nurses who 
worked on a unit with a nurse manager prepared with a master’s degree or higher reported 
submitting more error reports.  
One explanation for these findings is that nurse managers who are prepared with a 
graduate degree may have a greater understanding of error reports and foster learning from 
errors throughout the unit.  Thus, nurses who work on these units value error reporting in a 
way that nurses working on units with managers prepared with bachelor’s degrees do not.  
 116 
Another possibility is that nurses working on units with managers prepared with master’s 
degrees are led in a way that is different than those who work on units led by nurse managers 
with a bachelor’s degree.  This fundamental difference in unit leadership may result in 
different reporting behaviors by nurses.  For example, nurses working on units led by 
master’s prepared nurse managers may perceive they are empowered to participate in 
decision-making regarding error reporting and the frequency of error reporting, which fosters 
increased reporting of errors.  Interestingly, nurse manager education was the only variable 
where both measures of error reporting (nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on 
the unit and the number of error reports nurses recalled submitting in a year) responded in the 
same way (i.e., positively) to an independent variable.   
The other significant nursing unit level covariate in the study was the type of nursing 
unit on which nurses worked.  There were four types of nursing units identified in the study: 
medical/surgical, ICU, specialty, and other.  The only type of unit that had a significant effect 
on the number of error reports submitted by nurses was the unit categorized as Other.  The 
Other type of units included procedural units and outpatient clinics, as well as other types of 
non-ICUs that were neither medical-surgical nor specialty care units.  Specifically, working 
on an Other unit negatively predicted the number of error reports submitted by nurses.  There 
are many possible reasons that nurses working in these types of units acknowledged 
reporting fewer errors.  For example, it is possible that these types of units have fewer errors 
because of the nature of the care delivered on these units.  Or perhaps the patient populations, 
such as outpatient clinics where fewer activities like medication administration occur, might 
create fewer opportunities for errors to actually occur.  It is also possible that the teams on 
these types of units function differently so that the teams communicate more face-to-face or 
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through other informal reporting practices than through the formal error-reporting system.  
Ultimately, there is not enough information in the data to clearly determine why these types 
of units submitted fewer error reports.  However, this finding does suggest that further 
research is needed to help explain the differences in error reporting between types of units. 
The Relationships between the Two Measures of Error Reporting 
In seeking to make sense of the study findings, further statistical analyses were 
conducted to determine the relationship between nurses’ perceptions of the frequency of error 
reporting on the unit and the number of error reports nurses acknowledged submitting during 
the 12-month period preceding the survey.  These analyses did not reveal a significant 
relationship between the two measures of error reporting, even after controlling for 
covariates.  On the surface, this suggests that there is a disconnect between nurses’ 
perceptions of error reporting frequency on the nursing unit and their actual reporting 
behavior, to the extent that actual behaviors can be determined via the use of a self-report 
measure of error reporting.  It may also be that because nurses’ perceptions of error reporting 
focused on unit level reporting behaviors, and the estimate of the number of error reports 
focused on the individual level of error reporting behavior, nurses viewed these two measures 
of error reporting differently. 
Thus, measurement issues may explain the difference in findings.  Interestingly, 
AHRQ (2015) recently released a statement indicating they removed several items from the 
newest version 2.0 of the HSOPSC.  Two of the items that were changed or removed from 
the survey were from the Frequency of Event Reporting Scale (AHRQ, n.d.), used in this 
study to measure nurses’ perceptions of error reporting frequency on their unit.  This 
suggests that there may have been measurement issues related to these two items that 
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prompted AHRQ to remove them from future versions of the survey.  Altogether, the 
differences in findings between the two measures of error reporting in this study are puzzling 
and highlight the need for deeper study of error reporting. 
Summary of Major Findings 
 In summary, this study’s findings demonstrated that safety climate and leader 
inclusiveness on unit-level teams positively predicted nurses’ perceptions of error reporting.  
Further, the study demonstrated that those same team factors of safety climate and leader 
inclusiveness positively affected psychological safety, which in turn positively predicted 
nurses’ perceptions of error reporting.  Finally, psychological safety mediated the 
relationship between the interprofessional relationships dimension of safety climate and 
nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the unit, as well as the relationship 
between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the 
unit.  Thus, psychological safety helped to explain how these two variables that reflect team 
relationships, safety climate-interprofessional relationships, and leader inclusiveness affected 
nurses’ perceptions of error-reporting frequency on nursing units in hospitals. 
 The study findings also demonstrated that the team factors of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety all negatively predicted the number of error reports 
that nurses submitted through error-reporting systems.  These findings were surprising 
because they do not support the model of work-team learning, which would lead us to believe 
that these team factors should positively, not negatively, predict the number of error reports 
submitted by nurses.  Thus, alternate explanations for the findings were explored.  First, there 
is the possibility that nurses who work on nursing units with more positive team factors of 
leader inclusiveness, safety climate, and psychological safety may choose more informal 
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error reporting methods over submitting error reports through the formal error-reporting 
system.  Another explanation might be that nursing units with more positive team factors 
actually make fewer errors, and therefore they submit fewer error reports because there are 
fewer errors that actually occur.  Ultimately, the study findings reinforce the complex nature 
of error reporting in hospitals that have been reported by others (Lederman et al., 2013).  
Altogether, this study’s findings raise important implications for future research.  
Limitations  
There are a number of limitations in this study that must be addressed.  First, the 
study used a cross-sectional design to answer the study’s research questions, which means 
that the findings reported represent one snapshot in time.  This limitation is especially 
important to highlight relative to the team factors examined in this study: safety climate, 
leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety.  It may be that the perceptions and beliefs 
held by team members about the nursing team factors examined in the study actually change 
over time and their relationship to error reporting could change as well.  Thus, there is a need 
for future study that investigates team factors over time to establish whether some of the 
findings observed in this study remain.  Further, the use of mediation analysis implies 
causality that cannot be fully supported with cross-sectional, non-experimental data 
(MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; Wong & Laschinger, 2015).  At best, any conclusions about 
causality from this study should be viewed cautiously and causation can only be suggested 
from the theoretical framework, in combination with the study’s findings (Wong & 
Laschinger, 2015).  Instead, this study can be used to provide support for and further 
elucidate aspects of the underlying theoretical framework and to lay the groundwork for 
future study. 
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 Second, the study was conducted in a single hospital.  As a result, the study findings 
are not widely generalizable and should be interpreted cautiously.  However, the findings 
demonstrate that the nursing unit factors included in this study exert an important effect on 
error reporting, and that further study is needed to better tease apart how those factors work 
together to influence error reporting.  This study provides important information that can 
inform the conduct of future study, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Third, there were limitations related to measurement of study variables.  At the outset 
of the study, the intent was to have a perceptual measure of error reporting (i.e., nurses’ 
perceptions of error-reporting frequency on the unit) and an objective measure of error 
reporting (i.e., the actual number of error reports submitted to the error-reporting system at 
the study site).  However, the study investigator was unable to obtain permission from the 
study site hospital to use the actual number of error reports submitted to the error-reporting 
system.  As a result, the second measure of error reporting was a self-report measure from 
study participants, which posed a risk for recall bias because participants were asked to 
estimate the number of error reports they submitted over the last year.  In addition, the two 
measures of error reporting used in the study produced significant but different findings.  
Further statistical analysis revealed that the two measures were not related. 
There were also problems with other scales in the study.  For example, there was no 
identified evidence from the literature that the safety climate survey had ever been factor 
analyzed.  When a factor analysis was performed in this study, there was support for at least 
a 2-factor solution.  In addition, the 5-item psychological safety scale used in this study had 
poor reliability with an initial α = .66.  When a single item was removed because study 
participants found it confusing and because it had poor inter-item correlation, the Cronbach’s 
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alpha improved to .70.  Finally, the leader inclusiveness scale demonstrated high inter-item 
correlations suggesting that scale items were redundant.  Every scale used in this study was 
problematic, which may have affected the study findings and highlights the need for more 
valid and reliable measures of the variables of interest.    
There were also a number of limitations related to the use of a survey questionnaire 
for data collection.  Because a survey questionnaire was used to collect data for the study, 
there was no opportunity to explore, in particular, why the two measures of error reporting 
generated such different results.  While the survey included an open-ended question at the 
end of the questionnaire that allowed study participants to provide additional information 
they wanted the investigator to be aware of, this question did not provide the level of detail 
needed to understand the stark difference in results between the two measures of error 
reporting.  This suggests that qualitative or mixed methods studies would better enable 
researchers to understand and explain how team factors influenced error reporting by nurses 
and why nurses’ perceptions of error reporting on the unit differ from the number of error 
reports they submit. 
The questionnaire was offered to participants in paper form or as a web-based survey.  
Web-based surveys are an efficient and cost-effective way to collect data, but in order to 
ensure anonymity, there was no way to prevent respondents from participating in the survey 
multiple times or to ensure that they completed the survey before submission (Heiervang & 
Goodman, 2011).  As a result, there were a number of surveys in this study that only had 
partial responses or missing data.  This limitation was addressed in the data analysis by only 
using complete responses for the statistical modeling.   
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A final limitation of this study is common method bias, defined as variance from the 
method of measurement rather than from the variables themselves (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  The greatest risk for common method bias arises from the use of 
perceptual measures for both the independent and dependent variables of the study.  The 
three major independent variables used in the study and one measure of the dependent 
variable, nurses’ perceptions of frequency of error reporting on the unit, all used perceptual 
measures and all gathered data from the same source, nurses in a single hospital.  As a result, 
there is a risk of common method bias that represents a threat to validity (Craighead, 
Ketchen, Dunn, & Hult, 2011).  A number of methods were used to address the risk for 
common method bias.  First, the survey was anonymous, and participants were encouraged to 
answer as honestly as possible.  Second, study participants were told that their participation 
was voluntary, and they could leave any questions they did not want to answer blank or could 
stop the survey at any time.  These tactics were used to address the apprehension that 
individuals may feel related to participating in the study and to minimize any perceived need 
to answer questions in a socially desirable way (Chang, van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010).  
Third, there were different measures of the dependent variable for the study, even though 
responses from these measures did not come from different sources.  By using different types 
of measures, participants may not answer in a mindless way, but instead they have to adjust 
their response to a different type of question, which may help to address common method 
bias (Chang et al., 2010).  Finally, more complicated regression models were used, with 
some models testing for mediation.  The more complex the regression models, the more 
unlikely that common method bias is a threat because the relationships examined are outside 
what participants would anticipate on their own (Chang et al., 2010).   
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Implications for Practice and Policy 
 The study findings have important implications for practice as well as policy.  First, 
the study findings indicated that when safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological 
safety were more positive, nurses reported fewer errors, but when those same team factors 
were more negative, nurses reported more errors.  These findings raise important questions 
about how error reports are viewed and utilized by leaders in healthcare organizations.  That 
is, do hospital administrators view error reports as a way to learn, understand, and improve 
processes and outcomes of care?  Or do they single out individuals who are involved in 
errors?  Or do they use error reporting as a way to manage associated risks? 
Hospital leaders are encouraged to embrace error reports as a way to improve the 
quality and safety of care delivered, which was also advocated over a decade ago by the IOM 
(2000).  Leaders can do this by communicating with staff about the tangible ways that error 
reports are used to improve safety in hospitals so that clinicians understand the value of error 
reporting for creating safer healthcare systems and improving care to patients.  When 
clinicians understand how error reporting improves the safety of care for patients, they are 
much more likely to engage in this activity.  Hospital leaders should also assess the degree to 
which error reporting in their facility is currently used for learning and improvement.  It may 
be that hospitals need better methods for reviewing errors and implementing changes within 
the system to prevent future errors from occurring.  Thus, leaders should explore how error 
reports are currently used in their hospital and the extent to which this information can better 
be used and applied to quality improvement efforts.   
Second, it is possible that known barriers to error reporting (e.g., the time-consuming 
nature of reporting, knowledge deficits about what constitutes a reportable event) frequently 
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cited by researchers (Hartnell et al., 2012; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kaldjian et al., 2008; Mayo & 
Duncan, 2004; Taylor et al., 2004) may help to explain why more positive team factors 
resulted in fewer error reports by nurses in this study.  Organizations should work to address 
known barriers to error reporting while remembering that the goal is not necessarily to 
increase the number of formal error reports per se, but rather to foster the appropriate 
reporting of errors so that organizational learning and improvement can occur.  Thus, 
hospital leaders might consider alternate methods of error reporting that work in combination 
with existing error reporting systems to provide clinicians with a way to report errors that is 
less time consuming and more compatible with their primary focus of patient care.  In 
addition to existing error reporting systems, some hospitals have successfully implemented 
phone error-reporting systems that allow clinicians to call a secure phone number within the 
organization and report errors (Jeffe et al., 2004; Kaprielian, Østbye, Warburton, Sangvai, & 
Michener, 2008).  Quality improvement specialists then review and route the error reports for 
further review and analysis by groups within the organization who can create action plans to 
improve the system in a way that works to prevent similar errors from reoccurring 
(Kaprielian et al., 2008). 
 Third, this study’s findings raise important questions about the education level of 
nurse managers.  Specifically, nurses who worked on units where the nurse manager had a 
master’s degree or higher acknowledged submitting more error reports.  One explanation for 
this finding is that nurses who worked for nurse managers with a graduate degree were 
exposed to ideas and activities that contributed to their broader understanding of the 
importance of error reporting to improving patient care, which translated to greater 
perceptions of and engagement in error reporting by these nurses.  More research is needed to 
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determine if this is the case, but as organizations look to establish policies that target ways 
they can improve the quality and safety of care delivered to patients, considering the effect of 
the education level of nurse managers on their nurses may be important in developing 
strategies for enhancing safety behaviors on and improving the safety climate of the teams 
they lead.  
Implications for Future Research 
 The relationship between the team factors in this study and error reporting are not 
well-explained in the current literature, and the findings of this study highlight the difficulty 
in explaining exactly how safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety 
affect error reporting.  In part, the inability to explain these relationships is due to the 
research design used in the study—a non-experimental, cross-sectional survey design.  
Future studies of error reporting should use different designs, such as mixed methods, that 
allow researchers to explore and explain how these team factors influence error reporting.  
Further, there is a need for studies that use a longitudinal design.  By collecting data over 
time, studies could minimize the risk of common method bias and help researchers determine 
whether the identified effects of the team factors examined in this study are consistent over 
time, especially with respect to error reporting.  Longitudinal or repeated measures would 
also enable mediation testing that allows researchers to better infer causality, which is 
beyond the scope of a cross-sectional study. 
A second implication for future research is the need for valid and reliable measures 
for studying error reporting in hospitals.  There were numerous issues identified in the 
limitations section that pertain to the measurement scales used in this study.  These problems 
highlight the need for reliable and theoretically sound measures that accurately reflect error 
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reporting, as well as team factors such as safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and 
psychological safety.  Without sound methods of measurement, the findings from studies and 
the ability of researchers to accurately draw conclusions are seriously threatened.  Future 
research should thus focus on meeting this need by developing theoretically based and 
psychometrically robust measures for studying error reporting.   
Another important implication for research is the need for greater clarity in how 
errors and error reports are used and interpreted by researchers, which is closely tied to how 
errors are measured.  There is great diversity in how errors are measured.  Some studies 
measure errors as clinicians’ perceptions about error reporting frequency (Hillen et al., 2015; 
Richter et al., 2014) or the number of error reports submitted to a hospital’s error-reporting 
system (Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), and still others use a 
combination of methods to measure errors, such as chart reviews and hospital error reporting 
systems (Edmondson, 1996).  The findings of this study suggest that nurses’ perceptions of 
error reporting are distinct from the number of error reports they submit.  Thus, future 
researchers should use caution when using and interpreting perceptions of error reporting.  
When more robust measures are used (i.e., multiple ways of measuring errors as advocated 
by Edmondson, 1996), then stronger conclusions can be drawn that support and expand our 
understanding of error reporting as well as safety in hospitals. 
This study provides evidence that the nursing team factors of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety are important to error reporting.  However, the exact 
relationships of these factors to error reporting are not fully understood based on this study’s 
findings.  Future research is therefore needed that builds on the findings of this study to 
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include both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, which might better explain how 
team factors interact to affect error reporting. 
Finally, studies are needed to determine the effects of error reports on organizational 
learning and ultimately outcomes of care.  While this level of examination was beyond the 
scope of the current study, there is evidence to suggest that errors are underreported in 
hospitals (Levinson 2012; Sari et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2004), yet remain essential to 
organizational learning in hospitals (Edmondson, 2004; IOM, 2000).  Until organizational 
researchers can demonstrate that error reports are a vehicle through which organizational 
leaders can learn from errors to improve systems of care in a way that future errors are 
prevented, there may be little emphasis on using error reporting as a way to learn from 
mistakes and provide safer care.  Thus, research is needed that establishes a link between 
error reports, learning at the team and organizational levels, and important outcomes of care 
related to safety and quality. 
 In summary, this study provides several implications for future research.  First, there 
is a need for diverse methods of research in hospitals that do not solely rely on survey data 
and staff perceptions when studying organizational phenomena.  Second, the validity of 
measures used in this and other studies of healthcare organizational phenomena indicate a 
strong need for more accurate and precise measures of complex variables.  Third, this study’s 
findings challenge researchers to use more robust measures of error reporting in order to 
further the science and our collective understanding about error reporting and patient safety 
in hospitals.  Fourth, this study’s findings emphasize the importance of further investigations 
of the team factors of safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological safety in 
relation to error reporting and suggests that different study methodologies that incorporate 
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both quantitative and qualitative data might help to better explain how team factors in 
hospitals affect error reporting.  Finally, research is needed that establishes a link between 
error reports, learning at the team and/or organizational level, and outcomes of care.  
Implications of the Findings to Theory 
 This study’s findings suggest that the team factors investigated in this study, rooted in 
the model of work-team learning, are important to the phenomenon of error reporting.  The 
study findings partially support the model of work-team learning by demonstrating that there 
is a positive relationship between safety climate, leader inclusiveness, and psychological 
safety.  These relationships are important because to the investigator’s knowledge, this is the 
first time that the model of work-team learning has been applied to studying nursing teams in 
hospitals.  The findings of this study reinforce the supposition that team context support and 
team leadership behavior are important to the team beliefs about safety purported by the 
theoretical model.  In addition, the results of the study further support the model by 
demonstrating that psychological safety mediates the relationships between one aspect of 
safety climate, interprofessional relationships, and nurses’ perceptions of error reporting, as 
well as the relationship between leader inclusiveness and nurses’ perceptions of error 
reporting.  
However, the difference in findings between the two measures of error reporting (i.e., 
perceptions about frequency of error reporting and number of error reports) raises important 
questions about the use of the model of work-team learning in studying error reporting.  
Based on the study findings, it may be that error reporting is a precursor to team learning 
behavior, such that error reporting informs organizations to learn.  Future research is needed 
to more fully explore the role of error reporting in teams and how teams learn from error 
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reporting.  The model of work-team learning introduces important constructs and concepts 
for studying error reporting.  Future research is needed to more fully understand how those 
constructs and concepts relate to error reporting and team learning in nursing units. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 This study demonstrates that the team dynamics of safety climate, leader 
inclusiveness, and psychological safety are important to error reporting.  This knowledge is 
important for nurse and health care leaders and researchers, who can use this study’s findings 
as a basis for developing and evaluating improved methods for error reporting and in turn 
delivering safe, high-quality, patient care.  Error reporting in hospitals is a complex 
phenomenon that warrants additional study.  Only when the importance of error reporting to 
organizational learning is thoroughly examined and better understood will future 
improvements in care delivery be achieved.  Insights gained from this and future studies can 
be used by healthcare leaders to design and implement more effective systems for delivering 
safe, high-quality care to patients in hospitals.  As continued emphasis is placed on 
improving quality and patient safety in hospitals, understanding how to enhance error 
reporting is necessary for the purpose of preventing errors and significantly improving the 
systems of healthcare delivery. 
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APPENDIX 1: FREQUENCY OF EVENT REPORTING SCALE 
 
 
Frequency of Event Reporting (AHRQ, n.d.) 
Items from the Original Scale Items as Used in the Survey for this Study 
1.  When a mistake is made, but is caught 
and corrected before affecting the patient, 
how often is this reported? 
1.  When an error is made on this unit, but is 
caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is it reported? 
2.  When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? 
2.  When an error is made on this unit, but 
has no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is it reported? 
3.  When a mistake is made that could harm 
the patient, but does not, how often is this 
reported? 
3.  When an error is made on this unit that 
could harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is it reported? 
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APPENDIX 2: SAFETY CLIMATE SURVEY 
 
 
Safety Climate Survey (Thomas et al., 2005) 
Items from the Original Scale Items as Used in the Survey for this Study 
1.  The culture of this clinical area makes it 
easy to learn from the mistakes of others. 
1.  The culture on my unit makes it easy to 
learn from the mistakes of others. 
2.  Medical errors are handled appropriately 
in this clinical area. 
2.  When an error occurs on my unit, it is 
handled appropriately. 
3.  The senior leaders in my hospital listen to 
me and care about my concerns. 
3.  My unit management listens to me and 
cares about my concerns. 
4.  The physician and nurse leaders in my 
areas listen to me and care about my 
concerns.1 
4.  The physician leaders on my unit listen to 
me and care about my concerns. 
 
 
5.  The nurse leaders on my unit listen to me 
and care about my concerns. 
5. Leadership is driving us to be a safety-
centered institution. 
6.  Leadership on my unit is driving us to be a 
safety-centered unit. 
6. My suggestions about safety would be 
acted upon if I expressed them to 
management.2 
 
 
7. Management/leadership does not 
knowingly compromise safety concerns for 
productivity. 
7.  Management/Leadership on my unit does 
not knowingly compromise safety concerns 
for productivity. 
8. I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any safety concerns I may have. 
8.  I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any patient safety concerns I may have. 
9. I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety. 
 
9.  I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety I may have 
on my unit. 
10. I receive appropriate feedback about my 
performance. 
10.  I receive appropriate feedback from 
colleagues about my performance. 
11. I would feel safe being treated here as a 
patient. 
11.  I would feel safe being treated as a 
patient here on my unit. 
12. Briefing personnel before the start of a 
shift (i.e., to plan for possible contingencies) 
is an important part of safety. 
12.  Briefing staff before the start of a shift to 
plan for possible contingencies is an 
important part of patient safety here. 
13. Briefings are common here. 13.  Briefings are common on my unit. 
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Safety Climate Survey (Thomas et al., 2005) 
14. I am satisfied with the availability of 
clinical leadership (Physician) 
14.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
physician clinical leadership on my unit. 
15. I am satisfied with the availability of 
clinical leadership (Nursing) 
15.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
nursing clinical leadership on my unit. 
16. I am satisfied with the availability of 
clinical leadership (Pharmacy) 
16.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
pharmacy clinical leadership on my unit. 
17. This institution is doing more for patient 
safety now, than it did one year ago. 
17.  My unit is doing more for patient safety 
now than it did one year ago. 
18. I believe that most adverse events occur 
as a result of multiple system failures, and 
are not attributable to one individual’s 
actions.1 
18.  A commonly held belief on this unit is 
that most errors occur as a result of multiple 
hospital failures.3  
 
19.  When errors occur on my unit, they are 
generally not attributable to one individual's 
actions. 
19. The personnel in this clinical area take 
responsibility for patient safety. 
20.  The staff on my unit takes responsibility 
for patient safety. 
20. Personnel frequently disregard rules or 
guidelines that are established for this 
clinical area. 
21.  The staff on my unit frequently 
disregards established rules or guidelines.3 
 
21. Patient safety is constantly reinforced as 
the priority in this clinical area. 
22.  Patient safety is constantly reinforced as 
the priority on this unit. 
Note.  1 This item was changed from 1 item to 2 separate items.  2 When the paper version of the survey 
was created, this item was inadvertently eliminated from the survey.  The online survey was then created 
from the paper version so no data were collected on this item.  3 These items were eliminated from the 2-
factor solution of the survey because they did not meet the requirement of at least .40 factor loadings. 
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APPENDIX 3: DIMENSIONS AND ITEMS OF THE SAFETY CLIMATE SURVEY 
 
 
Safety Climate Survey 
Safety Climate Survey: 
Unit Environment 
Safety Climate Survey: 
Interprofessional Environment 
1.  Leadership on my unit is driving us to be 
a safety-centered unit. 
1.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
physician clinical leadership on my unit. 
2.  The nurse leaders on my unit listen to me 
and care about my concerns. 
2.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
pharmacy clinical leadership on my unit. 
3.  My unit management listens to me and 
cares about my concerns. 
3.  Briefings are common on my unit. 
 
4.  When an error occurs on my unit, it is 
handled appropriately. 
 
4.  Briefing staff before the start of a shift to 
plan for possible contingencies is an 
important part of patient safety here. 
5.  I am satisfied with the availability of 
nursing clinical leadership on my unit. 
5.  The physician leaders on my unit listen to 
me and care about my concerns. 
6.  The culture on my unit makes it easy to 
learn from the mistakes of others. 
 
7.  I would feel safe being treated as a 
patient here on my unit. 
 
8.  Management/Leadership on my unit does 
not knowingly compromise safety concerns 
for productivity. 
 
9.  Patient safety is constantly reinforced as 
the priority on this unit. 
 
10.  The staff on my unit take responsibility 
for patient safety. 
 
11.  I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any patient safety concerns I may 
have. 
 
12.  I receive appropriate feedback from 
colleagues about my performance. 
 
13.  I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety I may 
have on my unit 
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Safety Climate Survey 
14.  My unit is doing more for patient safety 
now than it did one year ago. 
 
15.  When errors occur on my unit, they are 
generally not attributable to one individual's 
actions. 
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APPENDIX 4: INCLUSIVE LEADERSHIP SCALE 
 
 
Inclusive Leadership (Carmeli et al., 2010) 
Items from the Original Scale Items as Used in the Survey for this Study 
1.  The manager is open to hearing new 
ideas. 
1. The manager on my unit is open to hearing 
new ideas. 
2.  The manager is attentive to new 
opportunities to improve work processes. 
2.  The manager on my unit is attentive to new 
opportunities to improve work processes. 
3.  The manager is open to discuss the 
desired goals and new ways to achieve them. 
3.  The manager on my unit is open to discuss 
desired goals and new ways to achieve them. 
4.  The manager is available for consultation 
on problems. 
4.  The manager on my unit is available for 
consultation on problems. 
5.  The manager is an ongoing ‘presence’ in 
this team—someone who is readily 
available. 
5.  The manager is an ongoing presence on my 
unit—someone who is readily available. 
6.  The manager is available for professional 
questions I would like to consult with 
him/her. 
6.  The manager on my unit is available to 
discuss professional questions on which I 
would like to consult with him/her on. 
7.  The manager is ready to listen to my 
requests. 
7.  The manager on my unit is ready to listen 
to my requests. 
8.  The manager encourages me to access 
him/her on emerging issues. 
8.  The manager on my unit encourages me to 
access him/her on emerging issues. 
9.  The manager is accessible for discussing 
emerging problems. 
9.  The manager on my unit is accessible for 
discussing emerging problems. 
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APPENDIX 5: PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY SCALE 
 
 
Psychological Safety (Edmondson, 1999) 
Items from the Original Scale Items as Used in the Survey for this Study 
1.  Members of this team are able to bring up 
problems and tough issues. 
1.  I am able to bring up problems and discuss 
tough issues with others on my unit. 
2.  People on this team sometimes reject 
others for being different. 
2.  People on my unit sometimes reject or 
ignore others for being different. 
3.  It is safe to take a risk on this team. 3.  It is safe to take a risk on my unit.1 
4.  It is difficult to ask other members of this 
team for help. 
4.  It is easy for me to ask other members on 
my unit for help. 
5.  No one on this team would deliberately 
act in a way that undermines my efforts. 
5.  No one I work with would deliberately act 
in a way that undermines my efforts. 
6.  If you make a mistake on this team, it is 
often held against you 
 
7.  Working with members of this team, my 
unique skills and talents are valued and 
utilized. 
   
Note. 1 After data collection, this item was removed because of comments from study 
participants that they found this item confusing.  Further, the item had poor inter-item correlation 
with other items in the scale. 
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APPENDIX 6: NURSE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
 
This research study invites registered nurses working on patient care units at UNC Hospitals to 
help us understand the ways the nursing work environment and other factors influence error 
reporting.  You are one of almost 3,000 nurses invited to complete the survey, which forms the 
basis of my doctoral dissertation at the UNC-Chapel Hill School of Nursing.     
 
There are no known risks, benefits, or costs to you for participating in this study.  Taking part in 
this research is not a part of your University duties, and refusing will not affect your job.  You 
will not be offered or receive any special job-related consideration if you take part in this 
research.  Your responses will be confidential; no one will be able to identify you or your 
answers, and no one will know whether or not you participated.  Data will be reported only in 
aggregate.  The information you and other nurses provide will help us understand the factors that 
influence nurse error reporting, as well as quality and safety in hospitals.    
 
The survey takes most people about 10 minutes to complete.  Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you can skip any question you choose not to answer.  The completion of the 
survey indicates your consent to participate.     
 
Thank you for your participation.  If you have any questions about the study, please contact me 
by email at Lindsay.Thompson@unc.edu or my dissertation chair, Dr. Cheryl Jones, at 
cabjones@email.unc.edu.     
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board at irb_questions@unc.edu and mention 
study number 15-0229. 
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APPENDIX 7: NURSE MANAGER CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
 
This research study invites all nurse managers of patient care units at UNC Hospitals to 
participate in a study examining how the nursing work environment and other factors influence 
error reporting.  You are one of almost 50 nurse managers invited to complete the survey, which 
forms the basis of my doctoral dissertation at the UNC-Chapel Hill School of Nursing.     
 
There are no known risks, benefits, or costs to you for participating in this study.  Taking part in 
this research is not a part of your University duties, and refusing will not affect your job.  You 
will not be offered or receive any special job-related consideration if you take part in this 
research.  Your responses are confidential.  Data will be reported only in aggregate, no individual 
nurse managers or patient care units will be identified.  The information you provide will help us 
understand how nursing work force factors may influence nurse error reporting, as well as 
quality and safety in hospitals.    
 
The survey takes most people about 5 minutes to complete.  Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you can skip any question you choose not to answer.  The completion of the 
survey indicates your consent to participate.     
 
Thank you for your participation.  If you have any questions about the study, please contact me 
by email at Lindsay.Thompson@unc.edu or my dissertation chair, Dr. Cheryl Jones, at 
cabjones@email.unc.edu.     
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board at irb_questions@unc.edu and mention 
study number 15-0229. 
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APPENDIX 8: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Variables n M (SD) % Minimum Maximum 
Nurse Characteristics      
Highest Nursing Education      
Diploma 24  3.0%   
ADN 179  22.3%   
BSN 549  68.4%   
MSN 48  6.0%   
Doctorate 3  0.4%   
      
Nurse Experience (years) 786 11.7 (10)  <1 51 
      
Nurse Tenure (years) 777 6.1 (6.3)  <1 39 
      
Nursing Unit Characteristics      
Highest Nurse Manager Education      
BSN 25  54.4%   
Any master's degree  20  43.5%   
Doctorate 1  2.2%   
      
Nurse Manager Tenure (years) 43 5.3 (4.8)  <1 26 
      
Unit Size      
Number of RN Employees 49 39.9 (28.7)  9 162 
Number of RN FTEs 43 36.0 (25.5)  6.8 137 
      
Type of Unit      
Medical/Surgical 13  26.5%   
ICU 6  12.2%   
Specialty 18  36.7%   
Other 12  24.5%   
Note. ADN: Associate Degree in Nursing; BSN: Bachelor of Science in Nursing; MSN: Master of 
Science in Nursing; RN: Registered Nurse; FTEs:  Full Time Equivalents; ICU:  Intensive Care Units 
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APPENDIX 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN THE STUDY 
 
 
Variables n M (SD)  Minimum Maximum 
     
Dependent Variables     
 
Error reporting (perceived) 
876 3.4 (0.9) 1 5 
 
Error reporting (# of reports submitted) 
 
924 
 
1.9 (3.5) 
 
0 
 
40 
 
Independent Variables 
    
 
Safety Climate- 
     Unit Environment 
     Interprofessional Relationships 
 
 
 
824 
822 
 
 
3.9 (0.7) 
3.7 (0.8) 
 
 
1.6 
1 
 
 
5 
5 
Leader Inclusiveness 847 4.0 (1.0) 1 5 
     
Psychological Safety 842 3.9 (0.7) 1.3 5 
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APPENDIX 10: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR CONTINUOUS 
STUDY VARIABLES AND COVARIATES1 
 
 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
1 Error Reports —          
            
 Safety Climate           
2 - Unit Environment .39* —         
            
3 
- Interprofessional 
   Relationships 
.37* .58* —        
            
4 Leader Inclusiveness .23* .76* .43* —       
            
5 Psychological Safety .24* .61* .36* .39* —      
            
6 Nurse Experience .07 .04 .004 .11* .04 —     
            
7 Nurse Tenure .003 .06 .01 .16* .04 .65* —    
            
8 
Nurse Manager 
Tenure 
.02 .08* .06 .11* .08* .01 .08* —   
            
9 
Unit Size 
(#RN employees) 
.02 .19* .07 .15* .10* .07 .22* — —  
            
10 
Unit Size (#RN 
FTEs) 
.01 .21* .07 .20* .12* .07 .23* — — — 
            
Note.  RN:  Registered Nurse, FTE: Full Time Equivalents; 1 Sample population represents nurse 
responses and ranged from 671 to 859; *p < .05. 
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APPENDIX 11: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR NURSING UNIT 
LEVEL COVARIATES1 
 
 
Variables 1 2 3 
1. Nurse Manager Tenure  —   
2. Unit Size (# RN Employees)  .22 —  
3. Unit Size (# RN FTEs)  .21 .96* — 
Note.  RN: Registered Nurse, FTE: Full Time Equivalents; 1 Sample population represents nursing unit level 
responses, N = 43; *p < .05. 
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APPENDIX 12: COVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY 
 
 
 
Covariate 
 
n 
 
r 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
 
Nurse Educationa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
- Diploma 842  840 0.01 0.08 .94 
- ADN 842  840    -0.04 -0.65 .52 
- BSN 842  840 0.04 0.81 .42 
- MSN or higher degree 842  840 0.05 0.49 .63 
       
Nurse Experienceb 779 .04    .27 
       
Nurse Tenureb 770 -.04    .30 
       
Nurse Manager Educationc        
- BSN 811  47 0.04 0.49 .62 
- Master’s or higher 811  47    -0.01 -0.11 .91 
       
Nurse Manager Tenurec 687  38    -0.01 -0.71 .48 
       
Sizec       
  -Number of RNs  781  44    -0.002 -1.23 .23 
  -Number of FTEs  687  38    -0.003 -1.73 .09 
       
Type of Unitc       
- Medical/Surgical  811  47    -0.02 -0.25 .80 
- ICU 811  47    -0.04 -0.32 .75 
- Specialty 811  47    -0.04 -0.47 .64 
- Other 811  47 0.11 1.08 .29 
Note.  df = degrees of freedom; ADN: Associate Degree in Nursing; BSN: Bachelor of Science in Nursing; MSN: 
Master of Science in Nursing; RN: Registered Nurse; FTEs: Full Time Equivalents; ICU:  Intensive Care Unit; a 
Standard t test for each covariate value one at a time; b Standard Pearson Correlation Coefficient for each of the 
covariates; c Linear mixed models with random effects models to account for within unit correlation used to assess 
each covariate value one at a time.
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APPENDIX 13: COVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR NURSE PERCEPTIONS OF ERROR 
REPORTING 
 
 
 
Covariate 
 
n 
 
r 
 
df 
Estimated 
Slope 
t 
value 
p 
value 
 
Nurse educationa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
- Diploma 876  874  0.37 1.97   .049 
- ADN 876  874  0.12 1.51 .13 
- BSN 876  874   -0.10  -1.52 .13 
- MSN or higher degree 876  874  0.04 0.31 .76 
       
Nurse experienceb 779 -.07    .05 
       
Nurse tenureb 770 .003    .93 
       
Nurse manager 
educationc  
      
- BSN 845  47   -0.22  -2.62      < .01 
- Master’s or higher 845  47  0.20 2.24 .03 
       
Nurse manager tenurec 715  38  0.01 0.55 .58 
       
Sizec       
  -Number of RNs  814  44   -0.001  -1.01 .32 
  -Number of FTEs  715  38   -0.001  -0.71 .49 
       
Type of unitc       
- Medical/Surgical  845  47   -0.12  -1.23 .23 
- ICU  845  47   -0.20  -1.73 .09 
- Specialty  845  47  0.06 0.62 .54 
- Other  845  47  0.22 2.22 .31 
 
Note.  df  = degrees of freedom; ADN: Associate Degree in Nursing; BSN: Bachelor of Science in Nursing; MSN: 
Master of Science in Nursing; RN: Registered Nurse; FTEs: Full Time Equivalents; ICU:  Intensive Care Unit; a  
Standard t test for each covariate value one at a time; b Standard Pearson Correlation Coefficient for each of the 
covariates; c Linear mixed models with random effects models to account for within unit correlation used to assess 
each covariate value one at a time. 
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APPENDIX 14: COVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR THE NUMBER OF ERROR REPORTS 
SUBMITTED BY NURSES 
 
 
 
 
Covariates 
 
 
n 
 
 
df 
 
Estimated 
Slope 
 
 
SE 
 
Z 
Score 
95% CI  
p 
value LL UL 
 
Nurse educationa 
 
 
       
- Diploma  924 1 -0.21 .17 1.64 -0.54 0.11 .20 
- ADN  924 1 -0.01 .06 0.05 -0.13 0.11 .82 
- BSN  924 1 -0.003 .05 0.00 -0.10 0.10 .95 
- MSN or higher  924 1 0.44 .09 26.0 0.27 0.61 <.01 
         
Nurse experiencea 784 1 0.01 .003 3.56 -0.0002 0.01 .07 
         
Nurse tenurea 775 1 -0.02 .004 27.9 -0.03 -0.01 <.01 
         
Nurse managerb 
Education 
        
- BSN  891  -0.59 .22 -2.71 -1.02 -0.16 <.01 
- Master’s or 
higher 
891  0.87 .21 4.13 0.45 1.28 <.01 
         
Nurse manager 
tenureb 
755 
 
-0.003 .02 -0.11 -0.05 0.04 .91 
 
Sizeb 
        
- Number of RNs  859  0.002 .003 0.67 -0.004 0.01 .50 
- Number of FTEs  755  0.01 .01 0.90 -0.01 0.01 .37 
         
Type of unitb         
- Medical/Surgical  891  -0.31 .27 -1.46 -0.72 0.11 .14 
- ICU 891  0.11 .29 0.38 -0.45 0.67 .71 
- Specialty  891  0.50 .25 1.95 -0.002 0.99 .05 
- Other  891  -0.49 .22 -2.23 -1.07 -0.06 .03 
 
Note.  df = degrees of freedom; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; 
ADN = Associate Degree in Nursing; BSN = Bachelor of Science in Nursing; MSN = Master of Science in Nursing; 
RN = Registered Nurse; FTEs = Full Time Equivalents; a   Poisson Regression used to assess each covariate value 
one at a time; b Poisson Regression with GEE models to account for within unit correlation used to assess each 
covariate values one at a time. 
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APPENDIX 15: THE INDIRECT EFFECT OF SAFETY CLIMATE AND LEADER 
INCLUSIVENESS ON ERROR REPORTING1 THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SAFETY 
 
 
 
 
Mediation Analysis 
 
 
n 
 
Estimated 
Slope 
 
 
SE 
 
Z 
score 
95% CI  
p 
value LL UL 
 
Step 1 
       
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
784 -0.22 .08 -2.59 -0.38 -0.05 <.01 
Safety Climate-
Interprofessional 
Environment 
784 -0.34 .11 -3.20 -0.54 -0.13 <.01 
Leader Inclusiveness 784 -0.18 .07 -2.55 -0.32 -0.04 .01 
        
Step 2       
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
784 0.68 .03 20.78 — — <.01 
Safety Climate-
Interprofessional 
Environment 
784 0.36 .03 10.90 — — <.01 
Leader Inclusiveness 784 0.27 .03 10.53 — — <.01 
        
Step 3        
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
Psychological Safety 
784 -0.14 
-0.11 
.09 
.10 
-1.63 
-1.07 
-0.31 
-0.31 
0.03 
0.09 
.11 
.28 
        
Safety Climate-
Interprofessional 
Environment 
Psychological Safety 
784 -0.31 
 
-0.07 
.11 
 
.10 
-2.76 
 
-0.68 
-0.54 
 
-0.25 
-0.09 
 
0.12 
<.01 
 
.50 
        
Leader Inclusiveness 
Psychological Safety 
784 -0.15 
-0.11 
.07 
.09 
-2.11 
-1.24 
-0.30 
-0.29 
-0.01 
0.07 
.03 
.21 
 
Note.  1Error reporting:  The number of error reports submitted by nurses over a 12-month period. 
SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
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APPENDIX 16: THE INDIRECT EFFECT OF SAFETY CLIMATE AND LEADER 
INCLUSIVENESS ON ERROR REPORTING1 THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SAFETY WITH SIGNIFICANT COVARIATES 
 
 
 
 
Mediation Analysis 
 
 
n 
 
 
Estimate 
 
 
SE 
 
Z 
score 
95% CI  
p 
value LL UL 
Step 1        
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
736 -0.22 .09 -2.60 -0.39 -0.05 <.01 
-Tenure 736 -0.02 .01 -2.24 -0.03 -0.002 <.03 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 0.84 .20 4.14 0.44 1.23 <.01 
        
Safety Climate- 
Interprofessional 
Environment 
736 -0.34 .08 -4.16 -0.49 -0.18 <.01 
-Tenure 736 -0.02 .01 -2.40 -0.03 -0.003 .01 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 0.87 .21 4.16 0.46 1.28  
        
Leader Inclusiveness 736 -0.20 .06 3.34 -0.32 -0.08 <.01 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 0.89 .20 4.24 0.47 1.27 <.01 
        
Step 2        
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
736 0.69 .03 20.28 — — <.01 
        
Safety Climate- 
Interprofessional 
Relationships 
736 0.36 .03 10.53 — — <.01 
        
Leader Inclusiveness 736 0.29 .11 10.79 — — <.01 
        
Step 3        
Safety Climate-Unit 
Environment 
736 -0.12 .08 -1.45 -0.28 0.04 .15 
Psychological Safety 736 -0.14 .11 -1.36 -0.35 0.06 .17 
-Tenure 736 -0.02 .01 -2.25 -0.04 -0.003 .03 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 .85 .21 4.13 .45 1.26 <.01 
        
        
Safety Climate- 
Interprofessional 
Relationships 
736 -0.30 .08 -3.74 -0.46 -0.14 <.01 
Psychological Safety 736 -0.09 .09 -0.95 -0.27 0.10 .34 
-Tenure 736 -0.02 .01 -2.43 -0.03 -0.004 .02 
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Mediation Analysis 
 
 
n 
 
 
Estimate 
 
 
SE 
 
Z 
score 
95% CI  
p 
value LL UL 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 0.87 .21   4.18 0.46 1.28 <.01 
        
Leader Inclusiveness 736 -0.17 .06 -2.65 -0.28 -0.05 <.01 
Psychological Safety 736 -0.12 .09 -1.27 -0.30 0.07 .21 
-Nurse Manager Education 
(master’s degree or above) 
736 0.87 .20   4.27 0.47 1.26 <.01 
Note. 1Error reporting:  The number of error reports submitted by nurses over a 12-month period.  SE = standard 
error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
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APPENDIX 17: THE EFFECT OF NURSES’ PERCEPTIONS OF ERROR REPORTING 
ON THE NUMBER OF ERROR REPORTS SUBMITTED 
 
 
  
n 
Estimated 
Slope 
 
SE 
Z 
score 
95% CI p 
value LL UL 
Model 1        
Error Reporting (Perceptions) 842 -0.07 .06 -1.19 -0.19 0.05 .23 
        
Model 1 with Covariates        
Error Reporting (Perceptions) 742 -0.12 .06 -1.89 -0.25 0.004 .06 
Tenure  -0.02 .01 -2.21 -0.04 -0.002 .03 
Nurse Manager Education:  
Master’s degree or higher 
 0.90 .20 4.45 0.50 1.20 <.01 
Note.  SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
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